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Summary
The debate on compensation for medically 
injured patients has continued for many years, 
producing a variety of proposals and
recommendations. Conclusions have been reached
without an adequate understanding of the facts 
surrounding medical negligence cases.
This study attempts to place many of the 
arguments and suggestions into perspective by 
examining both the legal and factual circumstances of 
medical negligence claims.
The thesis is divided into three chapters; the 
first chapter examines the legal requisites of a valid 
claim against a Health Board. or doctor. The 
difficulties of evidence and proof, limitation of 
actions. and access to legal services are 
considered. Judicial policies are examined from the
case law. The analysis suggests that patients face 
many legal and procedural hurdles due to the very 
strict parameters defined by the courts, before a 
claim is successful. The judiciary entertain a
traditional deference to the views of the medical
c
profession about their liability for negligence.
The second chapter is concerned with
ascertaining the factual circumstances of medical
negligence claims, since reliance on judicial records
(viii)
presents a distorted and unrepresentative picture of 
the problem. In addition to providing a quantitative 
assessment, the data validate some of the conclusions 
based on a case law analysis and reject others. The 
procedures for obtaining compensation for medical 
injury demonstrate that the initiation, validation and 
ultimate resolution of a claim place many pressures on 
the patient. The data further suggest that access to 
compensation is constrained by the rules regulating 
the availability of legal aid, and the narrow 
interpretation given to the Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1984. The study shows that 
while delay in resolution of claims is inherent in the 
process, the medical defence organisations use tactics 
which exploit every weakness of the patient's 
bargaining position.
The final chapter examines the scope for 
reform and outlines the general direction these 
considerations indicate. Alternative schemes, either 
complementary to or replacements for the present 
compensation system are considered. They reflect, to 
varying degrees, compromises on a variety of issues, 
yet they fail to deal effectively with the problems 
outlined in the study. In conclusion, the retention 
of delict is favoured following some procedural 
improvements. Greater involvement of the medical 
profession in attempting to reduce the incidence of 
medical injuries is suggested.
(ix)
Preface
Scots and English law attempts to define 
societal expectations for a medical practitioner's 
conduct under varying medical and clinical 
circumstances. It examines, characterises, and
analyses negligent conduct in the context of medical 
practice. This legal task is undertaken by the 
delict/tort system, whereby victims of medical 
injuries may sue for damages on the grounds of 
fault. However, expressions of doubt and concern 
about the usefulness and efficiency of delictual 
liability in this context show no signs of diminishing.
There has been a distinct shortage of any 
quantitative information on medical negligence claims, 
hence the system has been studied and debated with 
relatively little knowledge of the quantitative 
significance of any of its features. Further, the 
examination of cases on medical negligence in the 
published law reports presents a totally inadequate 
and unrepresentative picture of the problem, and much 
is to be learned from the scrutiny of cases which do 
not come to court or are unreported.
This study of medical negligence is an attempt 
to validate and assess these Rebates. Firstly, by 
investigating the authorities. Government reports.
independent studies, and literature relevant to this 
area of law and secondly by examining at source, those 
medical negligence claims which are not pressed as far 
as judicial proceedings or are otherwise unreported. 
The Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland 
permitted access to their claims records in order that 
a more informed and rational discussion on the issues 
could take place. I have constructed and presented 
all the statistical findings in Tables and Diagrams, 
prepared from the analysis of 1,000 cases, in the hope 
that they might facilitate interpretation of my 
results, and have value as reference material for 
future independent studies.
This thesis does not resolve all the issues, 
nor does it provide answers to every difficulty and 
inconsistency present in the medical negligence 
debate. The research meets some of the shortcomings 
in the understanding of medical negligence, and 
presents a firmer foundation based on the abstraction 
of authentic figures.
I have attempted to state the law as at 
September 1, 1986.
Introduction
Concern has been expressed at the quality of 
health care provided in National Health Service 
Hospitals and in medical and dental practice in 
general. It has been suggested that complaints 
initiated by the public against medical and dental 
practitioners are on the increase and that the 
effectiveness of the tort or delict system, based on 
fault, as a mechanism for providing compensation to 
victims of personal injury and in particular, medical 
injury, is unsatisfactory. Indeed, the report in 
1978 by the (Pearson) Royal Commission on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Cmnd. 
7054), which stated at page 284, para. 1326 that,
"The proportion of successful claims for 
damages in tort is much lower for medical 
negligence than for all negligence cases...." 
has led some to assert that the law treats negligence 
in medical and dental practice in a rather special 
way by placing very strict parameters, more strict 
than in other cases, on when compensation for injury 
may be awarded by the courts. Some academics have 
suggested replacing the tort or delict system, as a 
mechanism for compensating those suffering personal 
injury, with a comprehensive state insurance scheme 
similar to the one in New Zealand, providing for 
compensation without need to prove fault.
2The medical profession admit that the art of 
medicine often entails coming to important 
conclusions on limited information and frequently 
diagnosis involves assessing a number of 
probabilities.
Further, response to treatment is sometimes 
capricious, being affected by individual idiosyncrasy 
and inevitably there is a lack of precision in 
diagnosis and treatment. Practitioners contend that 
this is reflected also in complaints when things go 
wrong, that is. there is often subjective as opposed 
to objective dissatisfaction. The profession have 
expressed fears that the American experience of 
medical negligence claims - resulting in the practice 
known as 'defensive medicine' - may become a reality 
in the U.K.
This study of medical negligence is an
attempt to place these debates on a firmer basis, to 
remove some myths, and to suggest a better foundation 
on which future policies for compensation may be 
formulated.
Much of the debate over compensation for 
victims of medical injury has been conducted at a
level which is often removed from the actual 
experiences of both the patient and doctor involved
in a negligence action. This study is, so far as is 
known, the first in the U.K. to investigate
3negligence claims, (i.e., patient dissatisfaction as
represented by complaints arising from medical and 
dental practice in the U.K.), at source. In order
to assess the criticisms levelled at the present 
system of compensation it is essential to understand 
the legal requisites of a valid claim, the legal 
processes involved in raising an action and to
identify the practical difficulties facing 
dissatisfied patients who claim damages. There is 
also a clear need to examine the alternative remedies 
and claims which may exist for an injured patient, 
for example, social security. Before rational and 
effective measures can be taken to avoid or reduce 
the number of such claims being made it is also 
necessary to examine the factual circumstances 
surrounding them. There is not enough knowledge of 
how many claims are made, the kinds of alleged 
negligence, and against whom. There has been no
systematic analysis of the medical specialties, the 
status of the medical practitioners involved, the 
characteristics of claimants or the nature of their 
grievances. In particular legal books and judicial 
statistics do not disclose how many claims are 
intimated but not pressed as far as actions in court, 
how many are settled or withdrawn or otherwise do not 
proceed to trial, and may accordingly give an 
inaccurate picture of the total situation. It is
4hoped that by examining the Scottish records at 
source they will provide useful information in 
relation to the grounds of the complaints and the 
areas of the National Health Service which give rise 
to complaints. This may show how Health Boards
might take appropriate action to reduce the number of 
complaints in places or areas of practice which 
appear to generate larger volumes of complaints.
The study will not end these debates but it 
is hoped that it will provide much fuller and more 
reliable information than was previously available 
about the facts and the legal processes in medical 
negligence cases.
5Chapter 1
The legal processes
This chapter examines the legal circumstances 
in which a claim may be made against a Health Board, 
hospital, doctor or surgeon.
Generally claims made against doctors or 
dentists fall under one or other, but possibly both 
of, two distinct headings: (i) assault; and (ii)
negligence; although it must be emphasised from the 
outset that claims made in the former action are now 
much rarer.1 
(i) Assault
Assault in the context of medical or surgical
2procedures must be distinguished from assault in
1. See Chatterton v. Gerson and Another [1981] 1 All
E.R. 257, where the form of action was considered to 
be negligence rather than assault. See also Reibl v 
Hughes (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1. It has been
suggested by Harlow, C. Compensation and Government 
Torts, at p.47 that the present age is 
"...uncontrovertibly the age of negligence and its 
emergence has been confirmed by the House of 
Lords." See 'trilogy' of cases referred to by Lord 
Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough [1978]
A .C . 718, 751-2.
2. Latter v. Braddell, C.P.D. (1880) 50 L.J.Q.B. 166; 
Court of Appeal (1881) 50 L.J.Q.B. 448 where it was
alleged that the doctor had examined the plaintiff 
without her consent. C f . criterion of consent with 
Chatterton v. Gerson and Another [1981] 1 All E.R.
257. See also Smart v. H.M. Advocate 1975 S.L.T. 65 
where the court held that evil intention to injure 
was of the essence of assault, and the attitude of
the victim was irrelevant where such evil intention
was present. See Gordon, G.H., The Criminal Law of
Scotland, (2nd Ed.), Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd.. 
1978, for the distinction between intentional injury 
and assault.
6criminal law, where it is necessary to have proof of
mens rea or criminal intention. In cases of assault
for medical treatment or surgical operations consent
or volenti non fit iniuria is a defence even where
3
the injuries are likely to cause danger to life.
The justification is probably because the injuries
inflicted in such cases are not to cause pain or harm
but to benefit the patient. For consent to be a
defence the surgical procedure must be recognised as
valid by the law and this includes, for example, a
4sex change operation or indeed cosmetic surgery.
5The courts will consider an operation to be lawful 
only where it is recognised by the medical profession
3. For an excellent discussion of assault in surgical 
procedures see T.B. Smith, "Law, Professional Ethics 
and the Human Body" 1959 S.L.T. (News) 245 where he 
discusses the validity of medical and surgical
treatment in relation to the principle of
"Inviolability of the Human Person." See also 
Graham Hughes, "Two Views on Consent in the Criminal 
Law", (1963) 26 M.L.R., 233; Gordon. G.H., "Consent
in Assault", (1976) 21 J.L.S., 168; Williams, G.,
"Consent and Public Policy", [1962] Crira. L.R. 74; 
Skegg, P.D.G., Medical Procedures and the Crime of 
Battery [1974] Crim. L.R. pp.693-700.
4. Corbett v. Corbett [1971] 83.
5. The legality of operations for sterilisation or 
castration has been raised in England, (Bravery v. 
Bravery [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1169) but not in Scotland. 
Gordon. G.H., The Criminal Law of Scotland 1978, 2nd 
Ed. p829 suggests that it is unlikely that the courts 
would today create new crimes of the type suggested 
and would therefore treat, sterilisation or castration 
in the same way as other surgical operations. He 
contends that such operations would have to be 
considered as evil, presumably on the grounds of 
public policy, before they could be considered as 
assault.
7as appropriate and conducted in accordance with 
professional standards, and it is submitted that only 
in exceptional cases will consent to a surgical 
operation fail to be a defence. It follows 
therefore that a doctor or surgeon may be held liable 
to an action in assault where it is alleged that the 
pati e n t ’s consent, which may be given either 
expressly or implied by conduct, was either not 
obtained or obtained fully or obtained in the proper 
manner for the examination or treatment provided.
It has been suggested6 that consent may be implied 
when a patient presents him/herself to the doctor for 
the examination. This view however is in sharp
7
contrast to those of McLean, S. and McKay, J. 
where they state that if this view is accepted, it 
might mean that by virtue of attendance at a 
consulting room or a home visit, and no more than 
that, the patient could be deemed to have consented 
to whatever the doctor then does. Such a view is 
only possible, they contend, if the extreme position 
is accepted that the doctor always knows best. This 
sharp divergence of opinion reflects the different
6. Mason & McCall Smith, Law and Medical E thics, 
p . 113 1983, Butterworths 1983
7. McLean. S. and McKay, J. Legal Issues in Medicine 
1981, pp.96-113. Their views are consistent with 
the general theme adopted by Pellegrino, E, and 
Thomasma, D. , A Philosophical Basis of Medical 
P ractice. O.U.P. 1981; Kennedy, I., The Unmasking of 
M e d i c i n e . London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.
8approaches adopted by the legal and medical 
professions to the development of the doctrine of 
informed consent, an area which will be discussed
later.
Certainly the assumption is anomalous, 
particularly if compared with other professional 
groups. A mere consultation with a solicitor, for 
example, does not give him/her complete authority to 
take any steps s/he considers necessary to secure the 
interests of his/her client. Any arguments that 
suggest that a doctor is in a unique position which 
allows him/her to assume consent will diminish the 
doctrine of any real value as far as the patient's
autonomy is concerned. Indeed, it is submitted that 
it may be difficult to justify the proposition that a 
doctor is in a different position from other 
professional groups.
Q
According to Walker, to be an effective
answer to a claim for assault it has to be shown that,
"the pursuer was both sciens and volens, that 
he fully appreciated the dangerous character 
of the situation brought about and also 
exhibited a real -consent to his own assumption
8. See generally. Walker, D.M. , The Law of Delict in 
Scotland, (2nd Ed.), Edinburgh, W. Green & Son, 1978, 
pp. 345 - 353 . See also Gordon, G.H. Criminal Law
of Scotland p829.
9"of the risk in question without right to
Q
compensation from the defender."
It must follow therefore that the risk is known or at
least explicable since,
"...if the plea is to succeed it must be shown 
not that the pursuer consented to take the 
risk of some harm befalling him, but that he 
consented to take the risk of the particular
kind of harm which in fact befell him."10 
In Thomson v. D e v o n 11 it was alleged that a 
prison doctor was liable for an assault committed on 
a prisoner by representing to him that vaccination
was part of prison discipline to which he had no 
choice but to submit. It was held that while the
law was clear that,
"...if any person...is shown to have forcibly 
performed the operation of vaccination upon 
another person not consenting, the operator is 
guilty of ... assault and so is liable in 
damages,"
it did not apply in the above case since there was no
misrepresentation. Although the prisoner had.
9. at page 347. See also p.493, 496. for physical
examinations and tests in criminal cases; Forrester 
v. H.M.A. 1952 J.C. 28; H.M.A. V. M i l f o r d , 1973
S.L.T. 12; Hay v. H . M . A . , 1968, J.C. 40
10. at page 347. The disclosure of risks and the 
notion of informed consent will be examined later in 
the text.
11. (1899) 15 Sh. Ct. Rep. 209, at page 217.
10
"neither consented nor objected to the operation", it 
was held that in the state of knowledge he had, and 
in the absence of objection, he was reasonably held 
as consenting to the operation.
The law is settled as to whether the use of a
pharmaceutical product is suff icient to amount to
technical 12assa u l t . In an
13unreported case a
doctor administered " . . . secret doses of
phenobarbitone" in a patient ' s sou p ..., Justice
Armstrong, H . A . , stated tha t ,
"Where a patient expressly refused to take a 
particular drug there could not possibly be 
any implied authority to give it. The doctor 
could accept the refusal or he should withdraw 
from the c a s e ."
While it is standard practice for hospitals to 
require a patient to sign a 'consent form' consenting 
to undergo the treatment or operation "the effect and 
nature of which have been explained to me", the 
signing of such a form is not sufficient to afford 
the defence of consent unless the explanation had in
12. McLean, S. & Maher. G., Medicine. Morals and the 
L a w . Gower. 1983, p.96, suggest difficulties in this 
area, however their views are based upon insufficient 
examination of the case law. See Freeman v. Home 
Office [1983] 3 All E.R. 589. See Zellick, G., "The
Forcible Feeding of Prisioners: An Examination of
Enforced Therapy", 1976, Public Law 153; Casswell, 
D.G., "Limitations on the right of a prisoner to 
refuse medical treatment in Canadian Law", (1985), 
Report Seventh World Congress on Medical L a w , vol 2 68
13. B.M.J. 1949 V o l .1, p . 1100
11
fact been given.14
The principle that bodily interference which 
would otherwise amount to an assault, may be
justified in medical and surgical procedures by
showing that the patient voluntarily submitted to
the treatment or operation. is subject to a number of
exceptions. It is well recognised in Canada and
America that a doctor or surgeon is justified in
performing an operation without obtaining the
patient's prior consent where the circumstances
demand that action be taken before it is possible to
15obtain consent. This applies, for example m
the case of an unconscious patient who may have been 
involved in a road traffic accident. The exception 
is equally applicable in the analogous situation 
where, the patient having given consent to a 
particular operation, unexpected conditions arise 
during the course of the operation which necessitate 
an extension of the operation beyond the scope of the 
earlier consent.
From the decided cases in England, Canada and
14. Chatterton v. G e r s o n . [1981] Q.B. 432; From 
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 2 W.L.R. 
480, it would appear that it is sufficient if the 
doctor gives an explanation which would be thought 
right in the circumstances by a responsible body of 
medical opinion. Breen v. Baker (1956), The Times, 
January 27.
15. For discussion on medical Good Samaritan see, 
Fiscina, S.F., Medical Law for the Attending 
Physician. Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
12
A merica16 the principle that emerges is that if the
condition disclosed is of such a nature that
immediate steps are necessary in order to safeguard
the life, limb or health of the patient, a doctor
would be justified in taking such steps despite the
fact that no consent has been obtained. Where
immediate action is unnecessary, then the doctor will
be held to have committed an assault if s/he performs
an operation to which the patient has not
17consented. It follows, therefore, that m
unauthorised procedures a doctor will be held to be 
liable for assault.
Consequences of non-consensual treatment.
The treatment of a patient without consent
16. See Mar shal 1 v. Curry [1933 ] 3 D. L.R. 260 where 
the plaintiff sought damages for battery against the 
surgeon who had, in the course of an operation for a 
hernia, removed a testicle. The court took the view 
that the surgeon had acted 'for the protection of the 
patient's life', and there was, accordingly, no case 
to answer.
17. Precisely this situation arose in Devi v. West 
Midlands Regional Health Authority [1980] 7 Current
Law 44, where a woman who had consented to a minor 
operation on her womb was deemed not to have 
consented to an unauthorised sterilisation. See 
also Murray v. Mc M u r c h y , [1949], 2 D.L.R. 422, the
plaintiff succeeded in an action for battery against 
a physician who had sterilised her without her 
consent. The doctor discovered during the caesarian 
section that the condition of the plaintiff's uterus 
would have made a subsequent pregnancy hazardous and 
proceeded to tie the Fallopian tubes, although there 
was no urgency to do so. The court held that it 
would not have been unreasonable in the circumstances 
to postpone the sterilisation until after consent had 
been obtained in spite of the convenience of 
proceeding immediately in the circumstances.
13
entitles the patient to sue for damages for the 
assault committed or alternatively, to sue in 
negligence on the basis that it is the doctor's duty 
to ensure that the patient consents to the treatment 
proposed.
1BChatterton v_. Gerson and Another
highlights both the policy of the court in dealing
with an action raised in assault and the important
differences between the two forms of action for
personal injury and is worthy of extended
consideration.
The defendant gave the plaintiff a spinal
injection for chronic intractable pain which helped
for a while but caused numbness in her right leg.
There was dispute regarding the explanation given by
the defendant to the plaintiff about the nature and
probable effect of the injections. While the
principle of consent as a defence to what would
otherwise be a crime or a civil wrong was clear the
court felt that the problem lay in its 
19application. Bristow, J. stated that,
"In my judgment what the court has to do in 
each case is to look at ''11 the circumstances 
and say, "Was there a real consent?" I think 
justice requires that in order to vitiate the
18. [1981] Q . B . 432; [1981] 1 All E.R. 2S7
19. The policy implications are more fully discussed 
l a t e r .
14
"reality of consent there must be a greater 
failure of communication between doctor and 
patient than that involved in a breach of duty 
if the claim is based on negligence. When 
the claim is based on negligence the plaintiff 
must prove not only the breach of duty to 
inform but that had the duty not been broken 
she would not have chosen to have the 
operation. Where the claim is based on 
trespass to the person, once it is shown that 
the consent is unreal, then what the plaintiff 
would have decided if she had been given the 
information which would have prevented 
vitiation of the reality of her consent is 
irrelevant. Once the patient is informed in
broad terms of the nature of the procedure 
which is intended, and gives her consent, the
consent is real, and the cause of the action 
on which to base a claim for failure to go 
into risks and implications is negligence, not 
trespass. If by some accident ... where a boy 
was admitted to hospital for tonsilectomy and 
due to administrative error was circumcised
instead, trespass would be the appropriate
cause of action against the doctor, though he 
was as much the victim of the error as the 
boy. But in my judgment it would be very much"
15
"against the interests of justice if actions
which are really based on a failure by the
doctor to perform his duty adequately to
inform were pleaded in trespass."
It is presented that the judgment in Chatterton v.
Gerson and Another is in keeping with the court's
policy of limiting the application of assault-based
20
actions to intentional acts of aggression. It
is possible to go further and suggest that the courts
probably find it disagreeable to apply the concept of
assault in medical practice especially in view of its
therapeutic objectives.
Without doubt, from the patient's perspective,
an action raised in assault is likely to be
considered an easier option than one raised in 
21negligence since s/he has only to show that the 
medical procedure was unauthorised, thus avoiding the 
need to establish loss as a result of the 
intervention and so also avoiding the problem of 
causation. Admittedly the assault-based action may
20. Hills v. Potter [1983] 3 All E.R. 716; Sidaway v. 
Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All E.R. 643; Reibl
v. Hughes (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, Laskin. C.J.C.,
at p l O .
21. The problems attached to negligence are examined 
later in Section (ii) (a).
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require a high standard of proof of failure by the 
doctor to disclose relevant information. By
contrast an action raised in negligence, while in
theory requiring a lesser burden of proof in respect 
of the extent of the doctor's failure to disclose, 
has its own peculiar problems. For example the 
patient would have to not only establish that the
doctor's intervention was wrong but also that the 
negligence of the doctor in treating him/her without 
consent has led to the injury for which damages are 
sought.
22The problem of causation m  negligence 
actions based on the lack of consent is that the
court must be satisfied that the negligence in 
failing to obtain consent was. in fact, the cause of 
the patient's injury. To meet this requirement, the 
patient must prove s/he would not have given his/her 
consent and would not therefore have suffered injury 
if s/he had had the relevant information. A major 
difficulty here is one of discounting the wisdom of 
hindsight. The courts are certainly aware that it 
would be too easy for a patient, once s/he has
suffered damage, to say, "if I had been told I would 
have certainly refused consent", when in reality s/he 
may well have been prepared to do so. Another
22. Section (ii) (c) deals with the importance of 
causation in medical negligence cases.
17
feature of the negligence action is that the patient 
must establish that the doctor's conduct fell below
the accepted standard of practice - a test based on
the evidence of doctors. It is sufficient for 
present purposes to say that this could be a major
obstacle for the patient. As Walker says,23
"It may be negligent to fail to warn the
patient of the risks inherent in a proposed 
course of treatment, but only if proper 
practice is to give a warning in such
circumstances and that the patient would not
have consented to the treatment."
It can be argued that while consent has become 
a growing issue only in the field of medical 
negligence, its application in an assault-based
action is severely limited for medically injured
victims. Without doubt the assault action is a
reflection of the dissatisfaction felt by many of the 
forensic lottery associated with the negligence 
action. If we are concerned to provide for victims 
of medical injury, then the attempt to widen the
application of the assault action is certainly not
the direction which should be taken. If an
appropriate solution is to be found for dealing with
23.Walker, D.M. The Law of Delict in Scotland. (2nd 
Ed) Edinburgh 1981 p . 1059
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injured patients a more radical action may have to be 
adopted - one which certainly avoids the spectacle of 
medical victims in confrontation with their doctors, 
expending many years in potentially fruitless 
litigation.
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(ii) (a) Negligence
Since most medical and surgical treatment is 
undertaken under the National Health Service Scheme 
the majority of cases are not based in contract but 
rather on the law of delict.24 Where there is a 
contract a duty of care is owed by the doctor or 
surgeon to the patient both ex contractu assuming 
that the patient made the contract; otherwise if
another, for example, a curator made the contract;
25and ex delicto. . For Scots law, the existence
and imposition of the duty of care in medical
24. See however, Thake and Another v Maurice fl986] 1 
All E.R. 497 (C.A.). There may be some scope in the 
argument that a contract exists between a patient and 
his/her general practitioner which comes into being 
w h e n  the patient enrols. For English law. the fact 
that the patient allows his/her name to be added to 
the general practitioner's list which increases the 
remuneration to which the practitioner is entitled 
may constitute consideration. cf. para. 1313 of the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury, Cmnd. 7054 (1978).
25. It has often been plainly stated in the case law 
that the basic principle of Scots Law of delict is 
rooted firmly in the concept of fault or culpa. For 
example. Lord Guthrie has stated that "the 
fundamental principle of the Scots Law of reparation 
is that liability depends on culpa", Hester v. 
MacDonald 1961 S.L.T. 414, 424; and Lord Cooper that
"culpa is the very basis of the Scots Law of delict", 
McLaughlin v. Craig 1948 S.L.T 483. Bell's
Principles. Principles of the Law of Scotland 2, 
pl2 3 4 para 2029. However, tx.ere was considerable 
confusion in early English law as regards the origin 
of liability due primarily to the mis-application of 
the old English remedy of assumpsit - so much so that 
Holdsworth, History of English Law Vol. iii p 449-450 
was able to say, "... the courts allowed a cause of 
action founded on tort to masquerade as an action 
founded on contract." see also Dickson v. Hygienic 
Institute 1910 S.C. 325.
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negligence cases is dependent on the assumed 
responsibility for the treatment of the patient and 
is independent of any contractual obligations that
may exist. The basis of the duty of care has been
7 6
clearly and precisely stated by Walker,
"... the existence of the duty depends on the
proximity of the relationship of the parties;
were they so close that the defender should
have realised that the pursuer might be hurt
if he did not take care? If so, then he
should have taken care, i.e. was under a duty
to take c a r e ."
The judicial position regarding duty of care was best
summed up by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton 
27London Borough where he said,
"Through the trilogy of cases in this House, 
Donoghue v. Stevenson ([1932] A.C. 562). 
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
L t d . ([1964] A.C. 465) and Home Office v.
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. ([1970] A.C. 1004), the 
position has now been reached that in order to 
establish that a duty of care arises in a 
particular situation, it is not necessary to 
bring the facts of that situation within those 
of previous situations in which a duty of care
26. Walker, D.M. , The Law of Delict of Scotland, 2nd 
Ed. 1981 at p. 181.
27. [1978] A.C. 728, 751-2,
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"has been held to exist. Rather the question 
has to be approached in two stages. First 
one has to ask whether, as between the alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered 
damage there is a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the
reasonable contemplation of the former,
carelessness on his part may be likely to 
cause damage to the latter, in which case a
prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly,
if the first question is answered 
affirmatively, it is necessary to consider 
whether there are any considerations which 
ought to negative or to reduce or limit the
scope of the duty or the class of person to
whom it is owed or the damages to which a
breach of it may give rise ..."
From the authorities therefore the test of whether a 
duty exists depends upon the courts recognising the 
duty. Thus the liability of a doctor is only a 
particular instance of the general duty not to cause 
unintentional but foreseeable harm to his/her
patient. It follows then, that in most situations, 
where a doctor embarks on the treatment of another 
the circumstances will show an assumption of 
responsibility giving rise to a duty of care.
The principle is well established that where a
22
patient has suffered injury as a result of a doctor's 
improper or unskilful treatment s/he can sue the 
latter ex delicto even though the medical 
practitioner has a contract with a third party, for
example husband or wife or employer.
2 8In Edgar v. L a m o n t , concerning title to
sue. the argument maintained by the defence was that
the only person with a title to sue is the person
with whom the contract was made. In this case the
contract was between the medical practitioner and the
pursuer's husband. L d . Salvesen said,
"It seems to me that the clear ground of
action is that a doctor owes a duty to the
patient, whoever has called him in and whoever
is liable for his bill, and it is for breach
of that duty that he is liable, in other
words, that it is for negligence arising in
the course of the employment, and not in
respect of breach on contract with the 
29employer."
28. 1914 S.C. 277. see also Gladwell v. Steqqall.
(1839). 5 Bing. (N.C.) 733; Pippin and Wife v.
Sheppard (1822), 11 Price 400.
29. 1914 S.C. 277 at p279. Many English cases have
dealt with the issue as to whether the duty of care 
exists independently of contract. See judgment by 
Justice Heath at p . 161 in ShielIs v. Blackburne 
(1789) 1 H.B1.; Everett v. Griffiths. [1920] 3 K.B.
163 where it was held to apply though the patient was 
unconscious or incapable of exercising a conscious 
volition, p213; Lindsey County Council v. Marsha 1 1 . 
[1936] 2 All E.R. 1076
23
The defence failed and it was held that the wife had 
a good action in delict against the medical 
practitioner. Therefore a duty may be owed ex 
contractu to the person who engages the doctor and a 
duty ex delicto to the patient for whom s/he is 
employed. The duty of care in delict is additional 
to any contractual duties which may be owed, 
therefore, where a doctor is privately engaged it is 
normal practice to plead any claim both in contract 
and delict.
If the test for the assumption of
responsibility is accepted in the normal case, and if
the premise is accepted that there is no legal duty
imposed upon a bystander to assist a person in
danger, does it necessarily follow that there is no
corresponding legal duty upon a doctor to examine or
give medical aid to a stranger? It can logically be
argued that in the absence of a professional
relationship a doctor will not be liable for refusing
to treat, although this view takes no cognizance of
any moral duty that s/he may owe to such a person.
The issue concerning duty to give treatment was
30examined m  Barnes v. Crabtree where the
plaintiff, a registered patient of the defendant,
claimed damages for personal injury on the grounds of
30. High Court of Justice. Queen's Bench Division, 
T’iines, November 1st 1955.
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alleged negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff, 
an N.H.S. patient, called at the defendant's surgery 
for treatment outwith normal surgery hours. The 
doctor refused to examine or treat the patient. The 
point before the court was whether a patient who went 
to a National Health doctor outside surgery hours was 
entitled to be seen. Counsel for the defence argued 
that a doctor's duty under the N.H.S. was to treat 
any patient in an emergency whether his/her own 
patient or not. Further, if a patient were on 
his/her list to render proper and necessary treatment 
at all times. In a case of chronic illness, when 
s/he had been seeing the patient frequently the duty 
of providing all proper and necessary treatment did 
not mean that the doctor is required to make a full 
clinical examination every time the patient asked for 
it. In this case it was held that the circumstances 
were not one of emergency and judgment was for the
25
3 1d e f e ndant.
Clearly the law must recognise that a general 
practitioner is bound to exercise some discretion in 
determining whether and when it is necessary to visit 
patients who cannot come to his/her surgery.32
31. It is submitted that the defence counsel's 
submission in Barnes v. Crabtree is too wide. For 
N.H.S. patients, statutory regulations made under the 
N.H.S. Act 1946, require local Executive Councils to 
make arrangements for the provision of general 
medical services within their areas. Section 33, 1946 
N.H.S. Act; the terms of service are also set out in 
the regulations:
"A practitioner is required to render to his 
patient all proper and necessary treatment . . . 
In the case of emergency the practitioner is
required to render whatever services are,
having regard to the circumstances, in the
best interests of the patient."
The regulations refer only to the medical
practitioner's patients, and carefully defines the
persons to whom the practitioner must provide
services, namely, such persons as s/he has 'on
his/her list.' It may be argued that the terms of 
service operate solely between the Executive Council 
and medical practitioners, conferring no rights upon 
the patient. Where for example a doctor makes 
unwarranted assumptions about his/her patient's 
condition without an examination s/he may leave 
him/herself open to the dangers of an action for
negligence.
32. See however unreported case Rodgers v. G.M.C. 
Privy Council Appeal, Nov. 19 1984, where a doctor's 
appeal against erasure from the Medical Register was 
unsuccessful on account of his failing to visit two 
sick children at home. See Barnett v. Chelsea and
Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1
Q.B. 428; Edler v. Greenwich and Deptford H.M.C. The 
Times, March 7, 1953, - where a general practitioner
had decided not to visit a child with abdominal 
pains, because she had previously been examined by a 
hospital casualty officer, who failed to notice 
anything adverse. In fact, the child had
appendicitis. The general practitioner was held not 
to be negligent. See also Kavanagh v. Abrahamson 
(1964) 108 S.J. 320. A failure to attend and
examine in later stages may amount to negligence; see 
Corder v. B a n k s . The Times. April 9, 1960.
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In the absence of any decisions, the courts 
may hold that the National Health Service Acts impose 
on National Health Service doctors a statutory duty 
towards their patients, therefore allowing a patient 
to maintain an action for breach of duty if treatment
was refused or withheld to the patient's detriment.
There are no statutory provisions which
regulate the extent of a doctor's duties towards 
his/her private patients. This raises several 
questions; is the relationship between doctor and 
patient permanent because the patient has originally 
consulted him/her? Is the relationship renewed at 
each consultation, thus re-defining the extent of any 
duties owed? Finally has the medical practitioner a 
right to choose upon each occasion whether to
undertake the responsibility of treatment?
The agreement of a general medical 
practitioner to accept for care or treatment
predicates a duty to treat the patient. In a
particular case the circumstances may show that the 
doctor assumed a limited duty. It can be argued 
that no legal duty rests on a doctor to give further 
separate treatment to those whc have formerly, indeed 
recently been under his/her care for other
complaints. Thus the patient's right to receive
further treatment is dependent on a separate mutual 
agreement. The courts might, in the case of general
27
medical practitioners, consider the duties of such 
practitioners as more permanent in character.
This leads on to the problems raised by the 
medical Good Samaritan. Many law reports notably 
American contain examples where assistance to a 
person in danger has been refused by a doctor. 
Indeed the position has been reached in the United 
States and Canada where legislation has been enacted 
relieving doctors and nurses from liability for their 
conduct at the scene of an accident.
In the absence of judicial authority in the
United Kingdom it is suggested that a possible reason
why the courts may be reluctant to enforce
unselfishness on the part of doctors is because this
may be seen as too much of an infringement of
3 3
personal freedom. Certainly an underlying
policy reason could be that the proper function of 
the law is to prevent people from harming one 
another, rather than to force them to confer benefits 
on one another.
There is no doubt that once a doctor 
undertakes to assist a person in danger, s/he must 
exercise reasonable care and - will be liable for 
failing to do so. Obviously what is required to 
meet the standard of care will largely be dictated by
33. Minor, "Moral Obligations as a Basis of 
Liability". (1923) 9 V a . L. R e v . 421. 422.
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the actual circumstances presented. It is possible 
that this position could be interpreted as being 
rather harsh on the well-meaning rescuer and might 
tend to discourage potential Good Samaritans. Often 
doctors, in America, cite this as a reason for not 
stopping at the scene of an automobile accident. 
Such an interpretation by doctors practising in the 
U.K. may be inaccurate in light of the application of
the case East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v.
3 4 .  3 c
Kent m  Horsley v. MacLaren where Jessop, J.
argued,
"... where a person gratuitously and without 
any duty to do so undertakes to confer a 
benefit upon or go to the aid of another, he 
incurs no liability unless what he does 
worsens the condition of that other ... I
think it is an unfortunate development in the
law which leaves the Good Samaritan liable to 
be mulcted in damages, and apparently in the 
United States, it is one that has produced
marked reluctance of doctors to aid victims."
It is clear that the above principle is an attempt by 
the courts to encourage potential rescuers by 
reducing the risk of liability to them if their
effort is unsuccessful; this may be regarded as a
34. [1941] A.C. 74
35. [1970] 2 OR 487 (C.A.)
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wise policy so long as it does not foster careless
rescue operations.36 If the situation of the
medical Good Samaritan arose as a specific issue in
the Scottish courts, it is submitted that a similar
approach to that taken in Horsely v. MacLaren would
be adopted. It is suggested therefore, that the
unduly pessimistic views and fears expressed by
3 7Lord Denning regarding the influence of the
American medical negligence experience in the United
Kingdom are unfounded or at least very limited.
The standard of the duty of care
While the scope of the duty of care for
medical negligence has received a little judicial
attention, the standard of the duty of care however
has been reformulated on several occasions and its
development has been complex and confused. The
problem is best viewed through the authorities, some
3 8of which conflict.
It was long ago settled that a doctor, like
any other professional person was bound to exercise
3 9skill and care. This standard was subsequently
36. Linden, Allen, M  • *’ u6 scuers and Good
Samaritans". M.L.R. Vol. 33 1971 No. 3 p252; Ames, 
"Law and Morals" (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97.
37. Whitehouse v. Jordan [1980] 1 All E.R. 650 at 658.
38. It was suggested that there was an unwillingness 
by Lord Denning to find negligence against doctors. 
See Robertson, G.. "Whitehouse v. Jordan - Medical 
Negligence Retired" [1981] 44 M . L .R .457; K. McK. 
Norrie. "Common Practice and the Standard of Care in 
Medical Negligence", 1985, J .R . pt 2, December.
39. See Seare v. Prentice (1807) 8 East 348
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adopted by Tindal. C.J. in Hancke v. Hooper40 where 
he said,
“A surgeon does not become an actual insurer;
he is only bound to display sufficient skill
and knowledge in his profession. If from
some accident, or some variation in the frame
of a particular individual, an injury happens,
it is not a fault in the medical man."
Perhaps the best known formulation developed by the
41same judge was in Lanphier v. Phipos where he 
stated,
"Every person who enters into a learned
profession undertakes to bring to the exercise
of it a reasonable degree of care and skill.
He does not undertake, if he is an attorney,
that at all events you shall gain your case,
nor does a surgeon undertake that he will
perform a cure; nor does he undertake to use
the highest possible degree of skill. There
may be persons who have higher education and
greater advantages than he has, but he
undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and
competent degree of skill."
The principle was adopted by Erie, C.J. in the later
42case. Rich v. Pierpont where it was stated that.
40. (1835) 7 C. & P. 81
41. (1838) 8 C & P 475 at p.479
42. (1862) 3 S. & S. 35
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"A medical man was certainly not answerable 
merely because some other practitioner might 
possibly have shown greater skill and 
knowledge; but he was bound to have that 
degree of skill which could not be defined, 
but which, in the opinion of the jury, was a 
competent degree of skill and knowledge. 
What that was the jury were to judge. It was 
not enough to make the defendant liable that 
some medical men, of far greater experience or 
ability, might have used a greater degree of 
skill, nor that even he might possibly have
used some greater degree of care."
43In R v. Bateman Ld. Chief Justice Hewart stated 
that as regards civil liability the law required a 
fair and reasonable standard of care and competence,
"If a person holds himself out as possessing 
special skill and knowledge and he is 
consulted, as possessing such skill and 
knowledge, by or on behalf of a patient, he 
owes a duty to the patient to use due caution 
in undertaking the treatment. If he accepts"
43. (1925) 94 L.J.K.B. 791. This was an appeal by a
doctor against conviction for manslaughter, arising 
out of the death of his patient. The conviction was 
quashed because the trial judge's direction to the 
jury was more appropriate to a civil claim for 
damages than a criminal prosecution. The Lord Chief 
Justice discussed the duties imposed on doctors both 
by the civil and criminal law.
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"the responsibility and undertakes the
treatment and the patient submits to his
direction and treatment accordingly, he owes a
duty to the patient to use diligence, care,
knowledge, skill and caution in administering
the treatment. The law requires a fair and
reasonable standard of care and competence.
This standard must be reached in all the
matters above-mentioned. If the patient's
death has been caused by the defendant's
indolence or carelessness, it will not avail
to show that he had sufficient knowledge; nor
will it avail to prove that he was diligent in
attendance, if the patient has been killed by
44his gross ignorance and unskilfulness.
[A]s regards cases where incompetence is
alleged it is only necessary to say that the
unqualified practitioner cannot claim to be
measured by any lower standard than that which
45is applied to a qualified man. As
regards cases of alleged recklessness juries 
are likely to distinguish between the"
44. R v. St. John L o n g , 4 C. & P . 423
45. R v. Martin 3 C. & P. 211; £  v. Spillar. 5 C.& P. 
33;
33
"qualified and the unqualified man.46
There may be recklessness in undertaking the
treatment and recklessness in the conduct of
it. It is, no doubt, conceivable that a
qualified man may be held liable for
recklessly undertaking a case which he knew,
or should have known, to be beyond his powers,
or for making the patient the subject of
47reckless experiment."
However. as medicine progressed and became
more complex the courts recognised the difficulty in
determining what amounted to a reasonable and proper
degree of care and skill or what was a fair and
reasonable standard of care and competence. The
standard of care was no longer to be judged by the
ordinary reasonable man test but had to be looked at
from the point of view of the expert acting in an
48expert field. Thus m  Mahon v. Osborne Scott, 
L .J ., said.
46. In R v. Williams. 3 C. & P. 635, such a
distinction was made by Ellenborough, C.J. where he
stated that,
"...a person causing the death of another by 
medical or surgical treatment... is not liable 
unless he was guilty of crassa ignorantia; 
whereas in the case of a regular practitioner 
the ratio would be reasonable knowledge and
skill, that is such as is usual and reasonable
among medical men."
47. Approved in Akerele v. The K i n g . [1943] A.C. 255; 
followed in Crawford v. Campbell 1948 S.L.T.(notes) 91
48. [1939] 1 All ER 535 at p548; [1939] 2 KB 14 at p31
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"Before I discuss the learned judge's summing
up, it is desirable to recall the
well-established legal measure of a
professional man's duty. If he professes an
art he must be reasonably skilled in it.
[He] must also be careful, but the standard of
care the law requires is not insurance against
accidental slips. It is such a degree of
care as a normally skilful member of the
profession may reasonably be expected to
exercise in the actual circumstances of the
case in question."
4 9Ld. Justice McKinnon in the same case said,
"The proper question as reqards Mr. Osborne
was whether on the night in question he had
exercised the reasonable degree of skill and
care that a surgeon in his position ought to
exercise, whether he had done anything that,
exercising such skill and care, he ought not
to have done, or left undone anything that,
exercising such skill and care, he ought to 
50have d o n e ."
From the above case the general effect appeared to be 
a distinct refinement of the ordinary rule of 
negligence. However in the later English case
49. [1939] 2 K.B. 14
50. [1939] 2 K.B. 14 at p.38
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Hatcher v. Black51 a slightly different view was 
taken by Ld. Denning in his direction to the jury,
"You must not, therefore, find him negligent 
simply because something happened to go wrong; 
if, for instance, one of the risks inherent in 
an operation actually takes place or some 
complication ensues which lessens or takes 
away the benefits that were hoped for, or if 
in a matter of opinion he makes an error of 
judgement. You should only find him guilty 
of negligence when he falls short of the 
standard of a reasonably skilful medical man, 
in short, when he is deserving of censure - 
for negligence in a medical man is deserving 
of censure."
Ld. Denning appeared not to adopt the higher standard 
of care which was developing for medical negligence, 
nor did he define ‘the standard of a reasonably 
skilful m a n . ' He expressed the standard in terms 
similar to those used in R v. Bateman and Lanphier v. 
P h i p o s .52
The standard of the duty of care was settled
after Lord President Clyde's classic formulation in
53
the Scottish case. Hunter v. Hanley . It was
51. The Times, July 2, 1954
52. (1925) 94 L.J.K.B. 791; (1838) 8 C & P 475 at
p.479
53. 1955 S.C. 200
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defined by reference to the notion of 'usual
54professional practice' and expressed m  the
following manner,
"... where the conduct of a doctor, or indeed 
of any professional man, is concerned, the 
circumstances are not so precise and clear cut 
as in the normal case [of negligence]. In 
the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is 
ample scope for genuine difference of opinion 
and one man clearly is not negligent merely 
because his conclusion differs from that of 
other professional men, nor because he has 
displayed less skill or knowledge than others 
would have shown. The true test for
establishing negligence in diagnosis or 
treatment on the part of a doctor is whether 
he has been proved to be guilty of such 
failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would"
54. A test borrowed and adapted from that applied to 
solicitors; as per Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Hart 
v. Frame & Co. (1839) MacL.S. Rob 595
For a discussion between the distinctions to be made 
between 'ordinary* care and 'reasonable' care see 
case note on Hunter v. H a n l e y ; (1955) 67 J . R . 220
where Walker at p.221 points out t h a t r e a s o n a b l e  is 
not the same as 'ordinary': ordinary' may well be
less than 'reasonable', though one hopes that it is 
not, and 'reasonable' necessarily implies regard to 
the individual's experience and qualifications, and 
to the whole circumstances of the case. 'Ordinary' 
has regard to average standards". See also, Howie, 
R.B.M.. The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence", 
1983 J.R. 193
37
"be guilty of if acting with ordinary 
55care."
The standard of the duty of care stated in
Hunter v. Hanley was approved by the House of Lords
in the much publicised case, Whitehouse v. Jordan and 
56Another . In this case. Lord Denning M.R. m  the 
Court of Appeal, drew the distinction between errors 
of 'clinical judgment' and errors of negligence. He 
said,
"... the judge required Mr. Jordan to come up 
to the "very high standard of professional 
competence that the law requires". That 
suggests that the law makes no allowance for 
errors of judgment. This would be a 
mistake. [It] may be an error of judgment 
but it is not negligent.... we must say, and
55. at pp204-205. Approved in Bolam v. Friern 
Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582,
McNair, J. at p586.
"... where you get a situation which involves 
the use of some special skill or competence, 
then the test ... is not the test of the man
on the top of the Clapham omnibus [but] the
standard of the ordinary skilled man 
exercising and professing to have that special 
skill. A man need not possess the highest 
expert skill; it is well established law that 
it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary 
skill of an ordinary competent man exercising 
that particular art."
56. [198vl] 1 W.L.R. 246 (H.L.); [1980] 1 All E.R. 650
(C.A.). The case itself created no new law. The
standard of care formulated in Hunter v. Hanley was 
adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Chin Keow 
v. Government of Malaysia [19 67] 1 WLR 813
38
"say firmly, that, in a professional man. an
57
error of judgment is not negligent."
Donaldson L.J. exposed the false antithesis in
contrasting errors of clinical judgment and errors of 
negligence by saying:
"It is said that the judge lost sight of the 
fact that the plaintiff had to establish 
negligence. The basis of this submission was 
in part that he nowhere referred to "errors of 
clinical judgment" and contrasted such errors 
with negligence. I can understand the
ommission, because it is a false antithesis.
If a doctor fails to exercise the skill which 
he has or claims to have, he is in breach of 
his duty of care. He is negligent. But if 
he exercised that skill to the full, but 
nevertheless takes what, with hindsight, can 
be shown to be the wrong course, he is not 
negligent and is liable to no one, much though 
he may regret having done so. Both are 
errors of clinical judgment. The judge was 
solely concerned with whether or not the 
defendant's actions were negligent. If they
were not, it was irrelevant whether or not 
they constituted an error of clinical
judgment. The question which Bush J. asked"
57. [1980] 1 All E.R. 650 (C.A.), at p658.
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"himself was whether there had been any
failure by the defendant "to exercise the
standard of skill expected from the ordinary
competent specialist. having regard to the
experience and expertise which that specialist
S 8holds himself out as possessing."
The House of Lords unanimously upheld the judgment of
the majority of the Court of Appeal on the merits of
the case. However as regards the distinction
between errors of clinical judgment and errors of 
negligence. Lord Edmund-Davies said.
“To say that a surgeon committed an error of 
clinical judgment is wholly ambiguous, for, 
while some such errors may be completely 
consistent with the due exercise of 
professional skill, other acts or omissions in 
the course of exercising "clinical judgment" 
may be so glaringly below proper standards as 
to make a finding of negligence 
inevitable.1,59 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton stated.
"Merely to describe something as an error of 
judgment tells us nothing about whether it is 
negligent or not. The true position is that"
58. [1980] 1 All E.R. 650 (C.A.) , (dissenting) at p662.
59. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246 (H.L.); at p. 257
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"an error of judgment may, or may not, be 
negligent; it depends on the nature of the 
error. If it is one that would not have been 
made by a reasonably competent professional 
man professing to have the standard and type 
of skill that the defendant held himself out 
as having, and acting with ordinary care, then 
it is negligent. If, on the other hand, it 
is an error that such a man, acting with 
ordinary care, might have made, then it is not 
negligent."60
Lord Denning's interpretation has come under 
considerable attack from many academics61
particularly in relation to his use of the term
6 2"clinical judgment." Robertson, displays his
dislike for the 'mystical' phrase "error of clinical 
judgment" as one which ought to be avoided in future 
medical negligence actions, and that to say that an
60. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246 (H.L.); at p.263. In
Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority 
[1985] 1 All ER p635 the dicta of L d . President Clyde 
in Hunter v. Hanley 1955 SLT at p217 was applied. 
This case also applied the authoritative formulation 
by Ld. Edmund Davies in Whitehouse v. Jordan where he 
quoted from the judgement of J. McNair in Bolam v. 
Friern Hospital Management Cor~~ittee [1957] 2 All ER 
118 at p l 2 1.
61 See for example, Robertson, G., "Doctors' 
Negligence - a reply", 1982 27 J . L . S . 215; Amin.
S.H. , "Doctors' N e g ligence", 1981 26 J .L .S . 442;
Finch. J., "Whitehouse v. Jordan: The Epic that never 
was". 131 New L . J . 253
62 Robertson, G., "Doctors' Negligence - a reply", 
1982 27 J .L . S . 215
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error of clinical judgment is not necessarily
r
negligent is a simple truism. He further asserts 
that the phrase has dangers which may obscure the
proper principles of liability for doctors. He 
argues.
"The mystique which surrounds this phrase
created by its frequent use in medical
negligence cases not only in England but also 
6 3
m  Scotland has resulted in the phrase
being accorded much more significance than it
merits. In order to make clear that the
principle of law amounts to no more than that
a doctor is not necessarily liable if he makes
a mistake (whether or not in the exercise of
clinical judgment) the phrase ‘error of
clinical judgment' should be dropped from the
vocabulary of medical negligence law."
It is submitted that if we accept Robertson's views
then the phrase 'error of clinical judgment' will
continue to create confusion in this area of law
since it has been applied in subsequent cases, for
64example m  Hyde v. Tameside A.H.A. where the 
Court of Appeal, in R o b e r t s o n ’s terms, "once again 
sought refuge in the phrase 'error of clinical
63 See for example McHardy v. Dundee General 
Hospitals Board of Management 1960 S.L.T. (Notes) 19
64 The Tiroes, April 16, 1981
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judgment.' as a means of exonerating the defendant."
It is suggested that Robertson himself has
exaggerated the significance of the phrase and the
extent to which it is potentially misleading.
Clearly, if a doctor makes a mistake leading to harm,
the fundamental issue is whether the mistake was made
in breach of a duty of care to his/her patient.
That is, the mistake must be an unreasonable one;
where it can be shown that s/he is guilty of such
failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be
6 5guilty of if acting with ordinary care. The
position then is that an error, by itself, is 
insufficient to import liability - it must be shown 
to be an unreasonable one. It follows then that an
error of judgment on its own is not negligent,
however this does not mean to say that it cannot be 
negligent. To convert the mistake into negligence 
the element of 'unreasonableness' must be present. 
Afterall, if the premise is accepted that the 
reasonable person is capable of making mistakes, then 
it must follow that errors of judgment are perfectly 
reasonable and forseeable. There is ample authority 
which supports the contention that an error of 
judgment can be assumed to be reasonable until proved 
otherwise. Excellent authority is provided by the 
non-medical
65 L.P. Clyde, Hunter v. Hanley 1955 S.C. 200, 205
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case S.S. Baron Vernon v. S. S. Metaqama66 where an
error of judgment was said not to amount to a novus
actus interveniens as it was considered to be
reasonable. Viscount Haldane said,
•'What those in charge of the injured ship do
to save it may be mistaken, but if they do
whatever they do reasonably, though
unsuccessfully, their mistaken judgment may be
a natural consequence for which the offending
ship is responsible, just as much as any
physical occurrence ... it is their duty to do
all they can to minimise that damage, but they
do not fail in this duty if they only commit
an error of judgment in deciding on the best
course in difficult circumstances."
The analogy of the doctor delivering a baby
(Whitehouse v. Jordan) becomes very obviously
applicable to the situation described above. Indeed
Viscount Dunedin, one of the greatest judges this
century, was not "insensible to the view that a mere
error of judgment in choosing between two courses
67
ought not to be counted negligence."
The position is recognised by the Court of Session.
In McHardy v. Dundee General Hospitals Board of
66 1928 S.C. (H.L.) 21
67 ibid., at p 2 8 .
44
6 8
Management Lord Cameron said,
"Mere error of judgment is not by itself
presumptive proof of negligence."
Finally in McKew v. Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Sc) 
L t d .69 Lord Reid stated obiter
"In an emergency it is natural to try to do 
something to save oneself and I do not think 
that his trying to jump in this emergency was 
so wrong that it could be said to be more than 
an error of judgment."
The above judicial decisions clearly lend support to 
Lord Denning's views in Whitehouse v. Jordan - it 
would appear that an error of judgment is not
negligence; like any other action it can be 
negligent if it is unreasonable.
Many of Denning's critics on his statement of 
the principles of liability have taken his use of the
phrase 'clinical judgment* out of context; it is
submitted that his judgment does provide an 
acceptable summary of the appropriate principles - an 
error of judgment is a reasonable mistake, but an 
unreasonable error will incur liability. In order 
to establish unreasonableness it must be demonstrated 
that the mistake was one which no average competent 
and careful practitioner would make if acting with
68 1960 S.L.T. (Notes) 19,
69 1970 S.C.(H.L.) 20
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ordinary care.
The effect of the judicial pronouncements is
that it would not be a defence for a doctor to show
that s/he acted as s/he thought right in the
circumstances and to the best of his/her skill and
knowledge, if s/he has nevertheless failed to come up 
to the standards of the ordinary careful and 
competent practitioner. Therefore, the doctor will 
be liable in an action for negligence if s/he fails 
to exercise that degree of skill which is to be
expected of the practitioner of the class to which 
s/he belongs. S/he will not be judged by the
standards of the least qualified member of his/her 
class, nor by those of the most highly qualified, but 
by the standard of the ordinary careful and competent 
practitioner of that class.
Inherent flexibility of requisite standard
In order to decide whether negligence is
established in any particular case the conduct 
complained of is judged not by ideal standards but
against the background of the circumstances in which 
the treatment in question was given. However this 
does not mean that the standa J of skill and care 
required varies with the circumstances of each case, 
rather, the standard is always the same, namely the 
conduct of the ordinary competent and careful 
practitioner but what has to be done to comply with
46
that standard is conditioned by the actual
70
circumstances of the case. It is submitted that
the formulation of the standard of care is the same
although the content of the standard being different
7 1is allowed for within the formulation. It would
be unreasonable, for example, to judge by the same
criteria the conduct of a doctor who by necessity
performs an operation at the scene of an accident or
in the patient's home and the conduct of one who
72operates m  a well equipped hospital. In an
emergency a doctor's conduct is judged according to 
the circumstances of the emergency which existed and 
on the facts which were known to him/her when s/he 
was compelled to act. Similarly, it would be 
erroneous to argue that negligence inevitably exists 
if a swab is left in a patient after an operation, 
since regard must be had to the inherent difficulties 
of the particular operation, the condition of the 
patient, the risks to which s/he is exposed, the 
anxiety of the surgeon on surgical grounds to bring
70. See Walker, D.M. , The Law of Delict in Scotland. 
(2nd Ed.), Edinburgh, W. Green S. Son, 1981, pl058
71. See Bevin. T. , Negligence in L a w . Vol. 2, (4th 
Ed.) pp.1353 -1355.
72. It is clearly the case that where it is argued 
that a complaint should have been successfully 
diagnosed by the use of a particular apparatus, 
regard must be had to the availability the apparatus 
in the particular case in order to decide whether 
failure to use it amounts to negligence. See 
Whiteford v. Hunter (1950). 94 Sol. Jo. 758. cf. 
Crivon v. Barnet H.M.C. [1958] C.L.Y. 2283
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the operation to an end as rapidly as possible, and
7 3other similar factors. The degree of care
required varies also in proportion to the magnitude
of the risks involved in the particular procedure,
for example the degree of invasiveness of the
treatment, and therefore to the different areas of
medical and surgical practice. It is fairly clear
that more extensive precautions must be taken where
treatment which involves known risks is administered
than where no such risks can be reasonably
anticipated. Special care must be taken to guard
74against risks with children
The proposition that the standard of skill and 
care demanded of a doctor practicing in a particular 
locality ought to be the general standard existing 
among other practitioners in that locality has not 
been raised in the Scottish courts. It was,
however, raised in the South African case Van Wyk v.
. 75 . . .Lewis Innes, C.J., m  dealing with the issue
s a i d ,
73. Referred to as 'swab' cases. Mahon v. Osborne 
[1939] 1 All ER 535; Dryden v. Surrey C. C . [1936] 2
All E.R. 535; Morris v. Winsbury-White [1937] 4 All
E.R. 494.
74. See Newham v. Rochester and Chatham Joint 
Hospital B o a r d . The Times, February, 28, 1936
75. [1924] app. D. 438; see Bovjerg, "The Medical
Malpractice Standard of Care: HMO's and Customary
Practice", 1975 Duke L .J .1375,1368. The standard 
based on customary local practice was replaced with a 
nationwide standard to allow pursuers to call on 
expert witnesses from outside the locality and thus 
break local "conspiracies of silence".
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"In deciding what is reasonable the court will 
have regard to the general level of skill and 
diligence possessed and exercised at the time 
by members of the branch of the profession to 
which the practitioner belongs. The evidence 
of qualified surgeons or physicians is of the 
greatest assistance in estimating that general 
level. And their evidence may well be 
influenced by local experience; but I desire 
to guard myself from assenting to the 
principle approved in some American decisions 
that the standard of skill which should be 
exacted is that which prevails in the 
particular locality where the practitioner 
happens to reside. The ordinary medical 
practitioner should. as it seems to me. 
exercise the same degree of skill and care 
whether he carries on his work in the town or 
the country, in one place or another. The 
fact that several incompetent or careless 
practitioners happen to settle at the same 
place cannot affect the standard of diligence 
and skill which local patients have a right to 
e x p e c t ."
It is very likely that similar views would be echoed 
in the Scottish courts.
The standard of skill and care is also 
determined by reference to the current state of
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knowledge. in Roe v. Minister of H e a l t h .76 a
spinal anaesthetic was kept in a glass ampoule stored 
in phenol. The phenol which penetrated the ampoules 
through invisible cracks was injected into two 
patients, who thereby suffered injuries. The risk 
of such a mishap occurring was first drawn to the 
attention of the medical profession in 1951. 
McNair, J. held that a doctor was not negligent in 
failing to foresee and guard against the risk which 
occurred.
The case of Crawford v. Board of Governors of
77Charing Cross Hospital illustrates the relevance
of medical literature. The plaintiff suffered a
permanent injury, a brachial palsy, which was a 
consequence of his arm being in a certain position 
during an operation where a blood transfusion was 
necessary. Six months before the operation was 
performed, an article appeared in The Lancet in which 
the author condemned the positioning of the arm that 
gave rise to Crawford's injury. At the trial the 
anaesthetist accepted that he had seen in The Lancet, 
letters commenting on the article, but that he had 
not, in fact, referred to the a r t ’cle itself. It
76. [1954] 2 Q.B., 66. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the decision, stating that they were judging the 
doctor by the state of knowledge in 1947. Lord 
Denning observing that if the same mistake were made 
after 1951, it would amount to negligence.
77. The Times, December 8, (1953)
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was contended that the anaesthetist had been 
negligent in not knowing that the position should not 
be adopted, but the Court of Appeal rejected the
contention, and the position with regard to articles 
in the medical press was stated by Lord Denning as
foilows:
"It would, I think, be putting too high a
burden on a medical man to say that he has to 
read every article appearing in the current 
medical press, and it would be quite wrong to 
suggest that a medical man is negligent
because he does not at once put into operation 
suggestions which some contributor or other 
might make in a medical journal. The time
may come in a particular case when a new 
recommendation may be so well proved and so 
well known as accepted that it should be
adopted. But that was not so in this case." 
The inherent flexibility in the standard is
highlighted in cases where, in order to determine
whether a doctor exercised skill and care, regard is
had to the qualifications, experience and status of
7 8 79the doctor. For example, in J .nor v. McNicol
78. Hucks v. C o l e , The Times. May 9, 1968; see 
Cameron, J.A., Medical N e g l i g e n c e , The Law Society of 
Scotland. Edinburgh. 1983.p . 1; Bevin, T., Negligence 
in La w . Vol. 2, (4th Ed.) pp.1353 -1355.
79. The Times, March 26, 1959.
51
it was stated that the standard of skill and care 
expected of the doctor was that of a prudent
qualified house surgeon, a post normally held by a
ft o
comparative beginner.
The corollary of this principle must be that 
where a doctor lacks the skill and experience to
manage a particular case s/he should refer the case
8 1_
to a competent doctor. In Payne v. St. Helier
8 2
Hospital Management Committee a casualty officer
incorrectly diagnosed the abdominal injuries of a man
who had been kicked by a horse. Donovan, J. held
that the casualty officer was negligent in failing to
have the man examined by a doctor of consultant
rank. An extreme case arose in Nickolls v. Ministry 
8 3of He a l t h , where it was held that surgeons ought 
not to perform operations unless they were fit to do 
so. Often, mischances or inevitable accidents
occur, for which there is no liability, and leaves
80. Langley v. Campbell, The Times, November 6, 1975, 
a general practitioner failed to diagnose malaria.
It was taken into account that malaria was not a
j disease which normally came in the way of the
I ordinary practitioner and the standard of care which
t was applied was that of an ordinary general
j practitioner.; Hunter v. Glasqo Corporation, 1971
• S.C. 220 at 225 where Lord Fraser makes reference to
a 'registrar of ordinary skill'
81. R v. Bateman (1925) 94 L.J.K.B. 791.
82. Payne v. St. Helier H . M . C . , [1952] C.L.Y. 2442
83. [1955] C.L.Y. 1902, a surgeon, suffering from
cancer, operated on a patient for the removal of a 
goitre. The patient's laryngeal nerves were
damaged. The issue was whether the surgeon was
negligent in undertaking the operation.
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. • . 84
the patient without a remedy. This situation is
reflected in many cases and questions the whole
system of claiming compensation.
General and approved practice
The care and skill is normally measured and
defined by reference to the practice of other
practitioners of similar status at the time of the
Q  C
alleged negligence. This invariably involves
seeking expert evidence. In the English case
ft f.
Marshal 1 v. Lindsey C.C. Maugham, L.J. at p 540 
appeared to consider that evidence as to general 
practice, if accepted, was binding upon the court:
"An act, in my opinion, cannot be held to be 
due to a want of reasonable care if it is in 
accordance with the general practice of 
mankind. What is reasonable in a world not 
wholly composed of wise men and women must 
depend on what people presumed to be 
reasonable constantly do. A jury could not 
... properly hold it to be negligent in a"
84. A whole series of such cases exist, of which the 
following are illustrative: White v. Board of
Governors of Westminster Hospital. : ue Times, October 
26, 1961, accidental cutting of retina; Kapur v.
Marshall (1978) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 567, neurosurgeon
pierced artery while removing disc; Gerber v. Pines 
(1935) 79 Sol. J. 13 broken syringe needle due to
muscular spasm; Brazier v. Ministry of Defence [1965] 
1 Ll.L. Rep.26 latent defect in needle.
85. Marshall v. Lindsey C . C . ri935] 1 K.B. 516; Bolam 
v. Friern H.M.C. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582
86. Marshall v. Lindsey C . C . [1935] 1 K.B. 516
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"doctor or a midwife to perform his or her
duties in a confinement without mask and
gloves even though some experts gave evidence
that in their opinion that was a wise
precaution. Such an omission may become
negligent if, and only if, at some future date
it becomes the general custom to take such a
precaution among skilled practitioners."
It is suggested that Maugham, L.J. overstated this
position in the passage quoted above. The court
cannot abdicate, even to expert witnesses, its
ultimate responsibility to determine whether any
particular conduct was negligent. This component of
the test of negligence has come under considerable
criticism as a device to restrict the ambit of a
8 7doctor's liability since it is relied upon more
often in cases of negligence in medical practice than
other professional practices. Lord President
Clyde's succinct analysis of deviation from general
and approved practice has been applied in many cases
8 8and is worthy of quotation,
"To establish liability by a doctor where 
deviation from normal practice is alleged, 
three facts require to be established. First"
87. Gamble, A.J. 'Professional Liability', Legal 
Issues in Medicine, McLean, S.A.M. (Ed.) Gower 1981; 
Norrie, K. M c K . , "Commmon Practice and the Standard 
of Care", J .R ., 1985 pt.2 145, December.
88. Hunter v. H a n l e y , 1955 S.C. 200. at p206
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"of all it must be proved that there is a 
usual and normal practice; secondly it must be 
proved that the defender has not adopted that 
practice; and thirdly (and this is of crucial 
importance) it must be established that the 
course the doctor adopted is one which no 
professional man of ordinary skill would have 
taken if he had been acting with ordinary 
care."
However, not all deviations from normal practice are
8 9necessarily evidence of negligence and the policy
reason for this was clearly expressed by Lord
President Clyde:
"... it would be disastrous if this were so,
for all inducement to progress in medical
science would then be destroyed. Even a
substantial deviation from normal practice may
be warranted by the particular
90circumstances."
89. Crawford v. Charing Cross Hospital. The Times, 
December 8, 1963. See also Chin Keow v. The
Government of Malaysia [1967] 1 W.L.R. 813, where a
doctor departed from normal practice in that he did 
not enquire into the patient's medical history before 
prescribing penicillin; Stokes v. Guest Keen and 
Nettlefold [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1776 where a company
medical officer ignored warnings by a factory 
inspectorate; Robinson v. Post Office [1974] 1
W.L.R. 1176 where a doctor gave the patient a test 
dose of anti-tetanus serum, waited one minute and 
then administered the full dose. The normal
practice was to wait half an hour.
90. Hunter v. H a n l e y , 1955 S.C. 200 at 206.
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The problems of deviation from accepted practice are 
best viewed through two contrasting cases. In
_ _ 91
Landau v. Werner a psychiatrist undertook the 
treatment of the plaintiff, a middle-aged woman in an 
anxiety state. By July 1949 "transference" had 
taken place and she formed an emotional attachment. 
The defendent had a series of social contacts with 
the plaintiff which further aroused the plaintiff's 
feelings causing her condition to deteriorate. The 
medical evidence was to the effect that social 
contact between psychiatrist and patient was contrary 
to normal and approved practice. Barry, J. held 
that the defendent, although acting in good faith, 
had been negligent. This decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal:
"A doctor might not be negligent if he tried a 
new technique but if he did he must justify 
it before the court. If his novel or 
exceptional treatment had failed disastrously 
he could not complain if it was held that he 
went beyond the bounds of due care and skill 
as recognised generally."
By contrast, in Holland v. The Devf ^t and Moore
91. (1961) 105 S.J. 257
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92
Nautical College Ltd. a school medical officer
escaped a finding of negligence, even though he had 
departed from the orthodox method of treatment as
described in the textbooks. He was treating a pupil 
for infective hepatitis and allowed him to get up,
and further, to go home when he showed signs of 
improvement, even though he had not completely- 
recovered. Streatfield J. observed:
"Textbook writers, or writers of articles, 
were writing of a subject generally. They 
were not writing of a particular patient and 
it was common ground between all the doctors
that something must be left to the judgement 
of the doctors on the spot, who did not have 
to treat a case of infective hepatitis only, 
but had a particular patient, Peter Holland, 
to treat... It would be a sorry day for the 
medical profession if it were said that no 
doctor or surgeon ought to depart one little 
from that which he saw written in the 
textbooks."
Lord President Clyde's analysis of deviation from 
general and approved practice, while sound law, poses 
a considerable hurdle for a medically-injured patient
92. The Times, March 4, 1960.
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seeking compensation because in certain circumstances
93it may be difficult to establish such practice.
93. The difficulties and policy considerations will 
be examined later in sec (ii) (c).
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Negligence (ii) (b)
Vicarious liability
Until comparatively recently, medical 
negligence provided an exception to the general rule 
of vicarious liability of an employer for the acts of 
his/her servants. The reason for the courts' 
attitude was largely a reflection of the system of 
health provision that existed before the introduction 
of the National Health Service. Before 1948
hospitals were charities and doctors were often 
uninsured, this possibly explained the courts' 
reluctance to give judgment for the patient. The 
departure from ordinary principles of vicarious 
liability originated in Evans v. Liverpool 
Corporation1 where Walton, J., in dealing with 
liabilities of hospital authorities said,
"They do not undertake the duties of medical 
men or to give medical advice, but they do 
undertake that the patients in their hospital 
shall have competent medical advice and 
assistance."
It was held that the hospital, by appointing a 
competent physician, had d i s c h a r ^ d  its duty to the 
patient and was not therefore responsible for the 
medical practitioner's negligence even though he was
1. [1906] 1 KB 160
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a full-time servant of the authority. This anomaly
was adopted and developed by the Court of Appeal in
Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's 
2
Hospital , where L d . Justice Farwell held
that the hospital authority was not responsible for
the negligence of a consultant surgeon, an assistant
surgeon, a house surgeon and an anaesthestist since
they were not servants of the authority. Hillver * s
case was regarded as authoritative and followed in
subsequent cases for many years. Indeed, Ld.
3Justice Kennedy's judgment was adopted by the 
courts as containing the essence of the decision, 
consequently, hospitals were exonerated from
2. [1909] 2 KB 820; The Scottish position was
similar although the reasons had nothing to do with 
the developments taking place in the English common 
law. According to Lord President Clyde at page 280, 
the Roman law distinction between locatio operis 
faciendi and locatio operarum provided a complete and 
infallible test of the liability of the managers of 
the hospital. Reidford v. Magistrates of Aberdeen. 
1933 S.C. 276; see also Foote v. Greenock Hospital. 
1912 S.C. 69, Hillyer followed; In dealing with the 
question whether certain professional employees who 
rendered services at an infirmary, were employed 
persons within the meaning of the National Health 
Insurance Act, see Lord Dunedin at page 756 in 
Scottish Insurance Commissioners v. Royal Infirmary 
of Edinburgh 1913 S.C. 751 where it was held that 
persons appointed to act in an i n f r m a r y  as resident 
physicians and surgeons, non-resident house 
physicians and house surgeons, clinical assistants 
and anaesthetists were not persons employed within 
the meaning of the Act since the managers of the 
infirmary had no control over the manner in which 
these members of staff carried out their treatment of 
the patients, no contract of service existed between 
them.
3. [1909] 2 K.B. 820
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liability for negligence even of nurses if that 
negligence occurred in the performance of 
professional as distinct from administrative
4
duties . With the exception, therefore, of nurses
engaged in administrative duties, hospitals were
regarded as having fully discharged their duties to
5patients by employing competent staff. The legal 
justification was that skilled staff were treated as, 
and frequently in fact were, independent contractors 
and not employees of the hospital authority. A 
change came in 1942, with the decision in Gold v. 
Essex County Council6 when the Court of Appeal 
reconsidered the application of the principles of 
vicarious liability to hospital authorities and 
concluded that Lord Justices Kennedy and Farwell, had 
gone beyond what was necessary for the decision of
4. In Lavelle v. Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1932 S.C. 
see judgement of Lord Justice-Clerk Alness at p. 257 
where he refuses to assent to the views expressed by 
Kennedy, L.J., in H illyer.
5. In the following examples hospital authorities 
were held not liable for negligence: 
Strangways-Lesmere v. Clayton [1936] 2 K.B. 11, 
patient died as a result of an overdose of a drug 
administered to her by two nurses before the 
operation. It was argued that the only duty resting 
on the hospital was to ensure , "hat the nurses who 
were employed were duly qualified. This was 
overruled by Gold v. Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 
293; Dryden v. Surrey County Council [1936] 2 All ER 
535. The patient was discharged with a wad of 
surgical gauze in her body as a result of the 
negligence of the surgeon and nurses in the conduct 
of the operation.
6. [1942] 2 All ER 237; [1942] 2 KB 293.
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the case and their judgments were no longer to be 
considered good law. Ld. Justice Farwell's views
that nurses pass under the control of the surgeon 
during an operation to such an extent that they are 
no longer servants of the hospital authority and that 
a hospital can discharge its duty to a patient by the 
mere selection of competent professional staff were 
held to be erroneous. Further, the distinction 
drawn between negligence arising in the course of a 
'professional' duty and negligence arising in the 
course of a 'ministerial' or administrative duty was 
held to be artificial. Although the judges accepted
that there was no justification for the special 
position given to hospital authorities as regards 
vicarious liability, they failed to clarify exactly 
what principles should be substituted for those
expressed in Hillyer. The issue of vicarious
liability of hospitals was again raised in Cassidy v.
7
The Ministry of Health where the court considered 
the hospital’s liablity for the negligence of an 
assistant medical officer. The court held that the 
hospital was liable. Lord Justice Denning analysed 
the principles laid down in Hillyer v. Governors of 
St. Bartholomew's Hospital and carried them to their 
logical conclusion in a judgment worthy of extended 
quotation:
7. [1951] 1 All ER 574; [1951] 2 KB 343
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"In my opinion authorities who run a hospital, 
be they local authorities. Government boards 
or any other corporation, are in law under the 
self same duty as the humblest doctor; 
whenever they accept a patient for treatment, 
they must use reasonable care and skill to 
cure him of his ailment. The hospital 
authorities cannot, of course, do it by 
themselves; they have no ears to listen 
through the stethoscope and no hands to hold 
the surgeon's knife. They must do it by the 
staff which they employ. And if their staff 
are negligent in giving the treatment they are 
just as liable for that negligence as is 
anyone else who employs others to do his 
duties for him. What possible differences in 
law, I ask, can there be between hospital 
authorities who accept a patient for 
treatment, and railway or shipping authorities 
who accept a passenger for carriage? None 
whatever. Once they undertake the task, they 
come under a duty to use care in the dealing 
of it, and that is so wh. -her they do it for 
reward or not."
Lord. Justice Denning concluded that,
"When hospital authorities undertake to treat 
a patient, and themselves select and appoint
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"and employ the professional men and women who 
are to give the treatment, then they are 
responsible for the negligence of those 
persons in failing to give proper treatment, 
no matter whether they are doctors, surgeons, 
nurses or anyone else ... it has been said, 
however, by no less an authority than Goddard, 
L.J. in G o l d 1 s case, that the .liability for 
doctors on the permanent staff depends ‘on 
whether there is a contract of service and 
that must depend on the facts of any 
particular case.' I venture to take a 
different view. I think it depends on 
this. Who employs the doctor or surgeon - is 
it the patient or the hospital authorities?
If the patient himself selects and employs the 
doctor or surgeon, as in H i l l y e r 1s case, 
hospital authorities are of course not liable 
for his negligence, because he is not employed 
by them. But where the doctor or surgeon, be 
he consultant or not, is employed and paid, 
not by the patient but by the hospital 
authorities, I am of the opinion that the 
hospital authorities are liable for his 
negligence in treating the patient. It does 
not depend upon whether the contract under 
which he was employed was a contract of"
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"service or a contract for services. That is 
a fine distinction which is sometimes of
importance; but not in cases such as the 
present, where the hospital authorities are 
themselves under a duty to use care in 
treating the patient. I take it to be clear 
law, as well as good sense, that, where a 
person is under a duty to use care, he cannot 
get rid of his responsibility by delegating 
the performance of it to someone else, no
matter whether the delegation be to a servant
under a contract of service or to an
independent contractor under a contract for
g
services."
It can be stated with some confidence therefore, that
modern authority favours the view that a hospital
authority by receiving a patient undertakes a
9
personal obligation or duty towards that patient , 
for breach of which it cannot escape liability by
saying that it employed competent persons to 
discharge the obligation or duty on its behalf. The 
extent of this duty is a question of fact in each
8.[1951] 1 All ER 574; [1951] 2 KB 343 at p.
9. MacDonald v. Board of Management of Glasgow 
Western Hospitals, 1954, S.C. 453 - hospital liable
for negligence by resident medical officers; Fox v.
Glasgow South Western Hospitals 1955 S.L.T. 3 37 
hospital liable for negligence of nurse; Hall v. Lees 
[1904] 2 K.B. 603; Collins v. Herts C.C. [1947] 1
K.B. 598.
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case. Similar principles apply to National Health 
Service Hospitals. Therefore the obligation on 
National Health Service Hospitals goes beyond 
providing competent staff, it must actually provide 
medical treatment and nursing to their patients by 
means of the staff and facilities comprised in their 
organisation.10 Where there may be doubt as to 
the application of vicarious liability in a 
particular case, a hospital board may be found liable 
on the alternative ground of a failure to carry out 
their statutory duties.11
It is submitted that where a patient has made 
a private arrangement for accommodation in a 
non-private hospital, the nature and extent of the 
hospital's obligations are unaffected since the 
arrangement is for accommodation provided and not the 
services of the hospital staff. However, where a 
patient enters the pay-bed accommodation of a 
National Health Service hospital and has made 
arrangements to be treated as a private patient by a 
particular doctor or surgeon, the position must be 
different. In such cases the hospital cannot be 
held to be responsible for any nee’ Igence on the
10. The extent of this obligation was considered in 
the appeal case case Razzel v. Snowba 11 [1954] 3 All
ER 429; see also unreported case against DHSS, Court 
of Appeal. March 18, 1980
11. MacDonald v. Board of Management of Glasgow 
Western Hospitals. 1954, S.C. 453; Fox v. Glasgow 
South Western Hospitals 1955 S.L.T. 337.
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part of the doctor or surgeon, notwithstanding that 
these may be employed as consultants at the 
hospital. The reason is that the doctor is regarded 
as being employed by the patient rather than by the
hospital; this fact leads inevitably to the inference 
that the hospital assumes no obligation with regard
to the provision of their services. The hospital 
would be responsible for providing services other 
than those which the patient him/herself has 
undertaken. They would be liable for nursing staff 
and care, dressings, drugs, equipment and so on but
not for the actual medical or surgical treatment. 
This might give rise to factual problems. for 
example, a dispute as to what the doctor prescribed 
and what the nurse administered.
Private nursing homes
The liabilities of a private hospital will 
depend upon the terms, express and implied, of the 
contract made with the patient. There is no doubt 
that such hospitals will be held liable for the
consequences of negligent nursing by its staff. In
12Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home , where the
House of Lords restored a finding by the trial judge 
that nurses employed by the defendants had been 
negligent, it was never contended that the defendants 
could escape the consequences of such negligence.
12. [1935] A.C. 243
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In the majority of cases, a patient who enters 
a private nursing home will have made arrangements
for any treatment to be administered by his/her own
private doctor or one whom s/he has selected. In
such circumstances the nursing home will not be held
liable for any negligence on the part of the
patient's own doctor. since it can only be held
liable in respect of such services as it has itself 
expressly or impliedly contracted to provide. Lord 
Denning's analysis13 of the situation was as 
follows,
"Who employs the doctor or surgeon - is it the 
patient or the hospital authorities? If the 
patient himself selects and employs the doctor 
or surgeon... hospital authorities are of 
course not liable for his negligence, because 
he is not employed by them."
13. Cassidy v. Minister of Health [1951] 1 All E.R.574
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Negligence (ii) (c)
The legal hazards
Although the law, as outlined in part (i) and
(ii) above seems to be straightforward, it is
submitted that it scarcely • reflects the legal
complexities faced by the patient. This section
attempts to highlight some of the complexities met in
practice. These must be considered against a
background which is in some ways peculiar.
It has been suggested by some commentators
that the law places considerably more emphasis on
•policy' by restricting the ambit of liability in
medical negligence cases as compared with those
involving other professional groups.1
The public's attitude, which today is
increasingly conditioned towards a critical
consumerism, whereby every failure must be
2
compensated, has been assessed by one of the 
medical profession, in the following terms,
"To the layman ... if a patient is injured as 
a result of hospital treatment, and if he"
1.For example. Gamble, A.J. 'Professional Liability', 
Legal Issues in Medicine. McLean, S.A.M. (Ed.) Gower 
Publishing Company, 1981
2. In 1953, Lord Goddard felt the pressure of the 
trend and indicated his resistance to it when he said,
"Nowadays, if somebody is unfortunate enough 
to meet with of an accident from which some 
injury results, it is always thought that 
there ought to be somebody to pay. I think 
that that idea is getting far too common."
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"needs money to provide for his case and his 
wants and to compensate for his suffering, 
then he must be awarded damages. Injury 
demands compensation."3
In light of the divergent attitudes expressed above, 
which understandably reflect different
group-interests, policy considerations are explored 
and the practical difficulties facing dissatisfied 
patients who claim damages are assessed. The 
problems which will be examined include: evidence and 
proof; lapse of time; expenses; proving and assessing 
loss.
Policy considerations
In any individual case there is a natural 
sympathy and desire to see a patient, injured through
4
no fault of his/her own, compensated. Whenever a 
patient brings an action s/he does so with the object 
of obtaining some relief or other outcome beneficial 
to him/herself. This takes the form of damages, 
which is a monetary compensation for the injury or 
loss.
3. BMJ 1980 pl21.
4. See generally. Damages for Personal Injuries and 
D e a t h , Munkman, 1970; Street, Principles of the Law 
of Damages p4-13, 1962; Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, 
Compensation and the L a w . 3rd. Edition 1982, 
Introduction p.l.
5. Walker, D.M. , The Law of Damages in Scotland. W. 
Green & Son. Edinburgh, (1955). Ogus, The Law of 
D a m a g e s . 1973; Walker, D . M . , The Law of Delict in 
Scotland. 2nd. Edition, 1981, p. 460 and 461
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In several judicial pronouncements6 concern 
has been expressed at the danger of raising the 
standard of skill and care too high in order fully to 
compensate patients and in awarding very high damages
for purely sympathetic reasons. In Whitehouse v.
7 •Jordan for example. Lord Denning stated his
concern in the following terms,
"Take heed of what has happened in the United
States. 'Medical malpractice' cases there are
very worrying, especially as they are tried by
juries who have sympathy for the patient and
none for the doctor, who is insured. The
damages are colossal. The doctors insure but
the premiums become very high; and these have
to be passed on in fees to the patients.
Experienced practitioners are known to have
refused to treat patients for fear of being
accused of negligence. Young men are even
deterred from entering the profession because
of the risks involved. In the interests of
all, we must avoid such consequences in
England. Not only must we avoid excessive
damages, we must say, and say firmly, that,"
6. Many of which have been made by Lord Denning
7.[1980] 1 All E.R. (C.A .) 650 at 658
71
"in a professional man, an error of judgment 
is not negligent."
While the House of Lords questioned Lord Denning's 
statement regarding errors of judgment, the policy 
considerations did not attract any comment. In
Q
Hucks v. Cole, similar policy considerations were
promoted by Lord Denning, admittedly with less force
9on this occasion. Robertson suggests that the 
Whitehouse case contains many ingredients which are 
'pro-defendant* and argues that,
"When the desire to implement a particular 
policy, such as discouraging medical 
negligence claims, reaches such an extent as 
to conflict with the dispassionate 
consideration of an individual case on its own 
merits, then there is genuine cause for 
concern."
Further, it is suggested that there was no convincing 
reason for the ease with which the House of Lords and 
the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's 
finding of fact despite references to authorities10 
which lay down severe contraints on an appellate 
court's power to reverse a trial court's finding of
8.The Times, May 9, 1968.
9. (1981) 44 M.L.R. pp.457-461
10. Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] 
A.C.243 where considerable reference was made to 
Hontestroom v. Saqaporack [1927] A.C. 37; Clarke v. 
Edinburgh Tramways Co. 1919 S.C. (H.L.) 35, 36
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fact. In addition. Lord Denning's reference to the 
possibility of the American malpractice crisis 
arising in England was not based on convincing 
evidence.^1 It was clear that no account was made
1 o
of the fact that the Pearson Commission 
considered this very question and concluded that 
fears of a crisis were unfounded.
Lord Denning's 'non-interventionist' tendency 
was certainly made clear in Whitehouse v. Jordan 
(1979). He commented on the great disservice which 
would result to both the medical profession and 
society at large. In his concern at the American 
experience of claims against doctors he referred to 
the astronomical awards. crippling insurance 
premiums, prohibitively expensive treatment and 
unwillingness to treat at all except in the most 
straight-forward cases.
11 At first instance, the surgeon was held negligent 
for the manner in which he carried out a trial of 
forceps (although this finding was reversed on 
appeal). Shortly afterwards, an article appeared in 
the British Medical Journal expressing the fear that 
the decision may deter obstetricians from undertaking 
trials of forceps and lead to an increase in 
Caesarian operations. "Inevitably the decision has 
led to worry that trial of forceps may no longer be 
legally safe. If that worry was justified, then any 
ensuing tendency to 'defensive medicine' would result 
in more frequent Caesarians with their own different 
risks to mother and child." Negligence and Forceps 
Delivery (1979) 1 B . M.J. 763.
12. Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury, Cmnd. 7054-1 
(1978). Vol. 1, paras. 1318-1324.
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As mentioned earlier, it is doubtful whether
the comparison between British and American practice
is wholly valid. In the American system, damages
are assessed by juries rather than by judges, and, it
is submitted that juries are much more likely to be
sympathetic to the injured patient and probably have
equally little regard either for the rules of law in
difficult cases or for the conventional scales of
awards. Further, the American juries recognise that
an award must take into account the patient's legal
fees. Unlike the Scottish and English legal systems
these are assessed on a contingency basis whereby a
patient may have no costs if s/he is unsuccessful,
otherwise s/he incurs a third or more of any award.
Denning's views do not pay sufficient attention to
the dissimilarities in the American system of health
care. American doctors, particularly specialists,
in addition to being salaried, also play an
entrepreneurial role in their practice - a role which
is absent in British doctors. Indeed one
13commentator has suggested that,
“The U.S. doctor has been accustomed to having 
something to sell: a surgical operation,"
13. Stevens, 'The evolution of the Health-Care 
Systems in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
Similarities and Differences' in Priorities for the 
Use of Resources in Medicine (1977), Fogarty 
International Center Proceedings No. 40 at p27.
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"prescriptions, a complete physical check-up, 
a spell of hospitalisation. As a corollary, 
the U.S. public continues to treat its doctors 
as business operators, bringing suit when the 
commodity falls short of expectations. 
British patients, still more passive in their 
acceptance of care, would find it 
extraordinary to take such action."
If we accept the distinction between 
negligence and misadventure we must recognise that 
while the distinction assists the medical profession 
it achieves very little for the injured patient of 
such misadventure who seeks compensation. Two cases 
bring sharply into focus the problems associated with 
the distinction between negligence on the one hand, 
and misadventure, to which no liability attaches, on 
the other. In Chubey v. Ahsan.14 (1977) the
surgeon unknowingly damaged the patient's aorta 
during a disc operation. No undue loss of blood was 
noticed and so no remedial action was taken until too 
late. Evidence was given, in specific indications 
of probability, that such damage only occurred once 
in every 7,000 cases. These figures could be 
interpreted in two possible ways; if 6,999 of such
14 (1977) 71 D.L.R. (3d) 550
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procedures are successful, then the doctor who is 
unsuccessful in the 7,000th must be negligent; 
alternatively one could argue that the outcome could 
never be guaranteed in any operation, no matter how 
straightforward and usually successful. It was 
held, by a majority of two to one, that the outcome 
can never be guaranteed. To suggest that because 
most cases have a successful outcome, therefore all 
cases must be successful, is an unrealistic
proposition of medical practice and an unacceptable
proposition of law. Contrast this with Barrett v.
15Swindon HMC where as a result of an involuntary 
twitch on the surgeon's part, to the extent of 
one-fifth of an inch, forceps pierced the patient's 
spinal cord. This caused irreparable damage. It 
can hardly be argued that the surgeon was not doing 
his best and yet the consequences were disastrous for 
the patient. The judge in this case decided that
there was negligence, but probably only by seeking to 
decide which was the lesser of two evils. The
alternative would be to permit the consultant to have 
muscular twitches to up to one-fifth of an inch or 
thereabouts in an area where extreme precision is
vital, and that could not be tolerated. There is no 
doubt that this was an extremely hard decision.
15. The Guardian, February 13, (1973 ) .
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From a comparison between these cases the system of 
compensation for victims of medical injuries won Id 
appear to be unsound since both victims are injured 
yet only one receives compensation.
The application of negligence to doctors has 
been restricted in other ways, for example, by 
placing an undue emphasis on the element of risk 
inherent in surgery. In Roe v. Ministry of 
Health1 6 , the risk involved in surgery was used to 
defeat a claim in negligence. Lord Denning
expressed the policy in the following terms ,
" it is so easy to be wise after the event 
and to condemn as negligence that which was 
only misadventure. We ought always to be on 
our guard against it, especially in cases 
against hospitals and doctors. Medical
science has conferred great benefits on 
mankind, but these benfits are attended by 
considerable risks. Every surgical operation 
is attended by risks. Every advance in 
techniques is also attended by risks. 
Doctors, like the rest of us, have to learn by 
experience. Experience often teaches in a 
hard w a y . ..We cannot take the benefits without 
the risks."
16. [1954], 2 Q . B . , 66.
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As mentioned earlier, the degree of care 
required varies in proportion to the magnitude of the 
risks involved. Where the risk which eventuates is 
a known risk then clearly a doctor would have to take 
more extensive precautions than where the risk was 
unknown and could not have been anticipated. All 
that a doctor can be held bound to forsee are the 
reasonable and probable consequences of his/her 
failure to take care. It is well known for example 
that X-ray burns may result from an over-exposure to 
the rays during treatment; special care must 
therefore be taken to ensure that the patient is 
exposed to such rays for a safe period. Sometimes 
it may be necessary to take special precautions to 
guard against a reasonably foreseeable risk as where 
a patient has a history of mental illness and 
attempts to leave the hospital or attempt suicide.
In Thorne v. Northern Group H.M.C.1 7 , the plaintiff 
failed to win an award of damages for the death of 
his wife who had left a hospital in a suicidal mood 
and gassed herself. The court took the view that 
although the degree of supervision which a hospital 
should exercise in relation to patients with known 
suicidal tendencies is higher than that to be 
exercised over other patients, such patients
17. (1964) 108 Sol J. 484; Hyde v. Tameside A.H.A. .
(The Times), April 16, 1981, C.A.
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could not be kept under contant supervision by 
hospital staff.18
Where the risk is known then failure to 
exercise precautions to avoid a particular risk will 
only amount to negligence if the risk is of a 
reasonably substantial character. Indeed, where the 
risk is known, but can be characterised as negligible 
a failure to exercise precautions can be considered 
compatible with the exercise of proper skill and 
care. An early example of this principle arose in 
Warren v. Greig and White19 where a patient who had 
undergone an operation for the removal of 
twenty-eight teeth died from excessive bleeding. It 
was subsequently discovered that he had been 
suffering from acute myeloid leukaemia. It was held 
that the doctor and dentist were not guilty of 
negligence in failing to test the patient's blood. 
The disease was a rare one, and it could not be said 
that a blood test ought to be carried out, before an 
operation of this nature, as a safeguard against the
18.Cf. Selfe v. Ilford and District H.M.C. (1970) 114 
Sol. J.935, the patient, known to have suicidal 
tendencies was not kept under constant observation 
and fell from the hospital roof, while two nurses on 
duty had left the ward. Damages were awarded 
against the hospital authority. See also Hyde v. 
Tameside Area H. A. (1981) The Times, 16 April C.A. 
where Lord Denning expressed strong policy grounds 
for not allowing damages to be awarded in suicide 
cases.
19. The Lancet, 1935, vol.i, p.330.
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bare possibility that such a condition existed. The 
duty of care in relation to the size of the risk was 
discussed in Bolam v. Friern H.M.C.2 0 . It was 
argued for the defence that the risk of fracture 
without use of a relaxant was minimal although it was 
conceded that if it did occur it could be very 
serious for the patient. The substance of the 
defendants' case was that they balanced what they 
believed to be a remote risk of fracture on the one 
hand and a remote risk of mortality on the other. 
Indeed the risk was assessed by an expert as one in 
50,000 cases and that the particular injury which 
produced the disastrous results in the patient was 
one of extreme rarity.
Therefore negligence will consist of a failure 
to take sufficient precautions to guard against known 
risks; further, that by known risks are meant not 
simply those risks which were in fact known to the 
individual doctor whose conduct is in question, but 
risks which were known or ought reasonably to have 
been known to the ordinary skilled practitioner of 
his/her class. Clearly, what is reasonably
foreseeable must depend on the general standard of 
knowledge. For example it was not known until 1951 
that ampoules of spinal anaesthetic could develop
20. 1957 1 W.L.R. 591
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invisible cracks so that if they were put in phenol 
the phenol might enter the cracks and result in 
paralysis of the patient.2 “^ The courts' response
to 'risks' in medical negligence cases contain
considerable policy arguments, many of which were 
made by Lord Denning. For example in his
instruction to the jury in Hatcher v. Black22 where
the patient sued following a thyroidectomy during 
which the left recurrent laryngeal nerve was injured. 
Lord Denning said,
"In the case of an accident on the road there 
ought not to be any accident if everyone used 
proper care and the same applies in a factory; 
but in hospital, when a person goes in who is
ill and is going to be treated, no matter what
care you use there is always some risk. 
Every surgical operation involves risks. It 
would be wrong, and indeed bad law, to say
that simply because a misadventure or mishap 
occurred, thereby the hospital and the doctors 
are liable. Indeed it would be disastrous to
the community if it were so. It would mean
that a doctor examining a patient, or a 
surgeon operating at a table, instead of 
getting on with his work, would forever be
21. Roe v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66
22. The Times, July 2, (1954)
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"looking over his shoulder to see if someone
were coming up with a dagger. For an action
for negligence against a doctor is for him
like unto a dagger. His professional
reputation is dear to him as his body, perhaps
more so, and an action for negligence can
wound his reputation as severely as a dagger
can his body. You must not therefore find
him negligent simply because something happens
to go wrong, as for instance if one of the
risks inherent in an operation actually takes
place or because some complications ensue
which lessen or take away the benefits that
were hoped for or because, in a matter of
opinion he makes an error of judgment."
Similarly, in the recent case, Whitehouse v.
7 3J o r d a n . although mainly examined for the
distinction made between errors of clinical judgment 
and errors of judgment, the 'risks' inherent in 
pregnancy were discussed. Lawton L.J. acknowledged 
from the evidence that what was involved was an 
evaluation of risks. At page 659 he said,
"Obstetrical forceps must have saved the lives 
of many mothers and babies since they were 
first used a very long time ago; but it is"
23. [1980] 1 All E.R. 652
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"common knowledge that babies on whom they are 
used sometimes suffer injury . . . the doctor in 
each case has to decide for himself whether to 
apply forceps and continue to do so or to stop 
and deliver the baby by Caesarean section. 
There are risks in either procedure:"
He then expressed his opinion as to the hardship 
faced in negligence actions for victims of medical 
mishaps in the following terms,
"As long as liability in this type of case 
rests on proof of fault judges will have to go 
on making decisions which they would prefer 
not to make. The victims of medical mishaps 
of this kind should, in my opinion, be cared 
for by the community, not by the hazards of 
litigation."
It can be argued that the courts are placed in a 
difficult position when dealing with 'risks’ of 
treatment, or for that matter with 'deviation from 
normal practice', because it is attempting to strike 
a balance between allowing the doctor the use of 
clinical judgment/freedom and holding him/her 
accountable for his/her conduct which is protected at 
law by observing the standard of behaviour laid down 
in Hunter v. Hanley. For the patient involved in a 
medical negligence action, the debate concerning the 
foreseeability of risks, substantial or minimal
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becomes an academic issue since s/he is having to 
bear the consequences, however tragic, of the risk 
which materialised.
It is argued that the issue of 'risk' involves 
basic value judgments and can only be resolved in the 
specific context of resources available for 
compensation. Further it is possible to say that 
risks within medical treatment are really just a 
subset of all risks that people encounter in life. 
Probably every medical procedure entails some degree 
of risk, which either may be directly attributable to 
medical intervention or merely to a risk of life that 
happens to occur during the course of medical care, 
such as a myocardial infarction during a routine 
physical examination.
The differentiation of risks inherent in 
medical treatment from risks of life is clearly 
important because of the direct relationship between 
this issue and the scope of compensation. 
Obviously, the enactment of a comprehensive national 
health insurance scheme would diminish the necessity 
of distinguishing risks of treatment from risks of 
life. The position at the moment is unacceptable 
both for the patient and the doctor. The
difficulties for the patient have been highlighted; 
the medical profession are very uncomfortable with 
the idea that they or the hospital authorities should
84
be held financially responsible for ordinary risks of 
life. If a new compensation system is to develop 
then within the general category of risks of life, 
there will be some medical injuries that a 
compensation system should cover simply because
making the distinction between risk of treatment and 
risk of life would be too difficult and expensive.
The issue must be addressed for those medical
injuries that are clearly identifiable as risks of 
treatment. It is submitted that the decision to 
compensate for losses arising out of treatment is 
dependent on value judgments about the relative 
responsibilities of doctors and society as a whole 
for certain types of adverse outcomes. The
identification of risks in treatment will be 
conducted in the next chapter and their application 
to the development of an alternative system of 
compensation to the present one will be considered in 
the concluding chapter.
The reliance on 'usual or normal practice',
has several difficulties in its application in
medical practice and these were highlighted in Bolam
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v. Friern H.M.C. It was alleged that there was
negligence in not administering a relaxant drug 
before passing a current to the brain. Expert
24. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582
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witnesses had to be called by both sides to determine 
whether there was a normal practice in using relaxant 
drugs. Some used relaxant drugs, some used other 
methods but all agreed that there was a firm body of 
medical opinion opposed to the use of relaxant 
drugs. McNair, J. stated the position in the 
following terms:
"[A medical practitioner] is not guilty of 
negligence if he had acted in accordance with 
a practice approved as proper by a responsible 
body of medical men skilled in that particular 
art . . . merely because there was a body of 
opinion who would take a contrary v i e w . " 
Therefore deviation from normal practice can be 
justified by reference to some other acceptable 
authority. The major difficulty with the above 
proposition is that while there must be an 
'acceptable ' difference of opinion, the success of a
case will often depend on how much scope there is for
2 5such differences. The problem was more recently
highlighted in the case, Maynard v. West Midlands
25. Crivon v. Barnet H.M.C. The Times, November 19 
(1958). Further, negligence will consist of a 
failure to take sufficient precautions to guard 
against known risks; this means not only known risks 
which were in fact known to the particular doctor, 
but risks which were known or ought reasonably to 
have been known to the ordinary skilled doctor of 
his/her class.
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Regional Health Authority where two consultants 
who were treating the plaintiff for a chest complaint 
thought she might be suffering from tuberculosis, but 
also considered the possibility that she might be 
suffering from Hodgkin's disease. Before obtaining 
the result of a test which would have determined 
whether there was tuberculosis they decided to 
perform an exploratory operation to determine whether 
she was suffering from Hodgkin's disease. As a 
result of the operation the plaintiff suffered damage 
to a nerve affecting her vocal cords which caused her 
speech to be impaired. This was an inherent risk of 
the operation. The plaintiff brought an action 
against the health authority claiming that the 
consultants had been negligent in deciding to carry 
out the operation before obtaining the result of the 
tuberculosis test. At the trial of the action, 
expert medical evidence was called on both sides 
concerning whether the operation should have been 
carried out. The judge expressed his 'preference' 
for the plaintiff's expert evidence and accordingly 
gave judgment to the plaintiff. On appeal the Court 
of Appeal reversed the judge's decision, holding that 
there had been no negligence. The plaintiff 
appealed to the House of Lords where it was held
26. [1985] 1 All E.R. 635
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that, where a plaintiff's claim was based on an 
allegation that the fully considered decision of two 
consultants in the field of their special skill was 
negligent, it was not sufficient for the plaintiff to 
show that there was a body of competent opinion which 
considered that that decision was wrong if there also 
existed a body of professional opinion, equally 
competent, which supported the decision as being 
reasonable in the circumstances. Furthermore, it 
was not sufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
subsequent events demonstrated that an operation need 
not have been performed if the decision to operate 
was reasonable at the time.
It was recognised by the House that
differences of opinion and practice existed in the
medical profession and that there was seldom any one
answer exclusive of all others to problems of
professional judgment and therefore although the
court might prefer one body of opinion to the other
that was not a basis for a conclusion that there had
been negligence on the part of the defendant 
doctor. The House of Lords upheld the Appeal 
Court's decision.
Clearly, negligence cannot be established 
merely by showing that some schools of medicine 
disapprove of a particular practice, if nevertheless 
it remains a widespread and approved practice
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elsewhere. Indeed where there exist two or more 
recognised schools of thought the doctor must be 
entitled to choose between the rival doctrines and 
cannot be held negligent because s/he chooses one 
rather than the other.27 It follows therefore, 
that evidence by the exponents of some school, 
expressing their disapproval of the course in fact
adopted, will not in these circumstances go to show
2 8negligence m  the exponent of another school.
It is submitted that what will be required, in order 
to establish negligence, is evidence of a want of 
care or a lack of skill in administering that
generally approved method of treatment which was in
fact adopted in the particular case. In Hunter v. 
Hanley it was said,
"The practitioner must not obstinately and 
pigheadedly carry on with the same old
technique if it has been proved to be contrary"
27. See Hunter v. H anley. 1955 S.C.200 Lord 
President Clyde at p.206 for policy argument; see 
also Harrington v. Essex Area Health Authority. The 
Times, Nov. 14 1984
28. In the United States of America unorthodox 
systems of medicine are widely practiced and have in 
many instances received statutory recognition. The 
question whether or not a practitioner in his/her 
treatment of the patient exercised the requisite 
degree of care, skill and diligence is tested by the 
general rules of the particular school of medicine 
which s/he follows and not by those of other schools, 
since s/he is only under the duty of exercising the 
degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by 
practitioners of his/her school.
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"to what is really substantially the whole of 
informed medical opinion."
While it can be stated that a doctor should not in 
general resort to a new practice or remedy until its 
efficacy and safety has been sufficiently tested by 
experience, the courts do not press this proposition 
to a point where it might stifle initiative and 
discourage advances in technique. Clearly the
policy is that somebody has got to try innovative 
treatment. According to Hunter v. H a n l e y , as long
as a doctor observes the standard of behaviour laid
down in that case, i.e. where s/he does not 
unreasonably deviate from the usual practice accepted 
by reputable colleagues s/he is protected from an 
action in negligence. However, it is well known 
that tried and tested therapies often fail and indeed 
orthodox methods of treatment may fail to cure or 
provide a remedy for a particular patient. In these 
circumstances a doctor may feel ethically or 
professionally bound to adopt a new method of 
treatment - in other words s/he would deviate from
normal practice. In assessing whether innovative 
procedures would amount to negligence the courts 
would have to examine evidence of pre-clinical and 
post-clinical trials; inherent dangers; the 
patient's previous response to orthodox treatment and 
so on. While there may be doubts about the
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2 9objectives of some medical researches ultimately 
any decision is bound to be a value judgment, 
possibly justified on a risk/benefit analysis which 
shows the balance tending towards benefits.
The cases illustrate that while Lord Clyde's 
dictum in Hunter v. Hanley provides an attractive and 
simple exposition of the law, its simplicity belies 
the complexities found in reality which must be met 
by the injured patient. Admittedly, while it is 
possible in the majority of medical cases to 
demonstrate the existence of a 'usual and normal 
practice', there can be disagreement as to the 
appropriate course to adopt. Without doubt this can 
be a formidable obstacle in the patient's path to 
compensation for medical injury, so much so that it 
is understandable that s/he may think a remedy in 
delict or tort for compensation for his/her injury is 
almost mythical.
Consent
The most recent policy consideration 
attracting considerable attention is the courts' 
attitude towards the development of the doctrine of
29. Ciba Foundation Study Group: "Medical Research:
Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury 
- a discussion paper", (1980) Brit. Med. J. 1172; 
Thompson, I.E., et al, "Research Ethical Committees
in Scotland", (1981) 282 Brit. Med._____
718;Pellegrino, E, and Thomasma, D. , A Philosophical 
Basis of Medical Practice. O.U.P. 1981
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‘informed c o n s e n t 1 . Although there has been a
considerable volume of both case law and 
31literature devoted to informed consent. the 
concept escapes precise definition. The cases are 
mainly concerned with the disclosure of risks 
involved in medical procedures, the issues indeed can 
be resolved into one of the patient's right to 
self-determination. The arguments invariably turn 
on the extent which is required of the disclosure of 
risks to the patient before s/he consents to the 
treatment proposed.
Before the recent decision in the House of
32Lords the test applied by the courts as to the
disclosure risks was that laid down in Bolam v.
33F n e r n  Hospital Management Committee namely that 
of competent medical opinion - the normal test for 
medical negligence claims. The facts in Bolam are 
straightforward; during a course of electro-
30. See Robertson, G., 'Informed Consent to Medical 
Treatment', 97 L . Q . R . 102 (1981); Skegg, P.D.G..
'Informed Consent to Medical Procedures', 15 M e d . 
Sci. & Law 124 (1975)
31. Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Ho s p i t a l . (C.A.) 1984;
Hatcher v. B l a c k . The Times, July 2, 1954; Chatterton 
v. Gerson [1981] 1 All E.R. 257; Reibl v. Hughes
(1980) 114 D.L.R.(3d)l; see also: Clements, L.,
"Self-determination and Informed Consent to Medical 
Treatment", 1 P . N . 136; Porzio, R. , "The Linchpin of
Informed Consent",(1985) Report Seventh World 
Congress on Medical L a w .vol 2:1 Norrie, K. , "Informed 
Consent and the Duty of Care", 1985 S .L . T .289
32 Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem 
Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 2
W.L.R. 480
33 [1957] 2. All E.R. 118
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convulsive therapy the patient sustained fractures of 
the acetabula. It was known that with such 
procedures, without use of a muscle relaxant, there 
was a slight risk of bone fracture. The patient 
sued the defendant for failing to warn him of the 
risks involved in the treatment. Expert witnesses 
said that at the defendant's hospital it was the 
practice of doctors not to warn their patients of the 
risks of treatment unless asked; if asked, they said 
there was a very slight risk. (1 in 10,000). It was 
held that in determining whether or not the plaintiff 
was entitled to succeed on his allegation of failure 
to warn, the material considerations were, first, 
whether or not the defendants, in not warning him of 
the risks involved in the treatment, had fallen below 
a standard of practice recognised as proper by a 
competent body of professional opinion and, if good 
medical practice did require warning, then, secondly, 
would the plaintiff if warned, have refused to 
undergo the treatment, and that it was for the 
plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of the court 
that, had he been warned he would not have taken the
treatment. However. as a result of Sidaway v.
34
Bethlem Royal Hospital and The Maudslev Hospital 
there has been a perceptible shift in the law. In
34. [1985] 2, W.L.R. 480
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Sidaway. the patient, after an unsuccessful 
operation, performed without negligence, on her spine 
was left in a state of partial paralysis. The 
patient claimed that the surgeon was negligent in 
that he failed to warn her of a 1% risk of injury to 
the spinal cord. The judge accepted, from the
evidence, that not mentioning the remote risk of 
paralysis was in agreement with competent medical 
practice, and found the surgeon not guilty of
negligence. This was essentially an application of 
the Bolam test. The House of Lords rejected
Sidaway*s claim, but in doing so they effected a 
noticeable shift in the law to the patient's
advantage. Although the House stated that the
minimum standards of the duty of care was that of 
competent medical opinion - (the Bolam test) it was 
subject to an important proviso which allowed the
courts to intervene if medical opinion does not
support the giving of enough information to enable 
the patient to reach a balanced decision. Patients 
had to be informed of substantial or special risks 
with serious adverse consequences. Clearly
therefore, the minimum standard of the duty of care 
is imposed on the doctor, but where the treatment is 
surgical and competent medical practice will be 
persuasive evidence, it will not, as in other types 
of medical negligence cases, be conclusive. This
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certainly is in sharp contrast with issues concerning 
diagnosis and treatment, where the doctor's duty is 
satisfied if s/he has complied with what is 
considered good practice by a responsible body of 
opinion.
Many of the arguments reveal two schools of
thought. The first approach, often said to be 
35•paternalistic1 , suggests that a doctor is 
entitled to withhold information where the disclosure 
of such information is likely to be detrimental to 
the health of the patient or the efficacy of the 
treatment. The other approach, which assumes a 
rational patient, suggests that a doctor should give 
a patient such facts as are relevant to the proposed 
treatment in order that the patient can make an 
informed and rational decision. The selection of 
•relevant' facts would appear to undermine the 
foundation of the latter approach since it 
necessarily involves some degree of medical
assessment. Difficulties inherent in the second
3 6
approach, analysed by Mason and McCall Smith
35. Buchanan, "Medical Paternalism". (1978) 7
Philosophy and Public Affairs 370; Teff, H . , "Consent
to Medical Procedures: Paternalism,
Self-determination or Therapeutic Alliance?" L.Q.R. 
Vol 101, 1985 423; Kennedy, I., The Unmasking of
M e d i c i n e . London, 1981.
36. Mason and McCall Smith, Law & Medical Ethics.
London, Butterworths, 1983. p . 121
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have been stated in the following terms.
"[This] ... fully satisfies the requirements
of self-determination but can be criticised on
the grounds that it leaves little scope for
the exercise of clinical judgment by the
doctor. Is there any point in burdening a
patient with knowledge of risks when a doctor
in charge... knows or at least strongly
suspects. that this will serve to retard
recovery? Reassurance of the patient may be
an essential part of the programme of
treatment and any dwelling on or even mention
of risks may well harm the patient's health."
The legal response to 'informed' consent has been to
consider it as a feature of a doctor's duty of care
rather than one of a patient's right to
self-determination by adopting the view that any
remedy for failure in obtaining consent must lie in
37negligence as opposed to an action m  assault. 
There is no doubt that the difference in the forms of
action have important consequences for the patient.
3 8As argued earlier in an action for assault the
37. This conclusion can only be drawn from the 
judgments in Chatterton v. Gerson and Another where 
it was held that the appropriate action would be in 
negligence rather than assault.
38. at p. 6; however the standard of proof is higher, 
namely, 'beyond all reasonable doubt'.
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patient has only to establish that the medical
intervention was unauthorised. No question would
arise about differing standards of medical practice,
the doctor's exercise of therapeutic privilege, or
the calling of expert evidence. Equally there would
be no need to investigate the question of proximate
cause. In negligence this imposes a negative burden
of proof on the patient, namely, that s/he would not
have consented to the procedure if s/he had been
adquately informed. It is argued by many
39academics that this policy is adopted m  order to 
restrict successful actions against the medical 
profession since there are more hurdles to overcome 
in a negligence action than in assault. Clearly, 
the effect of the distinction which has developed 
between assault and negligence has restricted the 
scope of any consent-based action. It is submitted 
that the problems raised by consent must be seen in 
terms of the overall attitude of the courts towards 
the question of medical negligence liability. These 
have been succinctly considered by Mason and McCall 
Smith,40
39. see "Informed Consent and the Duty of Care", 
Norrie, K. 1985 S.L.T. 289; "Self-determination and 
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment", Clements, L. 
1 P . N . 13 6
40. Mason and McCall Smith, Law & Medical E t h i c s . 
London Butterworths, 1983, p. 125
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"British courts are clearly cautious. 
Actions based on lack of consent are generally 
seen by lawyers as a last-ditch attempt to
obtain damages when no more obvious medical
negligence is evident. In this light,
consent actions may well be regarded as 
back-door attempts to extend the scope of 
medical liability and may, therefore, expect 
to encounter both judicial scepticism and
powerfully voiced policy objections."
41It is evident from case law that there is a
noticeable judicial deference to the views of doctors 
about their liability for negligence. This can to 
some extent be justified when considering technical 
skills in diagnosis and treatment, but it cannot hold 
for matters of disclosure because some of the 
considerations go beyond the exercise of clinical 
judgment. The arguments about personal autonomy are 
perfectly valid, and there is no doubt that if the
courts impose a legal duty on doctors to disclose 
information, this duty becomes more compelling if it 
is founded on the patient's 'right* to decide. 
While many argue on the basis of the patient's 
'rights' to make decisions - it is submitted that
41. e.g. Hatcher v. B l a c k . The Times, July 2, 1954;
Roe v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66; Davidson
v. Lloyd Aircraft Services [1974] 3 All E.R. 1;
Whitehouse v. Jordan [1980] 1 All E.R. 650
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many patients simply want to 'get better' rather than 
assert their ‘rights' in an abstract fashion.
There is scope for not viewing the issues of 
consent, namely paternalism versus
self-determination, in strictly confrontational
terms. It is well recognised that therapeutic
42 . •benefits exist m  the doctor/patient relationship
where there is mutual participation - surely this is
43sound reason for improving communication between
the doctor and patient - since it is without doubt
the case that the doctor and the patient share one
goal - restoring the patient to health.
In Sidaway the majority rejected the doctrine
of "informed consent" advocated by Lord Scarman.
The doctrine compels the doctor to give such
information about risks and choices as would permit a
reasonable person to make a rational choice about
whether or not to undergo the proposed treatment.
It is conceivable, though unlikely, that 'informed'
consent may amount to, "little more than a routinely
demanded signature on a form containing a mass of
44barely intelligible information."
42. Gutheil, et al., "Malpractice Prevention through 
the Sharing of Uncertainty: Informed Consent and the 
Therapeutic Alliance" (1984) 311 New Eng. J. Med.49
43. See data in Chpt.2, Vol 2, as to number of claims 
which can be classified in terms of 'break-down' in 
communication.
44. Teff, H. "Consent to Medical Procedures: 
Paternalism, Self-Determination or Therapeutic 
Alliance?" L.Q.R. Vol. 101, p. 432, 1985
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Where the courts have been criticised for
voicing policy reasons in favour of the medical
profession, it can be argued that by stressing the
notion of self-determination, this would not
necessarily improve the patient's position;
self-determination, like paternalism, is also
imperfect since adherence to it may damage the
doctor/patient relationship because any mutual
participation or therapeutic alliance will be
damaged. Teff argues that informed consent can be a
vehicle for promoting better communcation between a
doctor and his/her patient, and suggests at p. 436,
"The very fact that negligence rather than
battery is now the dominant basis of liability
in surgical consent cases suggests a shift
towards a rationale of good medical care and
away from an exclusive focus on the right to
bodily integrity and self-determination."
It is submitted that there is scope for a 'middle
4 5ground' to exist for informed consent m  medical 
practice in the U.K. providing the law avoids undue 
stress on disclosure at the expense of understanding
45. Whether consent is a significant factor in 
medical negligence claims can only properly be 
determined by an analysis of the frequency of such 
claims - see Chapter 2. Volume 2.
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and on self-determination rather than mutual 
participation. It hardly needs to be emphasised
that self-determination can become an empty slogan to 
a patient bombarded with technical information.
With respect, while others debate the issue of 
paternalism and self-determination in medicine, the 
nub of the matter concerns communication. After
all, if giving information becomes more formalised
and impersonal it is very likely to become a
substitute for genuine communication. The situation 
is well summed up by Teff, at page 443,
"Properly understood, informed consent entails 
genuine dialogue, focusing ... on facilitating 
a broad appreciation by the patient of the 
seriousness of his illness, the anticipated 
benefits and risks of the proposed treatment
and any reasonable alternatives, bearing in 
mind the particular patient's values and 
objectives. The enhanced trust and mutual 
understanding to be anticipated from such an 
approach should have the secondary advantage 
of minimising the prospect of complaints or 
litigation in the event of adverse outcome."
In pursuing a claim the patient will encounter 
more than the frustrations which emanate from an
unfavourable judicial attitude; these tend to reflect
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procedural complexities inherent in 
action, namely, evidence and proof; 
expenses; proving and assessing loss.
the negligence 
lapse of time;
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Evidence and proof^
The burden of proof is on the pursuer, which
means that in medical negligence cases it is for the 
patient to establish his/her claim against the doctor 
or hospital board and not for the doctor or hospital
to prove the exercise of skill and care. To achieve
this the patient must have evidence of the doctor's 
conduct which is alleged to amount to fault and 
breach of professional duty. This may take several 
forms: oral evidence by the patient of pre- and post­
treatment conditions and usually, that offered by an 
expert upon matters of opinion - for example the 
appropriate method of treatment; documentary evidence 
to establish the facts upon which s/he bases his/her 
claim of negligence. The patient must establish
facts which on the balance of probabilities are more
47consistent with negligence than not. Once a
prima facie case has been established the doctor or 
health board, to escape liability, must rebut the 
inference of negligence raised by the patient's 
evidence. Rebuttal is possible where the doctor can 
establish evidence, which may also include expert
46. Only a superficial consideration of the 
procedures is presented, for a more detailed 
consideration see: Walker & Walker, The Law of
Evidence in Scotland, 1983, pp.65 - 70, Edinburgh;
also, Winfield & Jolowicz, T o r t , (11th Ed.), W.V.H.
Rogers, 1979, Sweet and Maxwell, p p . 95 - 98
47. See Walker, D.M. , The Law of Delict in Scotland, 
Edinburgh, W . , Green and Son, (2nd. Ed.) 1981 p.382
103
opinion, showing s/he was free from fault. The
/
court weighs the evidence given by both the patient 
and the doctor, rejecting evidence which is unworthy 
of credit and decide on the facts established whether 
the patient has shown that the doctor or hospital 
board was negligent.
The patient will encounter a great number of 
difficulties in establishing evidence and proof in 
medical negligence claims. Any such evidence must 
refer to the 'normal' or 'usual' practice in the
circumstances in question. The problems associated
with normal practice have been discussed earlier.
48However, m  Clark v. MacLennan the patient was 
suffering from stress incontinence after the birth of 
her first child. When conventional treatment 
failed, one month after the birth, the doctor
performed an anterior colporrhaphy operation. It
was generally recognised that such an operation 
should not be performed until three months after the 
birth in order to prevent haemorrhage. 
Haemorrhaging occurred, the operation was a failure
and the stress incontinence became a permanent 
disability. It was held that although the burden of 
proving breach of duty of care normally rested on the 
patient, because there was a duty of care and failure 
to take a generally recognised precaution resulted in
48. [1983] 1 All E.R. 416
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injury which that precaution was designed to prevent,
the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to show
' that he was not in breach of the duty or that the
injury did not result from the breach.
An additional difficulty facing the patient
is that invariably the full facts are within the
knowledge of the doctor or hospital and unknown to 
49him/her . Although the patient may be convinced,
it is unlikely that s/he can know with certainty
whether the injuries are caused by some fault of the
doctor or hospital board or by other circumstances.
This makes disclosure of documents essential in order
to establish whether facts exist which justify
. 50bringing a claim , otherwise the principles of
liability discussed above become only of academic 
interest. Access to medical records is clearly
important if the patient is to have any chance of
success in his/her claim against a doctor or health 
board. At the legal stage of discovery - i.e. where 
the patient requests to have access to documents from 
either the hospital board or doctor involved in legal 
proceedings or for that matter from a party not 
involved in proceedings, the pursuer is likely to
encounter difficulties.
49. In some cases, the defendant doctor's identity is 
unknown to the patient and can only be brought to 
light by an examination of the records.
50. See Baxter v. Lothian H. B. 1976 S .L .T.(Notes) 37
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Authority to produce documents is derived
from the Administration of Justice Act 1970, sections
\
31 and 32 and the Administration of Justice
(Scotland) Act, 1972 section 1. Section 31 states 
that,
"... in respect of personal injuries ... the 
High Court shall . . . have power to order a 
person . . . likely to have or to have had in 
his possession, custody or power any
documents which are relevant to an issue 
arising or likely to arise out of that claim
(a) to disclose whether those documents are 
in his possession, custody or power; and
(b) to produce to the applicant such of those 
documents as are in his possession, custody 
or power.
Section 32 (1) extends this power;
the High Court shall . . . have power to order 
a person who is not a party to the 
proceedings and who appears to the court to 
be likely to have or to have had in his 
possession, custody or power any documents 
which are relevant to an issue arising out of 
that claim -
(a) to disclose whether those 
documents are in his possession, 
custody or power; and
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(b) to produce to the applicant such
of those documents as are in his 
possession, custody or power.
There has been a marked difference in the
interpretation given to the Act in Scotland and
51England. In Baxter v. Lothian Health Board in 
an action of damages against the Health Board the 
pursuer claimed reparation on the ground of negligent
treatment of a damaged knee, and requested the court
to grant authority to recover medical records 
relating to the pursuer. The motion was opposed by 
the defenders - one of the reasons being that it was 
inappropriate and unnecessary for the pursuer to 
recover these documents because the defenders had 
offered to make the records available for scrutiny by 
a medical expert or experts of the patient’s 
choice. In granting commission and diligence for
the recovery of the documents.
Lord Dunpark said,
"...the pursuer has set out in general terms 
an intelligible prima facie case and now 
seeks to make her averments more specific and 
detailed by reference to most important 
contemporary sources, which up to now have 
been available only to the defenders."
51. 1976 S.L.T. (Notes) 37
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Lord Dunpark stated that the patient was not to be 
deprived of the right to recovery of documents merely 
because the defenders offered to hand them over to 
medical experts of the pursuer's choice, a notion 
which was borrowed from English procedure. Lord 
Dunpark emphasised the need for recovery of documents 
to assist the process of litigation in the following 
t e r m s :
"If it is thought to be in the interests of 
natural justice for a pursuer to recover 
hospital records relating to him or her, that 
fact must overrule the natural desire of 
hospitals and doctors to restrict their 
circulation. If effect were given to the 
views expressed by Lord Denning M.R. in 
Davidson v. Lloyd Aircraft Services L t d . ....
counsel for pursuers would be deprived of the 
opportunity, which seems to me to be
essential to place them in a proper position
to advise their clients, of examining the 
medical records with a view to ensuring that 
all pertinent questions are put to, and 
answered by, the medical men whose opinion is 
sought."
This opinion of Lord Dunpark is in sharp contrast to
the policy-based judgments found in the English
authorities. For example in Davidson v. Lloyd
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52Aircraft Services Ltd. Lord Denning applied a 
limited interpretation to sections 31 and 32 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1970 and gave his 
reasons in the following terms,
"First, medical notes and records are very 
difficult for laymen to understand. They 
may easily misinterpret them. Second, the 
notes and records may include the medical 
men's fears of worse things to come which may 
disturb the patient greatly if they were 
known to him - such as giving six months to 
live: or saying the doctor suspects a
malignant cancer. Third, the records and 
notes may contain statements made by the 
patient himself or by relatives which may be 
embarrassing and distressing if made known." 
The House of Lords eventually overruled Davidson v. 
Lloyd Aircraft Services Ltd. and similar cases in
52. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1042. See also Dunning v. Board
of Governors of the United Liverpool Hospitals (1973) 
2 All ER 454 for the interpretation given to Section
31 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970; 
Paterson v. Northampton and District Hospital 
Management Committee (1974) 1 W.L.R. 890.
The situation has become such that the definition of 
medical negligence claims can be said to be
"[A] claim met with a refusal to disclose the 
hospital records, a repudiation of liability 
and a shyness on the part of all the experts 
you approach." 
in New L .J ., 1985, p.1002
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Mclvor v. Southern Health B o a r d .53 One of the 
medical issues in this action was whether the 
plaintiff's alleged total incapacity for work since 
the accident and in future was caused by injuries 
sustained in the accident or by a pre-existing 
cardiac or vascular condition. The Court held that 
it had no discretion to order the doing of anything 
different from that which alone was required by
section 32 (1), namely, to produce the documents to
the applicant, which in the ordinary course of 
litigation would be carried out by production to his 
solicitor. At p761 Lord Dunpark considered Lord
Denning's views in Davidson v. Lloyd Aircraft 
Services Ltd. in the following terms,
"I must confess that I do not find their
arguments to be of general applicability or 
convincing. The disclosure called for by the 
section is narrower than that provided for by 
the ordinary discovery of documents 
Discovery under section 32 of the Act of 1970 
is limited to documents relevant to 'an issue"
53. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 757. see Deistunq v. South
Western Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1975],
1 All ER 573 concerning an application for the 
disclosure of documents before an action has 
started; Dunning v. Liverpool Hospitals Board [1973]
2 All ER 454. After diagnosis of undulant fever, the
patient was prescribed streptomycin - however her
condition had deteriorated. She was granted legal
aid only to the extent of getting a medical
opinion. The hospital refused to disclose the
records to the consultant appointed by Dunning.
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"arising out of the claim in the action. '
This would invalidate Lord D e n n i n g ’s third
argument. I think that the decisions of the
English Court of Appeal were wrong."
Whenever a patient is injured as a result of
a mishap during hospital treatment a report on the
accident is prepared by those hospital staff members
involved. This procedure is contained in the
Ministry of Health Circular HM (55) 66 which came
into effect in 1955. These reports consist of
statements from doctors and nurses involved with the
particular incident; the nature of the mishap and,
where possible, reasons for the mishap. Clearly such
a document is invaluable to an injured patient who
wishes to raise an action in negligence against the
Health Board. The question which stems from this
is, are such reports discoverable? The Circular
states that such reports attract legal and
professional privilege, since they are communications
between solicitor and client relating to possible
future litigation.
In Patch v. United Bristol Hospitals
. .
Board Streatfield, J. upheld the proposition that 
accident reports attracted legal professional 
privilege and therefore could not be discovered. It
54. [1959] 3 All ER 876
Ill
is submitted that Patch v. United Bristol Hospitals
Board is now highly doubtful in view of the decision
by the House of Lords in Waugh v. British Railways 
55Board and the very recent case of Lask v.
5 6
Gloucester Health A u t h o r i t y . It was held in
Waugh that a document attracted legal professional 
privilege only if the dominant purpose in its 
preparation was that of submission to a legal adviser 
for use in litigation. This raises a crucial 
question for medical negligence claims, namely what 
is the dominant purpose in preparing hospital 
accident reports? Streatfield, J., in Patch made the 
following observations about hospital accident 
reports,
"It is not a document which was made in the 
ordinary course of treatment, but it is made 
simply because something unfortunately has 
gone wrong, and in order to provide the legal 
advisers of the hospital authority with the 
necessary material to advise, if a claim 
should be made, these documents come into 
existence."
However the implication that the only reason for the 
preparation of the document relate to advice on 
potential litigation is misleading. The Circular
55. [1980] A . C . 521
56. Court of Appeal, The Times, December 6 1985
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reveals more than one reason; paragraph 1 states,
'From time to time accidents or other 
untoward occurrences arise at hospitals which 
may give rise to complaints followed by 
claims for compensation or legal proceedings, 
and which may call for immediate enquiry and 
action to prevent a repetition.'
It states further that,
•Without a contemporaneous report it may not 
be possible to take action urgently needed to 
prevent the occurrence of the same mishap 
ag a i n .1
Therefore there is still scope for the question as to 
which of these is the dominant purpose. The 
decision in W a u g h , that advice on litigation was not 
the dominant purpose in preparing a report on a 
railway accident, might suggest, very strongly, that 
a hospital accident report may not attract legal 
privilege on the Waugh test. Lord Edmund-Davies's 
dictum does lend support to this argument,
"The claims of humanity must surely make the 
dominant purpose of any report on an accident 
(particularly where personal injuries have 
been sustained) that of discovering what 
happened and why it happened, so that 
measures to prevent this occurrence could be 
discovered and, if possible devised."
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If; the argument presented is accepted then the effect
of Waugh would be to remove the privilege enjoyed by
hospital accident reports and make them open to
discovery. This would appear to be the correct view
in light of the recent appeal case Lask v. Gloucester
Health Authority. In dismissing an appeal by the
Gloucester Health Authority, it was held that a
confidential accident report, based on the
recommendations of the Circular was not subject to
legal professional privilege since the dominant
purpose of the preparation had not been submission to
solicitors in anticipation of litigation. This
decision has significant implications for medical
negligence claims in view of their potential value in 
57
litigation.
The extent to which some of the problems in 
medical negligence claims would be alleviated by 
easing the procedures for disclosure of documents 
will be considered in the concluding chapter, 
although it is safe to argue at this stage that any 
improvement is likely to minimise the antagonism 
which exists between the patient and the medical 
defence societies or hospital boards, and reduce
57. Samuels, A., "Discovery in Medical Negligence 
Cases", 129 S.J. 277; Simanowitz, A. "Knowledge and 
the Limitation Period in Medical Negligence Claims", 
[1983] L.A.G. Bui 139; G. Robertson, "Discovery of 
Hospital Accident Reports",133 New L . J .; Norrie. K . , 
"Medical Confidence; Conflict of Duties", (1984) 24
Med. Sci. Law 26; Simanowitz, A., "Action for Victims 
of Medical Accidents", (1986) M e d i c o - L .J . vol 54 pt.2.
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costs and time for the patient and defence society.
It is also likely to have the effect of rejecting 
frivolous claims - which only serve to hinder the
process of resolving medical negligence claims which 
may have substance - at an early stage.
Most cases are not as simple as the 'wrong
5 8
operation' situation, and the difficulties
certainly become acute when the issue of causation is
raised. Causation may be extremely difficult to
prove for a variety of reasons: the injuries may be
due to a natural progression of the disease; personal
idiosyncrasy; unforseen side-effects of treatment as
5 9opposed to negligent treatment. While it is
simple to argue that where a doctor has failed to
meet the appropriate standard of skill and care, the 
patient must show that s/he has suffered harm as a 
result of the doctor's negligence, the statement 
conceals many complex problems. The first issue 
that must be decided is whether the harm to the
patient was caused by the doctor's negligence. An 
approach commonly taken is to apply the 'but for' 
test - i.e. if the damage would not have happened 
'but for' a particular fault, then the fault is the
cause of the damage; if it could have happened just
58. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical 
negligence is examined later.
5 9. Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran Health B oard. 
S.L.T. 1986, August 29, 435 where the causal
connection between overdose of penicillin and 
deafness of the patient was considered.
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the same, fault or no fault, the fault is not the
cause of the damage. This is often said to be
decided by the ordinary plain common sense of the
, . 60 
business.
The application of the common sense 'but for' 
test is neatly illustrated by Barnett v. Chelsea & 
Kensington Hospital Management Committee6 1 . Three 
night-watchmen called early in the morning at
hospital and complained of vomiting after drinking 
tea. The nurse on duty consulted a doctor by 
telephone who said that the men should go home and 
consult their own doctors later in the day. The 
same day the plaintiff's husband died of arsenical 
poisoning. There was no doubt that in failing to
examine the deceased the doctor was guilty of a 
breach of his duty of care, but this breach was not a 
cause of the death because, even if the deceased had 
been examined and treated with proper care, it would
have been impossible to save his life. Similarly in
6 2
Fish v. Kapur it was held that no loss flowed 
from the defendant's failure to diagnose a broken 
jaw, because, even if he had diagnosed it, there was 
no treatment which he could have given. Once again 
the same reasoning was applied by Ashworth J. and
60. Cork v Kirkby MacLean Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 402, 
406-407 per Denning L.J.
61. [1969] 1 Q.B. 428
62. [1948] 2 All E.R. 176
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approved by the Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Post 
6 3
Office . The defendant decided to give the 
patient an injection of anti-tetanus serum. Where a 
patient has had a previous dose of anti-tetanus 
serum, as had the patient, it was essential that he
should first have a test dose. The recognised 
procedure at the material time was to wait half an
hour after the test dose to see if there was any
reaction. The doctor only waited for one minute 
between the test dose and the full dose. Although it 
was held that he was in error only to have waited for 
a minute, even if he had waited half an hour no
reaction would have appeared. Accordingly the claim 
against him was dismissed. The above approach is 
straightforward in cases similar to B a r n e t t . however 
in more complex situations, particularly medical 
injuries inflicted on a patient with an existing 
serious or disabling disease. In the thalidomide 
cases it was not possible in all cases for doctors to 
determine whether a deformed child was a victim of 
the drug or not. The complexity of the issues are 
brought out when matters of evidence and burden of 
proof are examined, because what is involved is a 
hypothetical inquiry - as opposed to a purely factual 
one - and it is this which leads to
63. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1176
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64disagreement. It is submitted that in such cases
the law has to be content with a standard of proof
which would not satisfy a scientist or doctor. In
establishing causation the patient has often to show
that it is more likely than not that the accident
would not have occurred without the breach of duty.
A useful example, to emphasise that what is involved
is a matter of probabilities rather than certainties
is brought out by Cutler v. Vauxhall Motors 
65L t d . . The plaintiff grazed his ankle in an
accident for which the defendants were responsible. 
A  few months later a condition of varicosity which 
had existed since before the accident was discovered 
in both the plaintiff's legs and, because of an ulcer 
set up by the graze, it was decided to operate at 
once to deal with this condition. The operation 
caused the plaintiff to suffer some pain and also to 
lose earnings. He was, of course, entitled to 
damages for the graze, but the trial judge and the 
majority of the court of Appeal held that he was 
entitled to nothing in respect of the losses due to 
the operation because the condition of varicosity was 
unconnected with the accident and was such that it 
would have required operative treatment within four
64. See, "The Analysis of Negligence", in Wilson. 
W.A. , Introductory Essays on Scots L a w . Edinburgh, W. 
Green & Son, 1978, at pp. 121-144.
65. [1971] 1 Q.B. 418
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or five y e a r s .66 Therefore the examination of 
'cause in fact' cannot be treated in the same way as 
questions of fact of the same kind as questions of 
historical fact. Further, where the inquiry is 
limited to the issue of 'factual causation' another 
difficulty can arise: for example, where a patient is 
affected by two successive breaches of duty, the 
court would have not only the task of determining 
whether either d o c t o r s ' conduct was a cause of harm 
to the patient, but also the extent to which each is 
liable to the patient for the end result.
Although the patient can show that the 
doctor's conduct was a 'cause in fact' of the harm 
suffered, and also that s/he was in breach of his/her 
duty of care, the doctor may escape liability for the
66. Russell L.J. dissented on the ground that the 
losses due to the operation had certainly been 
suffered by the plaintiff whereas the future need to 
operate had there been no accident was a probability, 
not a certainty. He therefore thought it
appropriate that the defendants should be held liable 
for a proportion of those losses. Russell L.J.'s 
view of the facts seems the more accurate, but, 
accepting the majority view, the decision is a 
correct, if somewhat hard, application of the 
'but-for' test. Even if the accident had not 
occurred the plaintiff would have sustained the 
losses due to the operation and so the defendants' 
breach of duty did not cause them; on the contrary, 
their sole cause was the plaintiff's pre-accident 
condition of varicosity. C f . Harwood v. Wyken 
Colliery [1913] 2 K.B. 158, where if correct, a
condition of varicosity arising independently after 
the accident may lead to a different result. See 
Hodgson v. General Electricity Co. [1978] 2 Lloyds
Rep.210.]
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injury if it has occurred in an unexpected or 
unforeseeable way. This limitation on liability 
firstly prevents a doctor being held liable for the 
consequences of his/her negligence where these would 
be considered 'too remote' - this includes those 
circumstances where some other event intervenes 
between the d o c t o r 's conduct and the occurrence of 
the injury; secondly, this limitation on liability 
prevents a doctor being held liable, where the injury 
occurs in an unusual or 'freakish' way. In Holland
f t 7
v. Lothian Health Board , foreseeability and
remoteness of damage was discussed. The pursuer was 
admitted to hospital with a respiratory condition and 
it was acknowledged that some patients suffering from 
such a condition sometimes become confused and
aggressive, as the pursuer did in this case, and when 
the nurses were attending to another matter, she got 
out of bed and either jumped or fell out of a 
window. She sued for damages, averring a failure on 
the part of the defenders in instituting and
enforcing a system of care for patients such as 
herself which would have prevented her jumping or 
falling out of the window. However, after proof 
Lord Ross held that what happened could not
reasonably have been foreseen and was quite different
67. Outer House, unreported, August 27, 1981
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in kind from what could reasonably have been
foreseen. The action accordingly failed.
Similarly, in Hyde v. Tameside Area Health
6 8
Au t h o r i t y . a patient was in hospital for
treatment to a painful shoulder and believed, 
incorrectly, that he had cancer. Over a period of 
several days he became very depressed and attempted 
suicide. The attempt failed, but he sustained
massive injuries quantified by the judge at
£200,000. The judge held the Health Authority 
liable on the ground that nurses and doctors should 
have noticed the patient's growing depression:
psychiatric help could have been given which might 
have prevented the depression becoming so severe as
to lead to a suicide attempt. On appeal, however, 
it was held that the judge's finding of negligence 
could not be supported. The attempt at suicide was 
too remote a consequence of the alleged negligence to 
be the subject of an award of damages. It was held 
that the patient's case depended far too much on
hypothesis and possibility and it was wrong to
attempt to found liability on a chain of causation 
which depended only on a series of possibilities.
Where some extraneous event intervenes
between the negligence of the doctor and the loss or
68. The Times, April 16, 1981. C.A.
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injury of which the patient complains, the chain of
causation may be broken. In Stevens v. Bermondsey
and Southwark Group H M C 69 the plaintiff was injured
in an accident caused by an employee of the borough
concerned. The plaintiff was treated at hospital.
On the strength of the medical advice he received he
settled his claim against the council for £125. He
later learned that he had spondylolisthesis. He
claimed that because of the defendant's negligence,
he had settled his claim against the council for less
than its true value. Pauli J. held that this loss
was irrecoverable;
"His claim against the council was either a
novus actus interveniens or at least a
severing of the direct line of causation
stemming from the doctor's negligence."
It is a feature of medical treatment that the
patient's care is shared among a number of different
70nurses, doctors and specialists. In such
circumstances, where more than one person makes a 
mistake, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether 
the earlier error is an effective cause of the
patient's injury. Ultimately this would depend on 
the particular circumstances of the case.
69. (1963) 107 S.J. 478; this treated in Hart, H.L.A.
& Honore, A., Causation in the L a w , (2nd.ed.) 0 xford« 
1984
70. Data in Chapter 2 Volume 2 indicates the number 
of doctors attending one patient.
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In Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital71 the 
patient went to see his family doctor but was 
examined by a temporary replacement for the usual 
family doctor. His condition was diagnosed to be 
tonsillitis and he was told that it was unnecessary 
to visit hospital. Later that night the patient 
began to hyperventilate: his family took him to the
emergency department of the defendant hospital, where 
he was seen by a general practitioner working in the 
hospital who simply noted the hyperventilation. 
After telephone calls to the hospital intern and an 
endocrinologist, the patient was admitted to the 
intensive care unit. Eleven hours later, as a 
result of a nurse's observations, a diagnosis of 
diabetes was made and insulin was provided. 
However, the patient continued to hyperventilate, 
remained semi-conscious, suffered a cardiac arrest 12 
hours later as a result of which he suffered 
permanent brain damage. The patient raised an 
action against the replacement family doctor and the 
hospital for damages. At trial he succeeded against 
the hospital, but the action against the replacement 
family doctor was dismissed. On appeal and
cross-appeal, it was held that, (1 ) the patient's
71. (1980) 110 D.L.R. (3d) 513
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appeal against the dismissal of his action against 
the replacement family doctor should be dismissed;(2 ) 
the hospital's appeal should be allowed. With 
regard to the action against the replacement doctor, 
although he was negligent in failing to diagnose 
diabetes, that negligence had no causal relationship 
with the cardiac arrest. He was "insulated from 
liability" by the subsequent negligence of the 
hospital intern.
As mentioned above, in order to succeed the 
patient must establish not only that the injury was 
caused by the doctor's breach of duty, but also that 
it was foreseeable. This issue arose in Smith v. 
Brighton & Lewes H . M . C .72 - as a result of the ward 
sister's negligence 34 streptomycin injections were 
administered to the patient rather than 30 as 
prescribed by the doctor. Following this treatment 
the plaintiff lost her sense of balance. 
Streatfield J. held that it was the last injection 
which probably did damage. The ward sister ought to 
have foreseen that some injury might result from 
giving more injections than the doctor prescribed.
It was not necessary that the quality and extent of 
the damage should be foreseen. Accordingly the 
plaintiff recovered damages for the injury she had in
72. The Times, May 2, 1958; Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire 
and Arran Health B o a r d . S.L.T. 1986, August 29, 435
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fact sustained. A well cited example is Roe v.
. . 73Minister of Health where N u p e r c a m e  was kept in
glass ampoules stored in phenol solution. The
phenol penetrated the ampoules through invisible
cracks and contaminated the Nupercaine. This
material was injected into two patients, who suffered
permanent paralysis as a result. One of the
allegations of negligence was that the nursing staff
must have knocked the ampoules together in order to
cause the cracking. This was taken to be the case
and the court unanimously held that the injuries
caused to the patients by this mishap were not
foreseeable: according to Denning L.J. at p .86
"The only consequence which could reasonably
be anticipated was the loss of a quantity of
Nupercaine, but not the paralysis of a
patient."
and Somervell L.J.at p.81:
"In the case I am assuming, having knocked
the ampoules the natural inference is that
the nurse would look to see if they were
cracked. As the judge has found no visible
crack and the nursing staff had no reason to
foresee invisible cracks, the nurse would
reasonably assume no harm had been done."
73. [1954] 2 Q.B. 66
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Causation is important at several stages of 
any proceedings, firstly with respect to breach of 
duty or care - i.e. did the injury arise out of the 
negligent conduct of the doctor; secondly an 
assessment as to what injuries to the patient were 
and will be caused; and finally, as we shall see 
below, what consequential losses were and will be 
caused by the injuries to the patient.
When we consider the question was the harm to 
the patient caused by some negligent conduct of the 
doctor, the response tends to be to consider whether 
the doctor's conduct was the proximate cause of the 
injury and that the injury must not be too remote. 
The test of remoteness is usually determined by the 
courts by reference to whether it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the acts or omissions of the doctor 
would be likely to cause harm to the patient of the 
type actually caused. It is suggested that the test 
cannot be applied without value judgments on what 
ought to have been foreseen, in other words while it 
would appear that the issue of 'cause' is one of 
'fact' it is submitted that in some cases, the 
'cause' of the injury is not reached by a scientific 
analysis of cause and effect, but rather on 
individual moral judgments of blame. In considering 
what injuries to the patient were and will be caused 
by the act or omission, obviously this will depend on
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the accuracy of the diagnosis available. For some 
medical negligence claims this would appear to be a 
simple step, however, despite advances in medical 
science, errors in diagnosis can result in 
mis-allocation of cause. Further, it is necessary 
to determine the extent to which the patient's 
disabilities resulted from the particular act or 
omission. This would normally present few problems, 
since ideally all that would be required would be a 
clearly diagnosed injury superimposed on a condition 
of normal health. For medical negligence claims 
this cannot apply because any injury or disease is 
likely to be superimposed upon a condition which is 
peculiar to the patient. Often very difficult 
questions have to be answered before a decision on 
this issue can be made. For example was the patient 
suffering from any part of his/her present injuries 
prior to the mishap? Did the accident stimulate a 
condition to which the patient was susceptible but 
which could otherwise have been stimulated later by 
something else? Was the injury coincidental with a 
deterioration in the patient's condition in any 
event? Such injuries can be speculative and the
best a doctor can do is express an opinion as a
. . . 74balance of probabilities.
74. Many of the above issues were raised in K a y ' s 
Tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran Health B o a r d , S.L.T. 
1986. August 29; 435
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Causation assumes importance when the courts 
have to assess damages. In some cases, for example 
where the patient suffers from cancer, it is often 
very difficult to determine the extent of injury or 
harm caused by late diagnosis. In Sutton v.
Population Services Family Planning Programme
75 .L t d . it was held that if the plaintiff's cancer
had been diagnosed at the proper time, its recurrence
would have been postponed by four years. She
recovered damages for four years' loss of earnings,
four years lost expectation of life and premature
onset of menopause. Once again value judgments
enter into the equation, because at this stage is
determined what expenses incurred or likely to be
incurred by the patient as a result of his injuries
are reasonable. This cannot be answered by doctors
since these are not medical questions - doctors can
only provide data - for example a doctor can explain
what the risks would be to a patient if s/he were to
return to his/her former occupation. It is a value
judgment to decide whether such risks ought to be
taken. These are the type of questions that have to
be answered to determine exactly what expenses and
losses were 'caused' by the doctor's negligence.
Clearly the types and quantum of losses and expenses
allowed in the assessment of damages will vary with
75. The Times, November 7, 1981
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the circumstances of each case, and therefore there 
is scope for the varying degrees of judicial 
liberality to have an effect.
It is very likely that some patients may jump 
to the conclusion that injury must be due to fault in 
that s/he may leave hospital in a worse condition 
than s/he entered it. While in such cases there may 
be a considerable degree of sympathy for the patient, 
the law often views the matter somewhat differently. 
Res ipsa loquitur
Medical negligence is the main area of 
professional negligence in which res ipsa loquitur 
assumes importance.
The patient's position is such that s/he may
very well not know, and not be able to establish,
what treatment s/he received and how his/her injuries 
were caused. Where s/he is able to invoke the
doctrine this will give rise to an inference of 
negligence on the defender's part.
The classic statement of the doctrine is that 
of Erie C.J. in Scott v. London & St. Katherine 
Docks7 6 :
"There must be reasonable evidence of
negligence. But where the thing is shown to
76. (1865) 3 H. & C. 596. However many authors 
perpetuate the error that res ipsa loquitur shifts 
the onus of proof; for example Khan, A., "Medical 
Negligence - res ipsa loquitur", Medico-L.J . 1985,
vol 53, p.164
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"be under the management of the defendant or
his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendants,
that the accident arose from want of care."
The maxim, if applicable, is only of assistance to
the patient only where the exact causes of the mishap
are unknown, therefore once the causes of the injury
have been established by evidence, there can no
longer be any scope for inferring its causes from the
fact that it occurred. The phrase res ipsa loquitur
translated from the Latin means "the things speaks
for itself".77 If for the words "the thing" are
substituted the words "the treatment of the patient",
the application of the doctrine to medical negligence
7 Bcases becomes apparent. However, an exception
has been introduced in medical negligence cases by a
77. It is believed that the phrase was used for the
first time in Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722,
where a barrel of flour rolled out of an open doorway
on the upper floor of the defendant's warehouse and
fell on the plaintiff who was a passer-by.
78. As Lord Pearson said in Henderson v. Henry E.
Jenkins & Sons [1970] A.C. 282,
"If in the course of the trial there is
proved a set of facts which raises a prima 
facie inference that an accident was caused 
by negligence on the part of the [doctor],
the issue will be decided in the [patient's] 
favour unless the [doctor] by his evidence 
provides some answer which is adequate to
displace the prima facie inference."
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majority of 2-1 by the Court of Appeal in Mahon v.
79Osborne when it said that there was no rule of
law, generally speaking, that res ipsa loquitur
applied to actions of negligence against a surgeon
for leaving a swab in a patient, even if in certain
circumstances a presumption may arise. According to 
Scott L . J .,
"Some positive evidence of neglect of duty 
was surely needed. It may be that a full
description of the actual operation will 
disclose facts sufficiently indicative of 
want of skill or care to entitle [the court] 
to find neglect of duty to the patient." 
Goddard L.J., at page 50 considered the matter in the 
following way:
"The surgeon is in command of the operation, 
it is for him to decide what instruments, 
swabs and the like are to be used, and it is 
he who uses them. The patient, or, if he 
dies, his representatives, can know nothing 
about this matter. There can be no possible 
question but that neither swabs nor 
instruments are ordinarily left in the 
patient's body, and no one would venture to 
say that is it proper, although in particular
79. [1939] 2 K.B. 14
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"circumstances it may be excusable, so to
leave them. If, therefore, a swab is left
in the patient's body, it seems to me clear
that the surgeon is called on for an
explanation, that is, he is called on to show 
not necessarily why he missed it but that he 
exercised due care to prevent it being left 
there."
This dissent, even at the time, appeared to be the 
better view so much so that it was accepted by
Q f\
Denning L.J. m  Cassidy v. Ministry of Health
when he said that, where a person went into the 
hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers but came 
out with four stiff fingers, it is up to the hospital 
to explain how it happened. The mere fact of four 
stiff fingers according to his Lordship raised a 
prima facie case against the hospital authorities.
As they had not adduced any evidence, including 
expert evidence, to show as to how it could have
happened, without negligence, they had failed to 
displace the prima facie evidence against them and
were liable for damages to the patient. The Court 
of Appeal decided that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applied. Examples of other cases in which 
the patient has succeeded on the basis on res ipsa
80. [1951] 2 K.B. 343
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loquitur are Clarke v. Warboys,81 and Cooper v.
N e v i l l .82
However not every mishap in the course of
8 3treatment raises a presumption of negligence . In
8 4
Lock v. Scantlebury. the plaintiff's lower jaw
was dislocated during an operation for the removal of
eight teeth. Pauli J. stated that is was 'by no
means proof of negligence' that the jaw became
disclocated during such an operation. In Fish v. 
8 5
Kapur a dentist left part of the root of a tooth 
in the plaintiff's jaw and fractured the jaw. The
plaintiff relied upon res ipsa loquitur and the 
defendant did not give evidence. Lynskey J. held 
that a fracture of the jaw was not itself prima facie 
evidence of negligence and the doctrine did not 
apply. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will only
81. The Times, March 17, 1952: Pad placed on
patient's left buttock for purpose of 
anti-coagulation. Severe burn caused to buttock. 
Defendants liable.
82. The Times, March 10, 1961: Abdominal pack left
in patient's body after operation, see however, Clark 
v. MacLellan [1983] 1 All E . R . 416
83. See for example O ‘Malley-Williams v. The Board 
of Governors of the National Hospital for Nervous 
Diseases (1975) 1 B.M.J. 635; Crawford v. Board of 
Governors of Charing Cross Hospital, The Times, 
December 8 , 1953;
84. The Times, July 25, 1963,
85. [1948] 2 All E.R. 176; see also Fletcher v. Bench
(1973) 4 B.M.J. 17 where a dentist was filing away a
tooth with a bone-burr, the bone-burr broke leaving 
part in the jaw. The dentist was unable to find and 
remove the broken bit of burr. The majority of the 
Court of Appeal held that res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply.
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apply therefore, where the injury suffered by the
patient is not of the kind which might reasonably 
occur through misadventure in the course of treatment.
In some medical accidents it is likely that
the patient will not be in a position to show any
evidence of negligence, except the end result of the 
accident, for example a patient on the operating 
table under a general anaesthetic will not know how 
the mishap occurred. The recent case Ashcroft v.
O  £
Mersey Regional Health Authority , highlights the
limited application of the doctrine. The patient
underwent a routine operation for the removal of 
granulations in the left ear. The operation proved 
disastrous as the facial nerve was cut leaving the 
patient with partial paralysis of the left side of 
her face. The patient brought an action pleading
negligence on the part of the surgeon, alleging that 
he failed to use sufficient care in removing the 
granulations. Res ipsa loquitur was also pleaded on 
the basis that the operation had been performed
thousands of times without mishap. Only two
operations were known to have gone wrong, for
specific reasons. The mishap in the plaintiff's 
case was unique. The evidence offered by the 
surgeon to explain the accident and rebut the
86. [1983] 2 All E.R. 245
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allegations of res ipsa loquitur was mostly directed 
to the question of the use of excessive force. 
Before dealing with the issue before him, Kilner 
Brown J. expressed his dismay at the present system 
of compensation in the following terras:
"Where an injury is caused which should never 
have been caused, common sense and natural 
justice indicate that some degree of 
compensation ought to be paid by someone.
As the law stands, in order to obtain 
compensation, an injured person is compelled 
to allege negligence against a surgeon who 
may, as in this case, be a careful, dedicated 
person of the highest skill and reputation.
If ever there was a case in which some
reasonable compromise was called for, which 
would provide some amount of solace for the
injured person and avoid the pillorying of a
distinguished surgeon, this was such a case." 
The question for the court, however, was whether the
surgeon had been negligent. The judge accepted that 
the surgeon had not used excessive force and that
degenerative changes were present. He gave judgment 
for the Health Authority. The application of res 
ipsa loquitur failed in this case; the injured
patient was unable to fix any blame and received no
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8 7compensation for the injury. While the case was
decided on good law and was fair to the defendants, 
it begs the question as to whether the method of
compensation for the patient was just.
8 8I n Roe v . Ministry of Health , two
patients in a hospital were operated on the same day
and in each case a spinal anaesthetic was used.
After the operations both patients developed severe
symptoms of spastic paraplegia, resulting in
permanent paralysis from the waist down. Denning
L.J. in the Court of Appeal at p.71 expressed the
view that res ipsa loquitur applied, but this was not
necessary for the decision because the court held
that the defendants had established how the accident
happened and had exonerated themselves from blame.
It has been suggested that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has not emerged as one of the main
8 9weapons in the hands of the patient's lawyer, but 
is likely to do so if the number of claims and court 
cases continue to rise. If, however, the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine is viewed as a short-circuiting of
87. see also Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority. [1985] 1 All E.R. 635
8 8 . [1954] 2 Q.B. at p.87
89. See Khan.A., "Medical Negligence - res ipsa 
loquitur", (1985) Medico-L.J . vol . 53, 164; Khan, A.,
"Res ipsa loquitur: an update", (1984) 128 Sol. J o .232
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9 0the Hunter v. Hanley principle in the sense that 
the Hunter v. Hanley principle has been satisfied
unless there is a satisfactory explanation, then its 
usefulness as a weapon must be put into 
perspective. This is done by Lord Justice Morris in 
Roe v. Ministry of Health91 :
"The evidence adduced at the hearing showed 
that it was only in very rare cases that any 
untoward consequence followed upon spinal 
anaesthesia injection. In the nature of
things the plaintiffs could not know, nor be 
expected to know, exactly what took place in 
preparation for and during their 
operations. When they proved all that they 
were in a position to prove they then said
1 res ipsa loquitur1 . But this convenient 
and succinct formula possesses no magic 
qualities: nor has it any added virtue,
other than that of brevity, merely because it 
is expressed in Latin. When used on behalf 
of a plaintiff it is generally a short way of 
saying: "I sumbit that the facts and the
circumstances which I have proved establish a 
prima facie case of negligence against the"
90. Cameron J.A. Q.C. Medical Negligence. An 
Introduction, The Law Society of Scotland 1983 , p.25
91. [1954] 2 Q.B. at p87
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"defendant. It must depend upon all the
individual facts and the circumstances of the
particular case whether this is so."
in general, there is a marked reluctance on the part
of the courts to apply the res ipsa loquitur
principle, and this is certainly evident in medical
negligence cases. While the doctrine would make the
process of compensation for medical injury a little
easier, to suggest that its use as "a weapon" in this
context is an exaggeration. It is only applicable
in limited circumstances: where the patient is
unable to identify the precise nature of the
negligence which caused his/her injury; where no
explanation of the way in which the injury came to be
inflicted has been offered by the defender; where
the injury must be of a type which does not often
happen. It must be conceded that it will only help
in a few instances of medical injury, indeed the
suggestion that res ipsa loquitur can ease the
hazards/burdens of litigation is falsely
92optimistic - since it really only deals with the
limited issue of questions of evidence rather than 
law.
Whether the application of res ipsa loquitur
92. Clark v. MacLennan [1983] 1A11 E.R. 416; see
Jones, "Medical Negligence - the burden of proof" 
(1984) New L.J. 7: Atiyah, P.S., at p305-306 suggests 
that the practical importance of res ipsa loquitur 
has been exaggerated.
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ought to be expanded, or indeed the doctrine itself 
modified, to meet the needs of patients seeking 
compensation can only be considered in light of the 
factual and evidential circumstances which exist in 
medical negligence claims which arise not only in the 
courts but also those that come to the attention of 
the medical defence societies. These will be 
examined in the next chapter, although it has to be 
admitted that any reform to the doctrine would, as 
far as appropriate compensation for medical injury is 
concerned, at best only assist in a few cases.
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While the burden of proof remains with the
patient it is unlikely to be discharged in the 
absence of expert opinion. This will incur further 
difficulty predicating appeal to expert opinion. An 
expert witness becomes of paramount importance in 
ascertaining whether there was a deviation from 
•normal practice' or incompetent handling of the 
case. Specifically if the deviation was such that 
no doctor acting with due skill and care would have 
made it; it is indeed an opinion as to the standard 
of care. Equally important is the expert's
assessment on the patient's present condition and
prognosis and the harm which flowed from the alleged 
negligent conduct. The role of the judge in
relation to the acceptance of expert opinion is also
crucial. In Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran
9 3 •Health Board , a case primarily concerned with the
issue of causation, the role of the Lord Ordinary in
relation to the partial acceptance of expert opinion
came under sharp criticism. The opinion of a
consultant neurosurgeon was relied upon, in part, by
the Lord Ordinary where the critical issue before him
was whether there was evidence which would entitle
him to hold, on a balance of probabilities, that an
overdose of penicillin, an act which was admitted to
have been negligent, had caused or materially
93. Kay's Tutor v. Ayrshire and Arran Health Board 
S.L.T. 1986, August 29, 435.
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contributed to the patient's deafness. Lord Grieve 
at p . 442 stated,
''There is no doubt at all that the weight of 
the evidence was to the effect that there was 
no causal connection between the overdose and 
the deafness, and it is important to remember 
that that evidence came from two consultants 
whose particular expertise was in the field 
of paediatrics and one consultant ... in 
microbiology. The lone voice of Mr.
Williams, a consultant neurosurgeon with no 
paediatric experience, proclaimed that the 
overdose and deafness were causally 
connected. ... the Lord Ordinary listened to 
that lone voice and used part of what it
had to say to construct a theory which 
entitled him to decide the issue in the 
pursuer's favour."
The Lord President, (Lord Emslie), criticised the 
Lord Ordinary, at p440, in the following terms,
"The Lord Ordinary . . . has gone far outwith 
his judicial role. It is ... wholly
improper for a judge to neglect the principle 
of doing justice between the parties and of 
fairness to both parties by going further and 
giving a decision in favour of one party upon 
a ground of his own devising which has not
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been the subject of consideration and 
exploration at the proof, and of which the 
opposing party has had no notice whatever.”
It follows therefore that expert opinion may be vital 
to the success of a patient's claim since it will 
allow the patient's legal representatives to assess 
whether there is a pr ima facie case and if 
appropriate, an early guidance on q u a n t u m .
94Selecting the right expert , often
difficult and expensive, is essential since it is
clearly useless to consult a general practitioner on
a complex surgical case, indeed this is particularly
so now that medicine and surgery has become very 
9 5specialised. While it can be argued that m
cases of medical negligence it is difficult for the 
patient to obtain the necessary professional
94. Difficulties in obtaining expert opinion partly 
explain the findings in Chapter 2 for ’abandoned 
cases'. Further a claim may raise several questions 
requiring more than one expert to consider the 
issues. See "Medical Negligence Claims - Without a 
Breakdown”, New L . J . 1985, p . 1002
95. It has been argued by Mirams, A., 1979 Kudos 
Conference, that,
” ... there is really no excuse for the 
solicitor who encourages his client to launch 
out in proceedings in the absence of really 
appropriate advice [and] full examinations of 
the records.”
142
96evidence, doctors attempt to justify this
position. From their point of view, there is an 
allegation of professional negligence against a 
colleague and the possibility that the court may be 
moved by compassion to favour compensating a damaged 
patient at the expense of a medical defence 
society. It is argued that this justification is 
very weak indeed, particuarly in view of the policy 
considerations explored earlier; the medical 
profession suggest there is an inherent defect in the 
present system of compensation because success in 
getting compensation depends on putting at stake the 
professional reputation of a doctor.
If this argument is pressed further, then it 
is possible to conclude that if the issue of
96. However, Lord Denning M.R. in Whitehouse v.
Jordan [1980] 1 All E.R. 652, at 653 , suggested the
ease with which expert evidence could be called upon, 
"It is sometimes said that you cannot get one 
medical man to give evidence against 
another: just as it is said that you cannot
get one lawyer to give evidence against 
another. This case shows how wrong that 
is. In this case two of the most eminent 
obstetricians in the country have given
evidence against the surgeon: and two
equally eminent have given evidence for
him. Eminent counsel have been engaged to 
press the case against him: and counsel
equally eminent to defend him. The expense 
must have been colossal. All borne on both 
sides by the taxpayers of this country.*
See Siraanowitz's sharp criticism of the attitude 
displayed by the medical profession, in "Action for 
Victims of Medical Accidents", (1986), Medico-L.J . 
v o l . 54 pt.2
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compensation was not dependent on proof of fault, 
then it would be more likely that doctors would be 
prepared to give expert opinion as to cause and
extent of the disabilities suffered by a patient. 
Whether this would have the additional benefit of 
reducing delays for payment of compensation and
reduce the tension between doctors and patients is 
debateable. The next chapter explores such
difficulties.
Limitation
Even if the patient can establish a pr ima
facie case, another hurdle which must be cleared is
whether any proceedings are brought within
97time. Limitation of time for actions of damages
for personal injury or death is regulated by the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1984, ss 
17 and 18, replacing sections 17, 18 and 19 of Pt. II 
of the 1973 Act which was considered to be 
complicated and difficult to apply.
97. The number of claims which were considered as 
•time-barred' is examined in Chapter 2.
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9 8Section 17 deals with actions in respect 
of personal injuries not resulting in death, while
98. This section applies to an action of damages 
where the damages claimed consist of or include 
damages in respect of personal injuries, being an 
action brought by the person who sustained the 
injuries or any other person.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below and section 19A 
of this Act. no action to which this section applies 
shall be brought unless it is commenced within a 
period of 3 years after -
(a) the date on which the injuries were 
sustained or, where the act of omission to 
which the injuries were attributable was a 
continuing one, that date or the date on 
which the act or omission ceased, whichever 
is the later; or
(b) the date (if later than any date 
mentioned in paragraph (a) above) on which
the pursuer in the action became, or on 
which, in the opinion of the court, it would 
have been reasonably practicable for him in 
all the circumstances to become, aware of all 
the following facts -
(i) that the injuries in question were 
sufficiently serious to justify his bringing 
an action of damages on the assumption that 
the person against whom the action was
brought did not dispute liability and was
able to satisfy a decree;
(ii) that the injuries were attributable in 
whole or in part to an act or omission; and
(iii) that the defender was a person to whose 
act or omission the injuries were 
attributable in whole or in part of the
employer or principal of such a person"
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99section 18 deals with actions where death has
resulted from personal injuries.
In medical negligence cases, the issue of 
'knowledge' is particularly acute more so than in 
ordinary personal injury cases, and this is
especially so in relation to the question as to 
whether the injury can be attributed to the act of 
the doctor. In most personal injury cases the 
pursuer is usually in a position where s/he can
immediately assess that it was the act or omission of 
the defender which attributed to the injury. For 
example, the pedestrian would have very little 
difficulty in seeing that it was the car driven by 
the defender which knocked him/her down, or the
factory employee can see that it was the defender's
99. This section applies to any action in which, 
following the death of any person from personal 
injuries, damages are claimed in respect of the 
injuries or the death.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below and 
section 19A of this Act, no action to which this 
section applies shall be brought unless it is 
commenced within a period of 3 years after -
(a) the date of death of the deceased; or
(b) the date (if later than the date of death) on 
which the pursuer in the action became, or on which, 
in the opinion of the court, it would have been 
reasonably practicable for him in all the 
circumstances to become, aware of both of the 
following facts -
(i) that the injuries of the deceased were 
attributable in whole or in part to an act or 
omission; and
(ii) that the defender was a person to whose act or 
omission the injuries were attributable in whole or 
in part or the employer or principal of such a person.
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defective ladder which broke and caused him/her to 
fall. Save for the most obvious cases the patient
will not know that the act or omission of the doctor 
attributed to his/her injuries. In some medical 
negligence claims it is this knowledge which proves 
to be so elusive, and invariably the abortive search 
for that knowledge can cause as much distress as the 
original injury.
Hunter v. Glasgow Corporation1 . although
decided before the 1973 and 1984 Acts, provides an
excellent example of types of 'factual' difficulties 
which often arise in medical negligence claims. A 
woman contracted an infection for which an operation 
was negligently performed by a doctor employed by the 
health board - as a result the uterus and ovary had 
to be removed at an emergency operation carried out 
by a senior registrar. Later it became necessary, 
partly because of the doctor's negligence, to remove 
the other ovary. In the course of investigating a
claim by the woman, who was unaware that the doctor 
had acted negligently, her solicitors obtained from 
the senior registrar a report which made no mention 
of negligence on the part of the doctor, but
attributed fault to the midwives. Relying on this 
report, the woman brought an action against the local
1. 1971 S.C. 220
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authority, as employers of the midwives, within the 
3-year time-limit. Some months after the expiry of 
the time-limit the local authority at adjustment made 
averments in which they imputed fault to the 
doctor. Until these averments were intimated, the
pursuer's advisers had no knowledge that she might 
have a case against the doctor and consequently 
against the Board of Management, as his employers. 
They did not communicate the averments to the 
pursuer, but, without her knowledge, called the 
doctor and the board as additional defenders, 
adopting the local authority's averments of fault 
against them upon the assumption that the facts 
averred by the authority in support of these were
true. If the hospital records had been perused on
the pursuer's behalf within the three year period, 
the fact that the doctor had been negligent might 
have been ascertained or inferred. The pursuer, who 
was unaware until she was in the witness-box that she 
was suing the doctor and the board, failed to prove 
negligence on the part of the midwives, but proved
negligence on the part of the doctor.
2
Scuriaqa v. Powell also illustrates the 
problems. The doctor agreed with the plaintiff to
terminate her pregnancy by means of a legal
2. (1979) 123 Sol. J. 406
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abortion. The operation was performed negligently, 
the pregnancy was not terminated and the patient gave 
birth to a child in December 1972. The defendant 
told the plaintiff that the operation had failed 
because of a physical defect in her. In 1974 the 
patient learned that she might have a cause of action 
against the doctor. In 1975 the plaintiff received 
a consultant's report on her condition which stated 
that she did not suffer from any physical defect.
In her action against the doctor, it was held that it 
was not until the plaintiff had received the 
consultant's report that she knew the failure to 
terminate the pregnancy was due to an act or omission 
of the defendant. Both cases were concerned with 
the issue of when the patients were said to be in 
possession of 'knowledge' for the purposes of the 
Acts before the time-limit could be held to have 
expired.
From the wording of the Act causation remains 
an essential component for proceedings since Sec. 17
(2) (ii) provides that: "The injuries were
attributable in whole or in part to an act or 
omission" and as we have seen, in some instances it 
may be impossible to make a decision, other than one 
which involves guesswork which often leads to erratic 
results. Sec. 17 (b) lends itself to uncertainty
since it is a matter for the court to interpret
another value judgment, namely when it would have 
been reasonably practicable for the patient to become
3
aware of certain facts for the purposes of fixing 
a date when time is to run.
While there is a general welcome for the new 
Act, the position of the patient is still very much 
dependent on whether the courts will follow a liberal 
interpretation of the Act. In some cases it may be 
fairly straight-forward to determine whether a claim 
is time-barred, for example a hospital operation 
where the outcome is clear. Difficulties exist 
where harmful results are not appreciated until a 
considerable time after the treatment, or where the 
patient delays in taking legal advice because s/he 
was uncertain of having suffered any injuries or did 
not think of claiming damages, or know whom to sue. 
S/he may , attribute such injuries to the original 
complaint or as accepted side-effects of treatment or 
both. There may be an unawareness or inability to 
undergo the possible trouble or bother of making a 
claim or there may be assumed difficulties in 
providing evidence of liability and fear of legal 
costs. Delay of itself does not automatically debar
3. Avinov v. Scottish Insulation Co. 1970 S.C. 128 
where the question was whether 'material' facts of a 
'decisive character' remained outwith the pursuer's 
knowledge. See also Hunter v. Glasgow Corporation 
1971 S.C. 220
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a patient from bringing proceedings, however, it may 
prejudice his/her chances of raising an action.4 
Expenses
There is nothing to prevent an injured 
patient from attempting to negotiate a settlement
with the medical defence society or hospital
5 . . .
authority . The obvious difficulty will be that
on one side there will usually be a team or committee
of experts and a novice on the other, this situation
does have the real danger that any settlement reached
is likely to be insufficient. The majority of
patients, however, require legal assistance which
necessarily incur expenses - these vary from case to
case. The variation in expenses can only be
explained largely by the different amounts of work
involved - each case is unique, with its own problems
of evidence, of conflicting medical reports and so
on. The use of professional services, and
litigation in particular has led some commentators to
assert that,
"the costs . . . are now of such an order that
all sectors of the community, except perhaps
the most wealthy or those in commercial
circles, are inhibited (though in varying
4. As where the court consider such delay as being 
prejudicial to the defender.
5. This situation is fully explored in the next 
chapter.
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"degrees) from resorting to law."6 
This leads on to the issue of Legal Aid. With the 
Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1967 some of this difficulty 
has been removed. If the patient can satisfy two 
stringent criteria, firstly that s/he is financially 
eligible and secondly, that s/he can satisfy the 
appropriate Legal Aid committee as to the merits of 
his/her case, s/he may proceed. Financial
eligibility is assessed by reference to the patient's 
disposable income and disposable capital and the 
limit prescribed by regulation by the Secretary of
State. It is clearly desirable that the patient can 
show that s/he is within the financial limit. A 
valid criticism may be that while legal aid helps
those in the lowest socio-economic group - it does
not help the middle socio-economic group at all - the 
financial limits are so low as to exclude many middle 
group claims. As regards the second criterion,
quite different considerations apply since by section
6 . See Hughes Commission, Royal Commission on Legal 
Services in Scotland, C m n d . 7846 (1980); also Benson 
Commission, Royal Commission on Legal Services final 
report Vol.l where it was suggested that except in 
property related matters, the public's use of lawyers 
is largely unrelated to class or income. Paterson, 
A.A. , & Bates, T.St.J. N . , The Legal System of
Scotland: Cases and Materials, 1983, Edinburgh, W.
Green & Son Ltd.
7. Now Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, which makes 
only administrative changes. Legal Aid is intended to 
equalise the relative financial position between the 
patient and the hospital board or defence society and 
not place the patient in a more advantaged position.
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1 (6).
"A person shall not be given legal aid in
connection with civil proceedings . . . unless 
he shows that he has a probabilis causa
litiqandi. and may also be refused legal aid 
in any such proceedings ... if it appears 
unreasonable that he should receive it in the
p
particular circumstances of the case." 
Demonstrating to the legal aid committee the merits 
of a case may prove difficult for the patient since 
the committee insist on having a medical report and 
medical evidence to suggest that there is in fact a 
claim. The mere fact that the legal aid committee 
require a statement from a medical practitioner, or 
sometimes two practitioners, for probabilis causa 
litiqandi provides an obstacle for the patient since 
he has to seek expert opinion, which, as argued
earlier is sometimes difficult, time-consuming and
expensive. Further, the patient will require
separate legal aid for diligence of disclosure of 
documents, which is again time consuming.
The medical profession, however, tend to view
8 . Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1967; Now section 14 (1) 
(a) and (b). Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986; see Legal 
Advice and Assistance Act 1972, s.l, as amended by 
S.I. 1982 No. 507.
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the situation quite differently,
"Indeed, it is a matter of some surprise to 
the defence societies and their legal 
advisers that in a very considerable number
of cases the relevant Legal Aid committees 
have seen fit to grant assistance to 
plaintiffs on the basis of really pathetic
reports, or at least reports which one can 
deduce were pathetic at the time they were 
placed before the Area Committee."10 
It is submitted that the Legal Aid committees are
placed in a very difficult position because of the 
great complexities of the issues involved, and that
their primary function is to establish if there is a
9. See earlier work, Jandoo, R.S., & Harland, W.A.. 
•Legally Aided Blackmail', N . L .J . p . 402, Vol. 134, 
1984 where the effect of legal aid in the settlement 
of such cases is examined. However Cf. Whitehouse 
v. Jordan and Another The Times, December 6,1979
10. Mirams, A., Seminar, Kudos C o n f e r e n c e . London, 
1979. Two inevitable hazards of relying on 
ill-founded reports are firstly, the patient, 
thinking that the right to compensation is automatic, 
is very quickly disillusioned; secondly, any future 
relationship with the medical practitioner is likely 
to be impaired through lack of trust and confidence.
However it is suggested that whenever a 
patient is granted legal aid, there is pressure for 
the defence society or hospital board to reach early 
settlement, since a prima facie case will be assumed 
to have been established by the patient showing 
probabilis causa litiqandi. Thus whenever a case is 
accepted by the Legal Aid committee the patient may 
be to all intents and purposes guaranteed success.
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prima facie case.11 It is for the court to decide 
whether a claim is valid or not. All that a legal 
aid committee can decide is whether a claim might be 
valid - in which case they should allow it to go 
forward - or appear to be hopeless. It is essential 
that they must not prejudge the issue. The claims 
are sometimes difficult to assess because the
demarcation between an unmeritorious claim and a
valid one is often unclear. The following examples 
illustrate inherent complexities in claims where
initially there appears to be valid grounds but which 
on further examination show no merit.
The first type of case is where damage has 
occurred without negligence. A fairly common 
example is where there has been inadvertent 
perforation of the uterus. With certain surgical 
procedures such a perforation is not tantamount to
negligence; failure to diagnose it however would be 
negligent particularly if not remedied by appropriate 
treatment. Similar examples are provided by
incomplete extraction of teeth or persistent bleeding 
following simple biopsy.
11. Drawbacks and criticisms of Legal Aid, both in 
Scotland and England, have been treated by Paterson, 
A . A . , & Bates, T.St.J. N . , The Legal System of
Scotland: Cases and Materials. 198 3 . Edinburgh. W.
Green & Son Ltd.; see Scottish Information Office, "A 
Guide to the Legal Aid (Scotland) Bill", Scottish Law 
Gazette. June 1986 vol 54, no.2; Myers, P. "The 
future of Legal Aid in Scotland," (1974) 19 J.L.S.
312; see also. White, R.C.A., "Contingent Fees: A
Supplement to Legal Aid?" M.L.R. p286, Vol 41. (1978).
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The second type of situation is where the
patient's condition does not lend itself to a 'cure'
and at best medical practitioners can merely
alleviate the symptoms. Such cases include
malignant disease or nervous disorders. A
successful action will lie in these cases only where
the distinction is made between a claim for delay in 
12treatment as opposed to a claim alleging failure 
to affect a cure. Further, there are conditions 
which have a fatal outcome whose cause and nature are 
presently unknown and where it is impossible to 
impute negligence. The extent to which legal aid is 
used in medical negligence claims in the present 
study will be examined in the next chapter.
12. Chapter 2 outlines those grievances, raised by 
patients, involving 'delay in treatment'.
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Proving and assessing loss
In making its assessment of an award of
damages the court has regard to the principle of
13restitution ,in integrum. Awards have to be
14individualised to suit the actual position of the
particular patient and they are in part
earnings-related. However, the patient is still far
away from obtaining compensation even though
liability may be admitted by the doctor's medical
defence society or the health board because the court
can only properly assess damages once it is shown
15evidence of loss. The pursuer must prove his/her
13. The professed aim of the legal principles is to 
restore the injured patient, so far as money can. to 
the position s/he would have been in had s/he not 
been injured. Clearly this cannot be acheived 
literally because a patient who loses a limb or 
becomes brain-damaged could never be put back by 
money in the position in which s/he would have been 
in had the harm not occurred.
14. There is no upper limit fixed by Parliament for 
the amount that may be awarded, which means that 
theoretically judges are under no direct pressure 
from the taxpayer to keep down the levels of 
compensation as an economy measure. Over the years, 
therefore, the judges may gradually increase awards 
in line with general inflation. See however. Lord 
Denning's view in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and 
Islington Area Health Authority [1980] A.C. 174
15. No special consideration is made for medical 
negligence cases since identical principles apply to 
the assessment of damages for personal injuries and 
death, whether resulting from medical negligence or 
from some other form of accident. The principles 
governing quantum of damages for personal injuries 
were reviewed by the House of Lords in Lim Poh Choo 
v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980]
A.C. 174; See also Whitehouse v. Jordan and Another 
[1980] 1 All E.R. (C.A .) 650
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loss under each head which is admissible in
calculation, or show facts which enable loss to be 
estimated. This is complicated by such factors as 
ignorance of the future cost of care. The 
assessment of damages involves questions of law as to 
the admissibility of particular heads of damages and 
questions of fact as to particular losses sustained 
under these heads. The various head6 which require 
evidence include: loss of earnings; the degree of
dependency of surviving relatives; pain and grief 
suffered. Opinion evidence by medical experts is 
necessary in questions regarding degree of 
disability, prognosis, life expectancy and future 
fitness for employment. In obvious minor cases
agreement among expert opinion is usual, however
medical opinion on prognosis is often contentious as 
there are genuine differences of interpretation of 
the facts, for example when considering the prognosis 
of a patient with cerebral injury. In such a case 
where the damage is the result of an alleged 
negligent application of an anaesthetic, in addition 
to the report on liability from an anaesthetist, the 
patient would require a report on his/her present 
condition and prognosis which is likely to be
obtained from a neurologist. A further report from 
a specialist in rehabilitation to advise on what 
medical and nursing care may be needed in the future
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would be necessary. Thus in a few cases16
questions of life expectancy and the expense of
maintaining the patient will be scrutinised in great 
17
d e t a i l .
An additional problem, which arises more 
commonly in assessing damages for medical negligence, 
is the need to make allowance for some degree of 
disability which would have occurred anyway, for 
example where the doctor's negligence only prevented 
a partial recovery. Where medical treatment leads 
to an increased risk of disease or injury, damages 
can be assessed and discounted to the extent that
there had been an original risk of such disease or
18injury developing. Where a patient can show
that s/he has been deprived of a substantial chance 
to make a good recovery from illness or injury but 
for the negligence of his/her doctor, the likelihood 
of making a good recovery is relevant to the quantum 
of damage only and not to the question of causation 
establishing liability.
16. for example those similar to Lim Poh Choo
17. Any report must state not only the patient's 
condition and prognosis, but a separate opinion on 
the extent to which the present condition is due to 
the alleged negligence.
18. In Hotson v. Fitzgerald (1985) 129 S.J. 558, 1
W.L.R. 3; Davies v. Taylor [1972] C.L.Y. 819; McGhee 
v. N.C.B. [19721 C.L.Y. 2350, Robinson v. Post Office 
[1974] C.L.Y. 255, Clark v. MacLennan [1983] C.L.Y. 
2584; Kenyon v. Bell [1953] S.C. distinguished
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18In Hotson v. . Fitz g e r a l d . the patient who
suffered a hip injury in a fall had his left knee 
X-rayed which showed no signs of injury, and was 
given a bandage and advised to return in ten days. 
The patient was in great pain, received no assistance 
from his G.P. or osteopath, and returned to hospital 
after five days. The injury was then properly 
diagnosed and treated; the plaintiff suffered very 
severe and permanent disability. It was claimed
that the hospital acted negligently in failing to 
diagnose the injury on his first visit to hospital; 
that negligence caused him five days additional pain 
and suffering and substantially increased the risk 
that avascular necrosis would develop - leading to
longterm disability. The hospital admitted
negligence but said that avascular necrosis would 
have developed in any event. The trial judge found
that there was a 75% chance that avascular necrosis 
would have developed in any event, therefore the 
plaintiff was deprived of a 25% chance of making a 
good recovery. The hospital sought to argue that
the chance of recovery was relevant to the question 
of causation and that it was not more likely than not 
that the patient's disability was caused by the 
hospital's negligence so that they were not liable
for that disability. It was held that once the
18. (1985) 129 S.J. 558; [1985] 1 W.L.R. 3
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patient had established that he had been deprived of 
a substantial chance of making a good recovery 
liability on the part of the hospital was 
established. The likelihood of making a good 
recovery was relevant to the quantum of damages so
that in the present case the amount awarded for the 
serious disability suffered by the patient would be 
discounted by 75%. If the likelihood of a good
recovery could not be adequately assessed he was 
entitled to recover damages in full on the basis that 
it had. not been shown by the defendant that he would 
not make a good recovery. It was further stated 
that the degree of substantiality of good recovery 
required to prove causation against the hospital
authority could be greater where the likelihood of a 
good recovery could not be ascertained, although it 
was doubted whether a chance significantly less than 
25% could be characterised as 'substantial'.
While evidence may be direct and capable of
exact quantitative analysis for some of the heads of 
claim, for example loss of earnings; the patient 
faces uncertainty because the other heads are inexact 
and have to be assessed by the courts, with the 
result being sometimes erratic, for example damages 
for mental distress such as 'pain and suffering', 
discomfort and loss of 'expectation of life.' The 
calculation of damages for such head is usually 
arbitrary because although the circumstances
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mentioned above constitute a loss to the patient they 
cannot be measured in monetary terms - yet the award 
of damages requires some form of monetary
assessment. In this area any relationship between 
the monetary value and the damages awarded for 'pain 
and suffering' can only be based on a value
] Q
judgment. As Atiyah says,
"All such damage awards could be multiplied 
or divided by two overnight and they would be 
just as defensible or indefensible as they 
are today."
20Walker puts the position thus,
"... in the case of personal injuries no 
amount of monetary payment can be full or 
adequate compensation to the injured party, 
and frequently the consequences of the 
initial wrong far exceed the amount of 
compensation which can be given. Many 
imponderable factors have to be taken into 
account."
While others have put forward a variety of 
formulations as to how to calculate the value of an
19. Atiyah, P.S., Accidents. Compensation and the 
L a w , (3rd.Ed.) 1982 at p. 213.
20. Walker. D . M . , The Law of Damages in Scotland. 
1955, W. Green & Son, Edin. at p.5; see also, Ogus, 
(1972) M.L.R. 1 for conceptual basis of awards; see 
Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth (London) 1967, 
chapter 5; Ogus, A.I., The Law of D a m a g e s . 1973, 
pp.6-10, London, Butterworths; Munkman, J.H., Damages 
for Personal Injuries and D e a t h , 1980 (6th ed); London
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•injury' or 'life' there would appear to be no
consistency in the results. Atiyah suggests that 
the issue is further compounded by the fact that the 
wealth of society fluctuates and this has an effect 
on the level which will be awarded. This would
explain, in part, why awards for intangible losses
are higher in America than elsewhere. With respect, 
many commentators fail to appreciate the basis and 
the underlying problems of the court's assessment of 
damages. Damages for the medical injury itself are
intended to be like all other damages: an equivalent
in money - as far as the nature of money admits - for
21the loss sustained. The problem facing a judge 
is to place a 'fair value' on the lost or impaired
21. The judgment of Lord Shaw in Watson. Laidlaw & 
Co. v. Cassels and W i l liamson. 1914 S.C.(H.L.) 18, 29 
places the tasks facing the courts into perspective:
"In the case of damages in general there is
one principle which does underlie the 
assessment. It is what may be called that 
of restoration. The idea is to restore the
person who has sustained injury and loss to
the condition in which he would have been had 
he not so sustained it. [In] the case of
loss of life, faculty or limb - the task of
restoration under the name of compensation 
calls into play inference, conjecture and the 
like. And this is necessarily accompanied
by those deficiencies which attach to the 
conversion into money of certain elements
which are very real, which go to make up the 
happiness and usefulness of life, but which 
were never so converted or measured. The 
restoration by way of compensation is
therefore accomplished to a large extent by 
the exercise of a sound imagination and the 
practice of the broad axe."
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function. This does not mean that a hand is valued 
in isolation - what is involved is a valuation of the 
totality of the harm which the loss entailed. 
Therefore the loss of a particular function will have 
similar effects for the majority of people, apart 
from earning capacity, and so logically, injured 
patients ought to receive similar awards. While
Atiyah's argument, that money can never be a true 
equivalent for a personal injury, is valid, its
significance is often overstated. Simpiy stated, 
the law does not reckon for the unique personal value 
which a thing may have, but rather its value in 
societal terms. Values are assessed by the common 
judgment of society - it is this judgment which is 
applied to determine the fair value of an injury. 
Therefore when the courts assess damages for personal 
injuries, they attempt to achieve a fair social
valuation. It can be stated then that the courts
are concerned with the dispassionate and neutral 
value which society at large, on the basis of 
prevailing money values in that society, would give 
to a particular injury. While monetary assessments 
are based on an intuitive deduction by the courts, 
the notion that the courts apply a wholly subjective 
assessment is erroneous. Since no market exists for 
fixing the value of any part of the body or lost 
function, judges are compelled to set arbitrary
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figures to maintain comparability between people with 
similar injuries, in addition to offering some 
guidance to legal advisers. In assessing personal 
losses and financial losses, the courts apply the 
same principle, namely, to reach a full and fair 
valuation of the losses by stating it's 'worth' 
according to prevailing social standards.
There is a clear call for consistency in 
assessments of intangible losses, not only for the 
purposes of ensuring equality of treatment of each
case but also for efficiency in the process of
22settlements. Others have indicated the extent 
to which personal injury disputes are resolved in 
out-of-court settlements and that unless there is 
some degree of consistency in calculation of awards, 
the negotiation of such settlements will become 
difficult.
Since damages are individually assessed, they 
can be adjusted to the potential earning capacity of 
each person; they may take account of the probable 
future earnings of--children and students; and the 
prospect of promotion or of increased earnings in the 
normal pattern of the plaintiff's career. A major 
advantage over the social security system is that 
damages can be tailored to meet each person's future
22. For example, Mnookin, R . H . , Kornhauser, L., 
"Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law", 1979, 88 Yale
Law Journal, 950
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loss of earnings. For patients who are permanently- 
affected by their injuries, an award of damages, 
should, in theory, be the best type of compensation; 
it can, for instance, meet the care of permanent 
partial disability, which causes some reduction in 
future earning capacity. In practice, however, the 
failure of the judges to take into account the 
prospects of future inflation severely undermines
this advantage of flexibility.
Greater problems are posed by the need for a 
once and for all assessment. The law requires the
courts to assess all the patient's losses, both past 
and future, at one time, and to compensate him/her by 
the award of a single lump sum. This introduces the 
further complication that a lump sum award can be, 
and should be, invested in a way which will earn 
interest, but that interest will be taxable in the 
hands of the injured person or a trustee for 
him/her. Future rates of interest and of tax are 
unknown, but allowance must be made for them. Thus
any expected loss of earnings for the next twenty
years at £5,000 p. a. would be overcompensated by a 
lump sum of £100,000. Another problem is that a 
second action cannot be brought in respect of the 
same cause of action as a previous action because 
that action has become res judicata. If the
patient's injuries turn out to be more serious than 
his/her medical advisers expected at the time of the
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trial or of the out of court settlement s/he cannot 
bring a second action to recover more damages. This 
means that all future contingencies which may affect 
the injured patient's health or employment prospects 
have to be taken into account at the time of 
settlement or trial.
It is clear then that doctors are forced to 
attempt a prognosis often beset with uncertainties; 
for example whether the condition of the patient may 
deteriorate in the future (e.g. a head injury that 
may lead to epilepsy) and even when it is virtually 
certain that a particular condition may develop in 
the future, e.g. osteo-arthritis, there may be 
uncertainty as to timing and seriousness of the 
condition. Medical experts are asked to reduce 
these uncertainties to a percentage chance of a 
contingency occurring. Thus the attempt to
compensate for future losses involves a likelihood of 
mistaken forecasts.
Consider the hypothetical case where medical 
evidence shows that there is a ten per cent 
probability that a patient will become blind at some 
future date. The judge in awarding a lump sum as 
compensation will make an assessment on the basis of 
the losses the patient will suffer if s/he goes blind 
and then reduce this by ninety per cent. Thus a 
patient who in fact suffers a subsequent complication
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not allowed for may be seriously under-compensated, 
whereas if it is allowed for and s/he escapes it, 
s/he may be over-compensated. The lump-sum method 
of payment also demands estimates of the period of 
the patient's future working life, or his/her chance 
of future redundancy or unemployment for other 
reasons. If the judge makes a prophecy about these 
risks, and then reduces the damages on account of 
them, s/he is extremely unlikely to have hit upon the 
right discount to suit the future circumstances when 
they occur. Another difficulty is that the courts 
refuse to take account of future wage inflation - 
they do make guesses about future levels of 
taxation: instead of leaving it exclusively to
Parliament to decide whether to tax damages for lost 
earnings, the courts estimate those losses net of 
tax, using the current rate of taxation.
Supporters of the lump sum method of payment 
can argue that it gives freedom of choice to the 
injured patient, who may choose to replace his/her 
loss of a regular income by using the lump sum to 
purchase an annuity, or by him/herself investing the 
sum to produce an income. It has to be noted that 
nearly all other types of compensation systems adopt 
the method of periodical payments to replace the loss 
of a regular income: social security, sick pay, and
permanent sickness insurance all provide income
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support by periodical payments, which enables 
adjustments to be made in light of medical changes 
and inflation.
The case of Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and
2 3
Islington Health Authority illustrates many of 
the problems found with the present system of payment 
of damages. A psychiatric registrar was admitted to 
hospital for a minor operation. Following the 
operation she suffered a cardiac arrest, leading to 
extensive and irremedial brain damage; this left her 
only intermittently and barely sentient and totally 
dependent upon others. Liability was admitted but 
the issue of damages was in dispute. Lord Scarman, 
after stating the facts of the case before him 
expressed his anxiety at the existing system of 
awards at pl82,
"I would suggest to your Lordships that ... a 
reappraisal calls for social, financial, 
economic, and administrative decisions which 
only the Legislature can take. The
perplexities of the present case, following 
upon the publication of the report of the 
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury (1978) 
(Cmnd. 7054) ("the Pearson report"), 
emphasise the need for reform of the law.
23. A .C . 174 (H.L.(E))
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"The course of the litigation illustrates, 
with devastating clarity, the insuperable 
problems implicit in a system of compensation 
for personal injuries which (unless the 
parties agree otherwise) can yield only a 
lump sum assessed by the court at the time of 
judgment. Sooner or later - and too often 
later rather than sooner - if the parties do 
not settle, a court (once liability is 
admitted or proved) has to make an award of 
damages. The award, which covers past, 
present, and future injury and loss, must, 
under our law, be of a lump sum assessed at
the conclusion of the legal process. The 
award is final; it is not susceptible to
review as the future unfolds, substituting 
fact for estimate. Knowledge of the future 
being denied to mankind, so much of the award 
as is to be attributed to future loss and
suffering - in many cases the major part of 
the award - will almost surely be wrong. 
There is really only one certainty: the
future will prove the award to be either too 
high or too low."
In dealing with consistency in awards Lord Scarman 
indicated that comparison with other total awards was 
unhelpful, because in so far as an award consists of
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'conventional' items, for example, for pain and 
suffering, comparability with other awards is 
certainly of value in keeping the law consistent. 
Pecuniary loss depends on circumstances and, as in 
the above case such loss predominates, comparison 
with total awards in other cases is of no help and 
may be misleading.
Cases of the Lim type have posed considerable 
problems for the courts when assessing the damages to 
be awarded. Due to advances in medical science 
people in a 'vegetable' state can be kept alive in a 
state of complete coma for many years even though 
there is complete paralysis. It is certainly open 
to question whether there can be any merit in 
awarding lump-sum damages for disabilities or loss of 
amenities, or even for loss of earnings if there are 
no dependents. The notion that there ought to be 
provision for substitute pleasures for those which 
are lost, is redundant because the injured patient is 
incapable of enjoying any pleasures. Indeed the 
issue of providing an award for pain and suffering or 
mental distress in such cases, bears no relationship 
to the condition of the patient since he is unable to 
feel pain or mental distress. In Lim Poh C h o o . the 
House held that the fact that the victim was 
unconscious of it did not eliminate the actuality of 
deprivation of the ordinary experiences and amenities
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of life.24
As regards inflation, it was held that the 
law was settled, more as a result of a rule of 
practice rather than a rule of law, that only in 
exceptional cases, where justice could be shown to 
require it would the risk of future inflation be 
brought into account in the assessment of damages for 
future loss.
In Croke and Another v. Wiseman and
25A n o t h e r , a child was left permanently and totally
24. The House applied Wise v. Kaye [1962] 1 Q.B. 638, 
C.A. and H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard [1964] A.C. 
326]. The main point actually decided in West & Son 
L t d . v. Shephard was that a plaintiff is entitled to 
substantial and not merely token damages for being 
deprived of the joys of life, although by reason of
prolonged unconsciousness there is little or no 
distress about the loss. It was not in dispute that 
a plaintiff who was aware of the situation would 
have substantially more because of the- mental 
distress. The point of the decision was that 
damages were not 'consolation money' - they are 
given for the harm actually sustained. See Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest at p.348, "I consider that it 
is sufficient to say that a money award is given by 
compensation and that it must take into account the 
actual consequences which have resulted from the 
tort," and he continued later, "If damages are
awarded ... on a correct basis it seems to me that it
can be of no concern to the court to consider any 
question as to the use that will thereafter be made 
of the money awarded." Compare this with Skelton v. 
Collins (1966), 39 A I L .J 480 - where the majority
decision would suggest that compensation is based on 
what the injured person needs and can use, so that a 
person whose life is shattered and who is in a 
permanent coma should get nothing except nursing 
costs, therefore logically, he should not get loss of 
earnings if it would exceed these costs, because he 
cannot use the surplus.
25. [1982] 1 W . L . R . 71,
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disabled as a result of negligent treatment by his 
general practitioner and the hospital authority. 
The issues before the Court of Appeal were similar to 
those presented in Lim Poh C h o o . in this case, the 
question of life expectancy was raised. The judge's 
acceptance of the evidence by one doctor was held to 
be valid. The suggestion that because of conflict 
of evidence the judge should have 'split the 
d i f f e r e n c e 1 was rejected by the Court of Appeal 
because judges are constantly faced with the task of 
deciding which body of expert evidence they prefer.
While the once-for-all-award system is 
defective, it is difficult to see what the 
alternative might be. If awards are reviewable 
annually or as often as the patients makes an 
application this would create more problems, because 
some awards might have to be scaled down on review 
which would give rise to dissatisfaction and 
complaint, or appeal.
7 fi
Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence will also have a
26. The distinction between contributory negligence 
and the failure to mitigate damages must be drawn - 
in the latter case the cause of action is complete 
before the injured patient's negligence, occurs - an 
injury has been caused by the doctor's negligence, 
but the extent of it is affected by the patient's 
subsequent negligent act or omission; while in the 
case of contributory negligence the patient and the 
doctor are each in part responsible for the 
occurrence which gives rise to the cause of action.
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27bearing on the amount of damages to be awarded to 
the injured patient, and will be held to exist where 
the incident which gives rise to the injured 
patient's cause of action happened partly as the 
result of his/her own fault. Contributory negligence 
is not often encountered in medical negligence 
actions; the more likely case is that of negligence 
by the doctor followed by some act of neglect by the 
patient which aggravates the original injury. It is 
possible to envisage' cases of genuine contributory 
negligence, as for example where a hypodermic needle 
breaks off inside a patient partly as a result of the 
doctor's negligence in using too fragile a needle and 
partly as a result of the patient moving during the 
administration of the injection. In such cases the 
question arises whether the patient's conduct 
constitutes an independent cause of the occurrence so 
as to disentitle him/her from recovering damages. 
Formerly a patient's action would have failed in such 
circumstances but since the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act, 1945, the position is that where the 
patient suffers damage as the result partly of 
his/her own fault and partly of the fault of the 
doctor or hospital authority, a claim in respect of 
that damage will not be defeated by reason of the 
fault of the
27. See Farquhar v. Murray (1901) 3F 859.
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patient. The damage recoverable is reduced to such 
extent as the Court think just and equitable having 
regard to the patient's share in the responsibility 
for the damage. There may well be cases where the 
patient's own default must be regarded as having been 
predominantly or even wholly responsible for the 
injury s/he suffered, and the damages will then be 
apportioned on that basis; although there may be a 
question whether it is proper to treat the case of 
where the patient is wholly responsible as a case of 
contributory negligence at all, for the failure of 
the doctor will not then have been in any degree 
responsible for the damage suffered. It certainly 
cannot be said, for example, that every failure of a 
patient to follow his/her doctor's instructions will 
necessarily amount to. negligence debarring him/her 
from claiming damages or justifying a deduction from 
his/her claim. It will only be the more flagrant 
instances of stupidity or carelessness on the 
patient's part which will be held against him in this 
way. Failure to minimise loss does not bear at all 
on liability but only on damages.
Alternative remedies and claims
Alternative remedies and claims may be 
available to the patient. S/he may have a remedy in 
contract but only where such an obligation exists 
with the doctor. Ordinarily, the task facing the
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courts in dealing with enforcement or breach of 
contract is to ascertain what terms in the contract 
were agreed upon by the doctor and the patient and to 
decide upon the meaning of the terms used, having
regard to their particular circumstances. However, 
there have been only a few instances where
interpretation of the terms of a contract between a 
doctor and a private patient have received judicial
authority.1 The most recent English authority,
2
Thake and Another v. Maurice , gives an indication 
of how the courts deal with such cases and is,
therefore, worthy of extended consideration.
Thake was a case in contract concerning a 
failed vasectomy operation. There was no suggestion 
that the doctor had not performed the operation 
properly, and at the time of the operation it was 
known in medical circles that very occasionally the 
effect of the operation could be reversed
naturally. Both plaintiffs, convinced that Mr.
Thake was sterile resumed normal sexual intercourse 
without any contraceptive precaution. A healthy 
child was born. An action was brought against the 
doctor claiming that their contract with him was not
1. Much of the earlier cases dealing with 
contractual obligations between doctors and patients 
have largely concentrated on the problem of title to 
sue rather than on any other contractual issue.
2. [1984], 2 All E.R. 513; [1986] 1 All E.R.497
(C.A.); see failed sterilisation case, Eyre v. 
Measday [1986] 1 All E.R. 488
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simply a contract to carry out a vasectomy but a 
contract to sterilise the first plaintiff and that 
the contract had been broken when he became fertile 
again, alternatively that they were induced to enter 
into the contract by a collateral warranty or 
innocent misrepresentation that the operation would 
render the first plaintiff permanently sterile, or in 
the further alternative that the defendant failed to 
warn him that there was a small risk that the first 
plaintiff might become sterile again. On the first 
question it was held that although the doctor had not 
intended to enter into a contract which absolutely 
guaranteed sterility, the test of what the contract 
was did not depend on what the parties thought it 
meant but on what the court objectively determined 
that the words used meant. The consent form 
contained no warning that the operation might not 
succeed in its effect, and since it was the do c t o r ' s 
document any doubt about its meaning was to be 
construed against him. Although normally surgeons 
would not deliberately guarantee any result which 
depended on the healing of human tissue, it was held 
that there was no reason in law why a surgeon should 
not contract to produce such a result. On the facts 
and evidence the contract was not merely a contract 
to perform a vasectomy but was a contract to make the 
patient irreversibly sterile. On the second
question, it was held that the doctor described the
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effect of the operation as an established medical
fact. The statement was not therefore, a promise as
to the future; and, without a warning, it was 
considered to be a factual statement on a crucial
factor, which was made by a person who had special
knowledge and skill, with the intention of inducing
the patient and his wife to enter into the contract 
for the vasectomy and which in fact did induce them 
to enter into the contract. The court of first 
instance held that the doctor was accordingly in 
breach of a warranty that the patient would become 
irreversibly sterile. The breach of warranty
occurred when the patient became fertile and the 
damage occurred when his wife became pregnant.
In terms of the quantification of damages for 
breach of contract, the doctor would be liable for 
losses which are not only reasonably foreseeable but 
also for those losses which he ought to have 
contemplated based on the actual knowledge he 
possessed in the circumstances. Therefore according 
to the judgment in this case, the measure of damages 
in cases involving contracts between a patient and a 
doctor would appear to go beyond those in a
negligence based action since it may be affected by 
the actual knowledge that the doctor possessed. 
Surprisingly, in Thake and Another v. M a u r i c e , the 
damages awarded by Pain, J., did not provide for
distress, and pain and suffering undergone by either
178
of the plaintiffs, they were confined to the birth of 
the child and its upkeep. This was in sharp contrast
with Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority3 a
case based on negligence for failed sterilisation
where damages were awarded for lost income, pain, 
suffering, anxiety and disruption to the family 
finances, but not for the upkeep of the child.
4
However on appeal and cross appeal the decision of 
Pain, J. was reversed in part, thus keeping it 
consistent with Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health 
Authority in terms of the heads of damages to be 
awarded. As regards the meaning and interpretation 
of the contract itself, Neill L.J., stated at p.540,
"... I do not regard the statements made by 
the defendant as to the effect of his
treatment as passing beyond the realm of 
expectation and assumption. Both the
plaintiffs and the defendant expected that 
sterility would be the result of the 
operation ... This does not mean, however, 
that a reasonable person would have 
understood the defendant to be giving a 
binding promise that the operation would 
achieve its purpose. Furthermore I do not 
consider that a reasonable person would have"
3. [1983] 2 All ER 522
4. Thake and Another v. Maurice 1 All E.R. [1986] 497
17.9
"expected a responsible man to be intending to 
give a guarantee. The reasonable man would 
have expected the defendant to exercise all 
the proper skill and care of a surgeon in that 
specialty; he would not in my view have 
expected the defendant to give a guarantee of 
100% success."
Nourse L.J. felt the need to state the functions of
the courts when examining contracts at p . 511,
"The function of the court in ascertaining, 
objectively, the meaning of words used by 
contracting parties is one of everday 
occurrence. ... In the end the question seems 
to be reduced to one of determining the extent 
of the knowledge which is to be attributed to 
the reasonable person standing in the position 
of the plaintiff's. Would he have known that 
the success of the operation, either because 
it depended on the healing of human tissue, or 
because in medical science all things. or 
nearly all things, are uncertain, could not be 
guaranteed? If he would, the defendant's 
words could only have been reasonably 
understood as forecasts of an almost certain, 
but nevertheless uncertain, outcome ... He 
could not be taken to have given a guarantee 
of its success."
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For the cross appeal on the issue of damages, it was 
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for, 
distress, pain and suffering, since the prenatal 
distress of both plaintiffs and the pain and suffering 
of the birth was a separate head of claim which was 
not cancelled out by the relief and joy after the 
birth of a healthy baby and there was no reason in 
principle why damages could not be recovered for the 
discomfort and pain of a normal pregnancy and delivery.
It is conceivable that a doctor iriay owe more
extensive and stringent duties towards his/her patient
by the implied or express terms of a contract than
would be owed in the absence of a contract. For
instance there may be breach of contract if a doctor
fails to perform a duty imposed by implied or express
terras, for example to provide additional or 'special'
post-operative care or treatment. Where a contract
contains an element of delectus personae. that is, the
doctor has been chosen for his/her particular skills,
qualities or abilities, and s/he delegates attendance
to another, then there may be scope for the argument
that such an undertaking imposes upon the doctor a
greater responsibility than would in the case of an
action raised in negligence. This contention was
5rejected m  Morris v. W m s b u r y - W h i t e . where the 
surgeon agreed to perform an operation on the patient
5. [1937] 4 All ER 494
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and to give his personal attention. It was argued on 
behalf of the plaintiff that this undertaking imposed 
upon the defendant a greater responsibility than 
normally fell upon a surgeon. Tucker, J. in
rejecting the contention said,
"Mr. Winsbury-White did say that he had 
pledged himself in terms to give this case 
his personal attention, although he agreed 
with me that in fact, in his view, that made 
very little difference as to the nature of 
his obligations. Of course, in any event his 
obligation was to perform the operation, and
to give the necessary supervision thereafter 
until the discharge of the patient. I think 
it is, therefore, involved in that Mr.
Winsbury-White expressly or impliedly 
intimate that the case would have his
personal attention. Whether you call it a
special contract or not is quite immaterial 
because, in my view, it merely emphasises, if
necessary, or it merely contains, all the
necessary ingredients of the ordinary case 
where a surgeon is retained to perform of
this kind. It is necessarily involved that 
he will perform the operation personally, and 
I think it was necessarily involved in such a
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"retainer that he would pay such subsequent 
visits as were necessary in the ordinary
c a s e ."
It is submitted that the above decision is erroneous 
and would not hold today, especially in light of the
views expressed by Megarry J. in Duchess of Argyle v.
Beuselinck6 a case dealing with a negligent 
solicitor. At pl83 Mr. Justice Megarry said, 
(o biter).
"I can see that in actions in tort, the 
standard of care to be applied will normally 
be that of the reasonable man; those lacking
in care and skill fail to observe the 
standard of the reasonable man at their 
peril, and the unusually careful and highly 
skilled are not held liable for falling below 
their own high standards if they nevertheless 
do all that a reasonable man would have 
done. But to say that in tort the standard 
of care is uniform does not necessarily carry 
the point in circumstances where the action 
is for a breach of an implied duty of care in 
a contract whereby a client retains a 
solicitor. No doubt the inexperienced 
solicitor is liable if he fails to attend the 
standard of a reasonably competent
6. [1972] 2 Lloyds Rep. 172
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"solicitor. But if the client employs a 
solicitor of high standing and great 
experience, will an action for negligence 
fail if it appears that the solicitor did not 
exercise the care and skill to be expected of 
him, though he did not fall below the 
standard of a reasonably competent 
solicitor? If the client engages an expert, 
and doubtless expects to pay commensurate 
fees, is he not entitled to expect something 
more than the standard of the reasonably 
competent? I am speaking not merely of 
those expert in a particular branch of the 
law, as contrasted with a general 
practitioner, but also those of long 
experience and great skill as contrasted with 
tfiose practicing in the same field of law but 
being of a more ordinary calibre and having 
less experience. The essence of the contract 
of a retainer, it may be said, is that the 
client is retaining the particular solicitor 
or firm in question, and he is therefore 
entitled to expect from that solicitor or 
firm a standard of care and skill 
commensurate with the skill and experience 
which that solicitor or firm has. The 
uniform standard of care postulated for the"
184
"world at large in tort hardly seems
. appropriate when the duty is not one imposed
by the law of tort but arises from a
contractual obligation existing between the
client and the particular solicitor or firm
in question. If, as is usual, the retainer
contains no express terms as to the
solicitor's duty of care, and the matter
rests upon an implied term, what is that term
in the case of a solicitors of long
experience or specialist skill? Is it that
he will put at his client's disposal the care
and skill of an average solicitor, the care
and skill that he has? ...I wish to make it
clear that I have not overlooked the point,
which one day may require further
consideration."
Although the case was concerned with negligent advice
given by solicitors, it is submitted that the
arguments may be equally pertinent to medical
practitioners.
Once a patient has suffered a misfortune, he
7
may have a valid claim m  social security. As
7. Social security must be considered an important 
source of compensation for those suffering personal 
injuries and it has been estimated that each year 1.5 
million injuries attract social security payments, 
Pearson Report, Vol 1, Table 4, p.13; Social Security 
Act 1975.
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mentioned earlier, negligence claims are generally- 
confined to cases in which fault can be established 
against the doctor, whereas in the social security 
systems fault is completely irrelevant. State cash 
benefits, payable by the Department of Health and 
Social Security, may be given in addition to other 
forms of State provision, for example, free medical 
treatment, hospitalisation and rehabilitation under 
the National Health Service and personal social 
services for the disabled.
The modern system of social security consists 
of a morass of different legislative measures based
o
on different traditions and principles. Briefly, 
the aims of social security can be categorised in 
terms of: the alleviation of poverty and need;
preservation of living standards; and compensation 
for certain losses.
Alleviation of poverty
The aim of social security as formulated by
9
Beveridge was freedom from want and the 
satisfaction of need. One category of benefit 
requires proof of poverty - the claimant is means 
tested and is entitled to relief only where his/her 
resources are below a legislatively prescribed
8 . (see Ogus, A.I. and Barendt, E.M, 1982, The Law of 
Social Security (2nd Edn.), London Butterworth)
9. Beveridge, W. 1942, Report on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services. (The Beveridge Report) C m n d . 6404
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standard.10 The means-tested approach does not
differentiate according to the cause of the need, 
except in the limited sense that controls exist to 
ensure that it is not self-inflicted. The other 
needs-based benefits are payable on the occurrence of 
a number of specific contingencies (disability, 
unemployment, old age, death). Here, it is assumed, 
in the absence of means testing, that the hazard 
gives rise to financial difficulties which may be 
divided into three categories: loss of earnings, loss
of support for dependants, and the incurring of 
special expenditure.11 
The maintenance of living standards
The policy behind social security was 
intended to provide equal treatment for all and so 
the provision of welfare above the legislative
10. The modern forms - supplementary benefit for 
those out of work, family income supplement for those 
in work with one child or more - have an ancestry 
which dates back to unemployment assistance between 
the wars, and perhaps even to the Poor Law.
11. Historically, the various systems of support 
concentrated on the first of these categories: 
unemployment and sickness benefit and old age 
pensions provided a form of income maintenance, 
enabling the person whose earnings had been
interrupted or lost to enjoy a standard of living at 
the very minimum. Additions for dependants were 
introduced in a piecemeal fashion, but, following the 
reconstitution of the system in 1946, became 
generally available with all income maintenance 
benefits. The idemnity of special expenses
especially those arising from disability, was not 
available until the 1 9 7 0 's when allowances were 
introduced for attendance and mobility.
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minimum was left to the individual's own 
responsibility. This position has been eroded over 
the years since the War; in 1946 an exception was 
made for the long-term disabled under the industrial 
injury scheme; in 1966 earnings-related supplements 
for short-term benefits such as unemployment, 
sickness and maternity were introduced. Under the 
1975 pension scheme earnings-related components were 
increasingly available for the period after 1978 
although they have never aimed at more than a partial 
indemnity for lost earnings.
Compensation.
In terms of compensation, social security is 
limited; it largely ignores the individual's economic 
potential and where it does, reference is restricted 
to the individual's performance up to the time of
his/her illness and injury. No account is taken of
12 . any partial loss of earnings; social security is
only made available where the person is wholly
incapable of earning. No compensation is payable
for losses such as pain and suffering. With this
background, the specific legislative provisions
available to support victims of illness and injury
are examined, although it has to be acknowledged that
they do not specifically apply to medically injured
victims.
12. Except for the industrial injury scheme.
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The benefits available can be grouped as
those payable under the 'contributory' social
13security scheme (formerly known as national
14insurance); 'industrial injuries scheme (which
replaced Workmen's Compensation); and the third group
as 'non-contributory' benefits. These benefits are
intended to provide some compensation for the loss or
interruption of earnings and entitlement is dependent
on the fulfilment of contribution conditions.
Contributory Social Security Scheme
The patient who must meet the contribution
conditions, has to establish that s/he is incapable 
15of work before entitlement for the loss or
interruption of earnings is granted. For the first
6 months of disability s/he will be entitled to 
benefits,16 but after this period s/he is expected 
to undertake other kinds of employment for which he
13. For an excellent account of the Social Security 
system see. Ogus, A.I., and Barendt, E., The Law of 
Social Security. (2nd Edn, London 1982); see also 
Calvert, H. , Social Security L a w , (2nd Ed.) London,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1978; also Atiyah, P.S., Accidents.
Compensation and the Law (3rd Ed), London, Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1980.
14. See Lewis, R . , (1980), 43 M . L . R . 514 for a
general review; also Ogus, A., "Recent Decisions on 
Industrial Injury Benefits", 5 Industrial Law 
J o u r n a l . 1976
1 5 . This does not mean incapable of performing his 
regular work - s/he must be incapable of work which 
s/he can reasonably be expected to do (Social 
Security Act 1 9 7 5 , s .1 7 (1 )(c ).
16. Until 1975 contributions were on a flat-rate 
basis, but are now earnings related.
189
is capable. Sickness benefit is payable for the 
first 6 months of incapability, and is in the form of 
a basic flat-rate weekly payment, plus additions for 
any dependents, and until 1982, an earnings-related 
supplement payable after two weeks. If after six 
months the patient is still incapable of work s/he is 
entitled to invalidity benefit - the benefit being 
payable for incapability lasting until retirement 
age. This benefit is a weekly flat-rate payment and 
any sum due for dependents. Since 1979 an additional 
payment is made under the new state pensions scheme, 
whereby the claimant receives a weekly addition which 
varies according to the age of the claimant at which 
s/he becomes disabled. The younger the claimant, the 
higher the rate of allowance. The assumption is that 
a person suffering disability at an earlier age will 
have greater financial needs and will not have had 
the opportunity to make savings for his/her 
retirement.
Industrial Injury Benefits
The industrial injury scheme is far more 
complicated - there are no contribution stipulations 
to be met, the claimant must have been an 'employed 
earner' at the time of the accident or disease. 
Benefits are financed by the National Insurance Fund 
but the system does not relate contributions to the 
safety record of industries, not withstanding
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the above schemes or for those whose needs were 
acute. The non-contributory invalidity pension is 
payable to persons incapable of work for a minimum of 
six months and who fail to meet the requirements for 
the contributory invalidity pension. Attendance 
allowance is payable to the claimant if s/he can 
establish the need for continual or repeated 
attention during both day and night, while the 
mobility allowance is a flat-rate weekly sum paid to 
those unable or virtually unable to walk. Both the 
Attendance allowance and the mobility allowance can 
be seen as the social security system attempting, in 
a limited fashion to cover out-of-pocket expenses 
which result from a disability.
Means-Tested Benefits
The remaining two benefits are part of the 
general social security provisions for those with 
inadequate provisions. Supplementary benefit is paid 
to those not in employment and registered as for 
employment.
While there are many benefits available there 
is a clear need to avoid overlap, although benefits 
may be accumulated only to the extent that they serve 
different purposes. For example sickness benefit 
cannot be aggregated with invalidity benefit but can 
be augmented by a benefit directed towards a specific 
need, such as mobility allowance. Social security
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gives rise to entitlements independent of other 
resources, therefore, a patient's right to 
compensation from a medical defence society or 
hospital authority under a claim in delict is wholly 
ignored. Private insurance takes little account of 
social security entitlement while certain disability 
schemes often make a deduction.
There is no doubt that the increase in the 
number of non-contributory benefits has improved the 
position of the long-term disabled. This is a very 
significant step forward because some people are 
never employable after an illness or medical accident 
which leaves them physically or mentally handicapped.
While the above has been a brief description 
of the available benefits with the social security 
system, there are sharp comparisons with the delict 
system.
The social security system by comparison may 
be speedy, certain and inexpensive to administer. 
Although the system is highly complicated in its 
administration and gives rise to many legal 
difficulties, the system operates on the premise that 
available rights can be understood by the individual 
without the need for expert advice. A claim must be 
accompanied by evidence of disability and for 
sickness or invalidity benefits a statement of 
incapacity from a general practitioner is sufficient
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- although an alternative medical opinion may be 
sought from a Regional Medical Officer. The system 
is rigid; there is no scope for compromise - the 
claimant will receive either the whole entitlement or 
none. An appeal from a decision will not incur the 
claimant any expenses, whereas in litigation expenses 
will arise to both parties. An injured patient who
makes a claim in social security, like a pursuer for
damages, will have to overcome certain hurdles if
s/he is to succeed in obtaining compensation. The
19 .most frequent problem is the criterion used for
incapability to work which includes an assessment of
the degree of disability. Another problem
encountered by a claimant is whether s/he is entitled
to particular benefits because of uncertainties
associated with categorisation.
Private Insurance
The patient may have private insurance which
might compensate for the consequences of illness or
injury. The loss. injury or damage the patient
suffers must be one which is insured against, and
s/he is entitled to recover from his/her insurers
irrespective of any rights s/he may have against the
19. Atiyah, P.S., (1980) at p . 345 and Pearson
Commission 1978 Vol 1 para 266 consider the
complexities.
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20doctor or health board. The Beveridge Report
made proposals for social security reform which were
consistent with the development of private insurance
to supplement social security benefits - but these
have been limited to life insurance and retirement
pensions. The private sector has remained
insignificant in providing compensation to those
suffering from the risks in medical treatment or
accidents. The Royal Commission on Personal
21Injury ' briefly examined the role of private
insurance in the present mixed system of
compensation. It was felt by some members of the 
22commission that, "greater facilities... by way of 
tax concessions or otherwise, might be offered for 
additional cover by first party insurance". This was 
not a recommendation by the committee and so private 
insurance has only a modest contribution to medical 
injury compensation.
20. For a critical examination of the role of 
insurance for compensation for personal injury see 
Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, Compensation and the Law 
(3rd Ed), London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980. pp. 
323 - 334;
21. Pearson Report, para 149-54.
22. Pearson Report, para 1715.
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"from the two sides, ... and offered months 
after the event by witnesses who were never 
very sure just what happened . . . and whose 
faulty memories are undermined by lapse of 
time, bias, by conversations with others and 
by the subtle influence of counsel."
The problem of delay must be acknowledged as a 
serious one, although it it has to be conceded that 
many of the causes of delay, which are explored in 
the next chapter, may not be unique to medical 
negligence cases or personal injury cases in 
general. It needs to be assessed whether the major 
reason for delay in medical negligence claims arise 
from the need to wait for the nature and extent of 
the injuries to become apparent. Whether delay in 
medical negligence cases is also a function of the 
requirement to assess a lump sum payment can only be 
determined from the negotiations that take place 
between the medical defence organisations and the 
p a t i e n t .
The procedure for settling medical negligence 
claims, which operates on the basis of case by case, 
to ascertain fault, may be a crucial factor in 
explaining the high cost of litigation. As
discussed earlier, this involves, firstly an enquiry 
into the circumstances to discover who was at fault, 
and secondly, an assessment of the compensation to be 
paid, which, in the case of future loss of earnings.
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involves the evaluation of medical prognosis.
The law recognises that the possibility of 
change and progress in medicine must be preserved, 
and this may explain, in part, why it is reluctant to 
intervene by adopting the policy considerations 
described earlier.
The criticisms, presented so far, are based
primarily on the analysis of legal principles applied
in those few claims which reach court. They may be
valid but it has to be acknowledged that they cannot
be a reflection of the overall picture. It is
submitted that the law of delict or tort is not a
scientifically designed machine for the allocation of
loss and compensation, it is essentially a forum for
the resolution of disputes rather than a compensation
2mechanism. This may explain Atiyah's finding 
that a relatively low percentage of claimants succeed 
in their claims. From the analysis of the legal 
circumstances surrounding medical negligence claims 
it would appear to be the case that regardless of the 
causes of medical injury, the losses are real and 
have a financial impact.
From this chapter we can conclude that the 
rules of law and procedure for medically-injured 
victims produces unsatisfactory results for the
2. Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, Compensation and the L a w , 
(3rd Ed), at p. 18; see also Pearson Report Vol. 1 
Chapt. 24 p284 1326. C m n d . 7054.
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patient since s/he will only be given compensation 
not according to his/her needs, but rather according 
to his/her ability to attribute fault to the doctor 
or health board.
The arguments presented in this chapter 
suggest that medical negligence is perceived 
differently by various groups depending on the way 
their financial, social, political and professional 
interests are affected. These differences in 
perception have led to accusations and fears that 
have contributed very little to the resolution of the 
problems peculiar to medical negligence. For
example, uncertainties about the causes of increased 
claims and premiums have contributed an emotional 
tone to discussions on the subject. Doctors blame 
lawyers for encouraging patients to press claims (for 
instance criticism of Legal Aid committees). 
Patients are not often credited by doctors as capable 
of understanding the complexity and risks of many 
procedures which may give rise to claims. Patients 
are blamed for the increase in medical negligence 
claims on the basis of their supposedly increased 
willingness to sue their doctors. It is presented 
that these and other attempts to assess blame for 
medical negligence illustrate the frustration this 
issue raises but offers little toward solutions - for 
either the short- or long-term. The problem is
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being defined in .terms of fault-based liability. 
The search for solutions to medical negligence may 
lie in reforming the existing system or by adopting a 
new system, for example no-fault social insurance. 
Therefore it can be argued that the primary 
objectives of any future compensation mechanism must 
be, firstly, fair and equitable distribution of loss 
associated with medical treatment or care, secondly, 
efficiency in the distribution of compensation and 
finally, conservation of resources through a 
reduction of injury and a minimisation of loss. 
Many commentators have directed their suggestions at 
reform within the legal system, but almost all fail 
to examine what reforms might be instituted within 
the medical profession.
The aim of the next chapter is to examine 
medical negligence claims at source since almost all 
the studies, so far as is known, have only examined 
personal injury generally, often at a level which is 
removed from the actual experiences of both the 
patient and the doctor. Before rational and 
effective proposals or recommendations can be made it 
is necessary to examine the factual circumstances 
surrounding medical negligence claims. The role and 
practices of the medical defence societies require to 
be examined in relation to such claims. There has 
been no systematic analysis of the medical
200
specialities, the status of the doctors involved, the 
characteristics of claimants or the nature of their
grievances. Legal books do not disclose how many
claims are intimated but not pressed as far as
actions in court, how many are settled or withdrawn
or otherwise do not proceed to trial, and may
accordingly give an inaccurate picture of the total 
situation. It is hoped that by examining the 
Scottish records at source they will provide useful 
information in relation to the grounds of the 
complaints and the areas of the National Health 
Service which give rise to complaints.
Medical Negligence
Thesis submitted in accordance with the 
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Chapter 2
Introduction
From the discussion in the previous chapter we 
can conclude that the legal principles which provide 
for damages to be awarded to victims of medical injury 
are not designed to provide compensation for all those 
who suffer from a medical injury. in other words, 
compensation is not automatically payable in every 
case. Generally, an award of damages will only be 
made where the patient can prove that the injury was 
in some way caused by the negligent conduct of the 
doctor or hospital board. We have also observed that 
a remedy in delict is available only where the patient 
can fulfil conditions which make reference mainly to 
the circumstances in which the medical mishap occurred 
and not to the position in which s/he presently finds 
him/herself. The law attaches importance to the 
consequences of the patient's injury only when 
assessing damages after the doctor or hospital board 
has been found legally culpable for causing the 
injury. Further, for Scots law, the fundamental 
principle of reparation is that liability depends on 
c u l p a . therefore the issues of deterrence of negligent 
conduct and restitution to the patient are 
inextricably bound up; culpa must be established 
before any examination is made of the patient's need 
to be compensated.
2An essential component in raising an action in 
delict is that the initiative to make a claim must be 
that of the patient or his/her representative because 
the onus is on him/her to prove that the doctor or 
health board was negligent. It follows that if the 
injured patient does not initiate a claim in respect 
of his/her injuries s/he will not be awarded any 
damages as compensation; where such a claim is made 
and s/he fails to meet the strict criteria for 
establishing negligence, the result is the same, 
although^s/he will have incurred legal expenses in the 
latter case, unless of course s/he is fully legally 
aided. One of the aims of this chapter, by 
undertaking a survey of medical negligence claims, is 
to provide some quantitative evidence of the manner in 
which the rules of delict currently operate in 
relation to the number of medically injured victims 
who bring claims for compensation; the proportion who 
succeed; and the practical difficulties encountered by 
those initiating claims.
Moreover any attempt to improve the existing 
methods of compensation whether it be through an 
action in delict, qualification under social security, 
or the introduction of a new mechanism for medically 
injured patients must be based on data which highlight 
the underlying problems attached to medical negligence 
claims. Judicial records are of limited value as a
3statistical source because, as we shall see later, 
only a minority of medical injury claims reach the 
level of judicial proceedings. In addition, court 
records are unsuitable because they are reported for 
reasons which have nothing to do with any empirical 
analysis that might be undertaken and therefore will 
contain many deficiencies which preclude a proper 
understanding of the problem. It follows therefore 
that an effort must be made to collect primary data on 
medical injury or medical negligence claims.
Much of the discussion and debate over 
compensation for medical injury has been conducted at 
a level removed from the actual experiences of both 
the patient and doctor and tend to rely either on 
accounts of how the medical defence societies operate 
in principle or on anecdotal evidence. Without doubt 
assumptions and conclusions based on such inadequate 
information perpetuate misconceptions about medical 
negligence. There is considerable ignorance about 
the nature and role of the medical defence societies; 
the nature of the procedures which go wrong; the 
apparent inadequacies of doctors or health boards; and 
the alleged injustices which patients are believed to 
suffer once they initiate claims. Many discussions, 
including those conducted by the media, often give an 
unrealistic and unbalanced picture of the dimensions 
of the problems encountered in medical negligence and
4this is reflected in the proposals and recommendations
based on such misinformation.
Surveys previously undertaken have been
concerned with issues such as the incidence and
prevalence of various illnesses and disabilities.1
The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and
2Compensation for Personal Iniury, established m
response to the concern being expressed over the
thalidomide cases, was constrained by its terms of
reference and concentrated its efforts on road and
work accidents. Thus little attempt was made by the
Commission to investigate the nature of patient
dissatisfaction with medical treatment or care. The
most recent and ambitious comprehensive survey by
3
Harris et al., studied victims of both accident and
illness by screening the general population for their 
sample. The researchers' decision to screen the
general population for data was based, in part, on the 
relative inaccessibility of individual doctors' and 
hospital records. It seems cogent that this
inevitably restricts the ambience of their study.
Thus far, discussions and studies on compensation
1. Harris et al.. Handicapped and Impaired in Great 
Britain, 1971, 1972 (3 Vols.) London H.M.S.O.
2. The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Iniury 1978, Crand. 7054 vol. 
1 , see vol. 2 for statistics on survey.
3. Harris et al., Compensation and Support for Illness 
and Iniury, 1984, Oxford, Oxford Socio-legal Studies.
5for medical negligence have lacked reliable 
information on the experiences of those actually 
affected by the existing mechanisms. This study is 
the first in the U.K., so far as is known, to 
investigate medical negligence claims (i.e., patient 
dissatisfaction as represented by complaints in 
medical and dental practice in the U.K.), at source.
A fundamental aim of the medical negligence survey is 
to provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
claims made by patients which would permit a more 
informed and rational discussion of the problems of 
medical negligence and its possible solutions.
General Considerations
4
It has been estimated that every year m  the
United Kingdom some 21,000 people die as a result of
injury and about three million are sufficiently
seriously injured to be out of employment for four or
more days. The vast majority of these deaths and
injuries are accidental and it is estimated that the
largest categories are accidents on road, at work and
5m  the home. Other studies have shown that the
4. Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability 
and Compensation for Personal Injuries, 1978 Cmn d . 
7054 Vol.l Chap.3 (hereafter referred to as "Pearson 
Report"). The statistics in the Report are not 
derived from one source, but rather, from a variety of 
samples submitted to the Commission.
5. For example, Harris, et a l .. Compensation and 
Support for Illness and Injury, Oxford, 1984
6number of accident victims who obtain compensation for 
their injuries through an action in delict/tort is low 
in comparison with the total volume of accidental 
injuries which occur. This is usually explained 
firstly, by reference to the very strict limits that 
the law draws as to when compensation for injury may 
be awarded by a court and secondly, by the fact that 
the vast majority of accident victims never take steps 
towards bringing an action for damages, whether or not 
in law, they may have a valid claim.
A major difficulty, from the outset with the 
analysis of medical negligence is that the incidence 
of medical injury is unknown in the United Kingdom and 
so the dimensions of the problem are unclear. 
Attempts at measuring the occurrence of injury during 
medical care in California6 have indicated that the
6 . California Medical Association and California 
Hospital Association : Report on the Medical Insurance
Feasability Study, August, 1977 p.50 In examining
21,000 hospital records it was found that injury 
occurred in approximately 5% of the cases - this 
incidence included all injuries without reference to 
causation or severity.
See also Pocincki L.S, Dogger S.J, Schwartz B.P: 
The Incidence of Iatrogenic Injuries. Appendix,
Secretary's Commission Report, note 1 p63. 1472 where
they examined 800 patient records from two urban 
hospitals and found that injuries occurred in nearly 8% 
of the cases reviewed.
It is argued that the reliability of estimates of 
injury incidence based on patient records is 
questionable, since such records are admissible as 
evidence in negligence actions if, as in America, 
doctors are particularly sensitive to situations of 
potential liability, then they may 'under-report' the 
incidence of medical injuries, whether or not induced by 
fault. See implications in recent case, Lask v.
Gloucester Health Authority, Court of Appeal, Times, 
December 6, 1985, discussed in Chapter 1.
7number of medical injuries is greater than the number
of medical negligence claims raised. It is suggested
that. even allowing for the many differences that
exist in the provision of medical care both in the 
7United States and the United Kingdom, such a 
general conclusion may be held applicable to this 
country, although any direct comparison would be 
seriously doubted. Before the analysis of the 
medical negligence survey is presented it is safe to 
argue, then, that the number of injured patients 
raising a claim in negligence for a medical injury 
suffered is very likely to be lower in comparison to 
the total volume of patients who suffer medical 
injuries. Therefore, the population which is being 
investigated is limited to only those patients who 
have suffered a medical mishap or have expressed 
dissatisfaction with their treatment or care by 
doctors/dentists or health boards.
It is against this general background of 
personal injury compensation that the present study is 
conducted.
7. Shultz. H. , “Medical liability: The American
Experience*', (1985), Report. Seventh World Congress on 
Medical L a w , vol.2: 91, suggests that presently in
America, patients are filing three times as many 
claims as they did ten years previously.
see also, 'Notes', “Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law 
in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting", Harv. Law R e v ., 
1986, p.1004
8Method
To collate information which would allow both a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis it was essential 
to have direct access to claims made against doctors 
by patients. This was made possible by examining the 
records of the Medical & Dental Defence Union of 
Scotland. To constitute a representative sample a 
total of 1,000 cases was examined, covering a period 
between January 1976 and August 1983. The claims 
were collected chronologically and in order of 
registration in the 'claims file' within this 
period. In order to address some of the questions
posed in the introductory comments, and others, each
claim was sub-divided into four major sections: a)
characteristics of patient (claimant); b)
characteristics of practitioner including specialty; 
c) nature of grievance; d) 'outcome' of claim.
The records examined included all claims reported to 
the defence union irrespective of whether the claims 
might be valid in law or not. Therefore the sample 
for the study was free from any pre-selection or prior 
screening by the defence union - this allowed an
examination of the complete range of grievances which 
patients considered to be worthy of initiating a claim 
against the particular doctor(s). However, this does 
not take into account the influence of the patient's
solicitor in advising a patient that a particular
9grievance may be of little merit and not worthy of
action.
Incidence of Claims
While the incidence of medical injury is
unknown, a crucial question that must be answered is
whether there is, in fact, an increase in the 
incidence of medical negligence claims.
An examination of the Medical and Dental Defence 
Union's records for the years 1973 - 1983 does
indicate a noticeable rise in the total number of
medical/dental negligence claims. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of medical negligence claims per annum.
As we can see, the trend is without doubt upwards - 
the number of claims made in 1983 had increased by a 
factor of 4 compared with those made in 1973 . This 
trend is consistent with the calculations submitted to
g
the Pearson Commission by the largest medical
defence society, the Medical Defence Union, and is
further supported by a similar trend suggested in an
earlier study based on the analysis of annual
9subscription fees for the Medical Defence Union. 
These findings strongly suggest that there is a 
developing trend for patients or their relatives to 
pursue negligence claims against
8 . Pearson Report vol 1 p.282 Cmnd. 7054
9. Harland, W . A . , Jandoo, R.S.. "Medical Negligence 
Crisis" Med. Sci. Law (1984) Vol.24 No. 2.
10
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medical/dental practitioners. Therefore there would
appear to be a sound basis for the concern10
expressed in recent years by the public, the medical
profession and the judiciary. Explanations as to the
causes of the increase in litigation against the
medical profession which have been pressed as far as a
court hearing have been suggested by several
authors11 and the Pearson Commission. For example
Cameron pin-pointed the tendency to litigate just
after the inception of the National Health Service in
121948. Indeed the Pearson Commission was able to 
state that,
"Fifty or sixty years ago, claims against 
doctors were rare. The position has changed 
somewhat since the inception of the National 
Health Service in 1948."
Cameron however then attempts to put the problem into 
perspective when he says,
"While it is true that medical negligence cases 
have increased greatly in number since the end 
of the Second World War, they were not unknown 
before. I think many may be under the
impression that in our parent's generation, for
10. The figures for 1984 and 1985 are consistent with 
the findings in this study.
11. See for example, Cameron, J.A., Medica1 
Negligence: an Introduction, The Law Society of
Scotland. Edinburgh 1983
12. Pearson Report vol 1 p.282 C m n d . 7054
12
"example, medical negligence would have been
regarded as a contradiction in terms. Trust in
13the doctor was absolute..."
The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
14put forward the suggestion that,
"... society demands more and more from 
medicine. In particular, personal involvement 
by the patient has been encouraged by the media 
the increase in these actions is [due to] 
the depersonalisation of the doctor-patient 
relationship. It is much easier to sue a 
hospital consultant than a family doctor and 
even more easy to sue a Hospital Authority."
The above comments, particularly those of Cameron, are 
mainly speculative, based only on subjective 
observations of judicial proceedings. Further they 
are based on the untested assumption that there has 
been a change in the public's attitude towards the 
medical profession since the introduction of the 
National Health Service. If this view is correct.
13. ibid. at p.2. Consider the comment by Lord Young 
in the Scottish case, Farquhar v. Murray (1901) 3F. 
859, where he said,
"This action is certainly one of a particularly 
unusual character. It is an action of damages 
by a patient against a medical man. In my 
somewhat long experience I cannot remember 
having seen a similar case before me."
14. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Study Group of the 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 
May. 1985, at p.3, London R.C.O.G.
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then it has to be shown that the patient's attitude 
towards litigation against doctors must in some way be 
linked to the manner in which medical treatment and 
care is dispensed since 1948. It is argued that an 
adequate explanation is only possible if we attempt to 
consider a variety of factors, for example, whether 
the provision of health care has become impersonal to 
such an extent that patients are more likely to sue an 
impersonal body in the form of a hospital board rather 
than a general practitioner giving personal attention 
or whether patients are dissatisfied with the outcome 
of their treatment because of misplaced 
expectations. It is submitted that only once these 
and other questions are sufficiently addressed can 
adequate explanations of the causes of the increase in 
medical negligence claims be suggested. For present 
purposes, the study has identified the problem as a 
growing one which does not leave room for complacency.
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with 
the complex interaction of factors which may appear to 
affect the likelihood that, following a medical injury 
or other grievance, a patient will make a claim for 
compensation.
Characteristics of patient/claimant
It seems clear that the characteristics of 
patients who in fact raise a claim ought to be 
identified in order to assess whether certain
14
characteristics, together with other factors, appear 
to be important in predicting the likelihood that a 
claim alleging negligence will be made. 
Characteristics considered worthy of investigation 
included age, sex and socio-economic status.
Age of Patient
As we can see from figure 2, which represents 
the distribution of age of patients, the sample of
1,000 claims included patients in all age groups, with 
the predominant age-group for both sexes being between 
35 - 45 years. For both male and female it is
evident from figures 3 and 4 that patients complaining 
were concentrated in the age-groups 20 - 40. The age 
distribution of male patients raising claims tended to 
be uniform with two notable exceptions: there was a
peak age-group of 30 - 40; and a sharp decline
following the post-working age group. A similar 
pattern was identified with the female age-group 
distribution - a sharp concentration of patients aged 
between 20 and 40 years, the peak age-group being 30 - 
40 years, and a clear decline in the over 60 year 
categories. In order to assess whether these
observations were in any way important is was 
necessary to compare the figures in this study with 
the sex/age distribution of the normal population as 
represented by the 1981 census figures of Great 
Britain - tables 1 & 2.
15
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Table 1
Acre Distribution of Normal Population*
AGE GROUP % MALE % FEMALE
0 - 4 6 . 58 6.17
5 - 9 7 .63 7.10
10 - 14 8.74 8 .47
15 - 19 8 .98 8 .47
20 - 24 8.03 7.60
25 - 29 7.36 7.04
30 - 34 7 . 92 7.76
35 - 44 12 . 81 12.39
45 - 54 12 .00 11. 95
55 - 59 6.26 6.57
60 - 64 5 .07 5 .66
65 - 74 8 . 65 11.09
Table 2
Acje Distribution of Patient Population**
AGE GROUP % MALE % FEMALE
0 - 4 7.50 3 .50
5 - 9 3.30 1.80
10 - 14 2.80 2.20
IS - 19 6 .30 4.40
20 - 24 4. 50 5.80
25 - 29 5 .00 8 .80
30 - 34 6 . 30 9 . 80
35 - 44 11.00 11.70
45 - 54 7.75 7 . 50
55 - 59 5 . 00 3 .00
60 - 64 2 .00 2 .70
65 - 74 3 . 80 2.30
* Figures deri v e d • from 1981 census figures of Great 
Britain. General Houshold Survey. 1981 (published by 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys) H.M.S.O.
Hale population: 25,408.526
Female population 25.780,526
** Figures derived from M.D.D.U.S. records, 1976 - 1983
by author.
Male population:398 
Female population:602
19
The findings in this study are in general 
agreement with the normal population - with two 
notable exceptions; for both sexes the proportion of 
patients over 60 years of age was exceptionally low 
compared with the same age group in the normal 
population; similarly the proportion of children 
under 15 years was lower than would be expected.
Explanations offered for this finding may be 
attributed to both the level of expectation that 
patients in such age groups have of medicine and the 
extent to which loss or anticipated loss of income is 
a motivating factor for the initiation of a claim. 
For the youngest age group - which is also the group 
which has the greatest powers of recovery from the 
effects of injury - the claims made are likely to 
reflect only those cases where the child's life 
expectancy is either impaired or where the injuries 
are such that the consequences represent a financial 
burden to the parents. With the post-working age 
groups, and particularly those in geriatric care, the 
disproportionately low number of claims probably 
reflect the diminished expectations of medicine, the 
tolerance of their condition and the extent to which a 
medical injury will have an impact on their financial 
position. Thus for this group, the findings may give 
some credence to the notion that the older generation 
do regard medical negligence as a contradiction in 
terms.
20
It is clear from figure 2 that claims by every 
age group within the working age group is larger than 
the pre- and post- working age groups. This would 
appear to support the argument that a claim against 
the defence society is likely to arise where the 
injury suffered impairs the patient's ability to 
resume work, or rather the extent to which such injury 
has financial consequences in terms of loss of income 
or future income. An important factor is that those 
in the working age group may have access to para-legal 
advice from their trade union or other such bodies - 
this may influence a patient to raise an action for 
negligence. Such infuence is certainly precluded 
from those in the extreme age groups.
Sex of Patient
The sex distribution of patients is summarised
in figure 5. It is evident from this survey that
more female patients raised claims against
practitioners than male patients, (ratio 3 : 2 ) .  The 
higher proportion of females and females in the 30 to 
40 age-group raising claims is partly attributed, as 
we shall see later, to the large number of claims
involving obstetrical and gynaecological procedures 
and partly attributed to the fact that claims in this 
specialty of medicine are high as compared with other 
areas of medicine and surgery.
21
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Socio-Economic Group of Patient
Another factor examined was whether the economic 
activity of patients at the time of the medical injury 
was an important variable which related to the 
likelihood of a claim for compensation being raised 
against the defence organisation.
Before examining the findings of this aspect of 
the study it is necessary to place the results in the 
context of earlier, more detailed research. There 
has been a considerable amount of socio-legal research 
in recent years investigating the differential use of 
legal services among social groups. These studies 
have attempted to quantify the dimensions of 'unmet 
legal needs', and explain why such needs remain 
unmet. It is clear that such studies inevitably face 
theoretical difficulties, for example the definition 
of 'unmet' or 'needs'. The investigations have 
developed in response to the almost untestable, and 
theoretically problematic proposition that many people 
who might benefit from the use of legal services fail 
to seek or obtain them, and that this failure varies
systematically between different groups in society.
15In summary, four theoretical approaches to
15. These have been summarised by Harris et al ibid.
at p.65 - 67. see Schuyt, K.,et al. The Road to
Justice. Deventer, Kluwer. extract in European
Yearbook in Law and Sociology, 1977, for an excellent
summary of research in this area.
23
the explanation of differential use of legal services 
have been identified. The first argues that it is 
the distribution of economic resources within society 
which determines use of legal services, in that income 
and property are the most important requirements for 
access to legal services. The second explanation 
offered, is that social-psychological resources, such 
as knowledge, access to social networks, and general 
competence determine the degree of access to legal 
services which the individual may enjoy. The third 
response suggests that the high level of participation 
in economic and social life increases the likelihood 
that legal services will be used. Finally, it is 
suggested that existing legal services are themselves 
organised in such a way that those problems which 
concern the wealthy are the most likely to be handled 
by solicitors, because solving them is inherently 
remunerative. Griffiths, J.,16 suggests that
despite the complexities of the arguments which form 
the basis of all four theories of differential use of
16. "The Distribution of Legal Services in the
Netherlands", Review Article, 4 British Journal of Law 
and Society 260, See literature: Abel-Smith, B..
Zander, M. , and Brook, R., 1973 , Legal Problems and The
Citizen, London: Heinemann; Ison, T.G. 1967, The
Forensic Lottery, London, Stapler Press. Latta, G. , 
and Lewis, R. , 1974. "Trade Union Legal Services", XII
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 63, Zander, 
Michael, 1978, Legal Services for the Community, 
London; Temple Smith; Royal Commission on Legal 
Services, 1980, London, HMSO, Cmnd. 7648.
24
legal services, they are all reducible to the simple 
explanatory axiom that the rich use lawyers and the 
poor do not. The studies mentioned above have been
concerned with differential use of legal services for 
all matters which may require legal advice or 
assistance. This study is confined to one specific 
problem area, that of medical negligence, which is
only a sub-set of the vast field of personal injuries, 
and it is submitted that the conclusions drawn may not 
necessarily hold for all areas requiring legal 
attention although, as we shall see below, they do 
lend support to the 'common-sense' view that those who 
can afford to do so avail themselves of the legal 
services while the less fortunate blunder on without 
legal assistance.
Table 3 shows the socio-economic groups of 
patients and a comparison with the general population, 
which is based on the General Household Survey data 
for the years 1980 - 1 9 8 3 . Although 1,000 claims
were examined, the records only permitted an analysis 
of 414 cases - this was mainly due to the fact that
some of the hospital records did not contain this
information. This may have been due to inadvertance 
by the attending nurse or where the circumstances
17 This classification of socio-economic group is 
based on a 'collapsed version' of the grouping used by 
the Registrar General in 'Classification of 
Occupations 1970' (OPCS, 1970), pp. x - x i . Patients' 
occupation were self-reported and mainly derived from 
those claims involving hospital authorities.
25
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precluded recording all the administrative .details, 
for example in an accident and emergency admission.
In addition most claims raised against dentists (151) 
did not disclose information concerning the patient's 
socio-economic status, in the way done by some 
hospital records. From the 414 claims, 250 were 
inadequately described, housewife, retired or student, 
and it was not possible to assess the socio-economic 
status of the head-of-household for this category.
It can be seen that all categories are
represented although the study population has features 
which distinguish it from the general population. 
Groups 2 and 3 reflect an acceptable parallel, whereas 
the other categories are peculiar to the survey 
population. Group 1 is disparate, it is high in 
comparison with the general population, while there is 
a corresponding paucity of figures derived from groups 
4 and 5. A comparison of patient-socio-economic 
groups raising an action of negligence indicates that
medically injured patients in 'professional' and
'unskilled manual' groups initiate claims
proportionately more often than those in all other 
socio-economic groups. The findings for the
professional group would appear to support the
proposition that those with greater personal resources 
will be more likely to embark on a legal action. The 
findings for group 6 - 'unskilled manual worker'
would appear to run contrary to the explanation
27
offered for the professional group, however it is
submitted that the apparent anomaly can be explained,
tentatively, by reference to the availability of legal
aid or trade union 'assistance for this group. As
discussed in chapter 1 the provisions for legal aid 
18are limited, in part, to those who meet the 
criterion of financial eligibility which, as mentioned 
earlier, is assessed by reference to the patient's 
disposable income and disposable capital. If this is 
the case then there ought to be evidence which 
supports the contention that whilst legal aid may 
assist only those in the lowest socio-economic group, 
it fails to help those patients in the other middle 
groups because the financial limits are so low as to 
exclude many of these claims. This in fact is 
substantiated by the results found for middle 
socio-economic groups 4 and 5. As we can see from 
table 3, proportionately fewer actions for medical 
negligence were raised by those patients in the middle 
economic group - this is probably due to the adverse 
manner in which legal aid operates. There is, 
however difficulty in untangling the extent to which 
the failure of these groups to raise actions of
18. The notion that Legal Aid only assists the
relatively impoverished pursuer is supported by the 
Medical Protection Society, Palmer, R.N.; "The Anatomy 
and Physiology of a Claim", Proceedings of the
Fourteenth Study Group of the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists; May 1985, London.
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negligence against the medical profession for reasons
not connected with the medical injury, is due to the
low propensity for groups 4 and 5 to use the legal
system in general. The records examined from the
defence organisation did not give consistent
information as regards the number of patients who had
in fact obtained legal assistance and so no assessment
as to the proportion of those legally-aided could be
given. The annual report of the legal aid committees
19was not sufficiently detailed to be of assistance.
It is submitted, again tentatively, that we can 
already see the manner in which the rules of law 
relating to legal aid currently operate to restrict 
the number of patients who may have valid claims in 
law but cannot proceed with litigation because of the 
financial burdens involved in such proceedings. This 
point will be examined later when we consider the
possible reasons for the delay in raising medical 
negligence actions.
This section has attempted to define the
population of patients raising claims against the
medical and dental profession by identifying
characteristics which might have a bearing on their 
propensity to raise such actions.
While all patient age-groups were represented
19. See however, 'Legally Aided Blackmail', New L .J ., 
Jandoo, R.S., Harland W . A . , vol 134, 1984
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the data population was distinctive from the normal 
population- The differences may be explained by such 
factors as: tolerance of the underlying medical
condition; ability to recover quickly from injury; and 
most importantly. the extent of loss of income or 
financial hardship. For women in the 30 - 40 age
range, the probable explanation lies in the nature of 
medical procedures which are exclusive to women.
The sex distribution of patients indicated that 
women raised more claims than men, but, only a limited 
interpretation can be applied because the difference 
may be due to the number of medical procedures which 
only involve female patients, for example obstetrical 
cases where expectations may be high and any 
disappointments very great.
The socio-economic groups of the patient
population was in contrast to the normal population
distribution. The extreme groups were
20over-represented while the middle groups were
20. The Legal Aid Efficiency Scrutiny Report,
reported that thirty per cent of applicants for legal 
aid were on supplementary benefit; Vol.2 L.C.D. 1986. 
It has to be borne in mind that it was beyond the 
scope of this project to assess the extent of other 
influences, such as para- or pre-legal advice from 
trades unions or other advisory bodies, on patients' 
motivation for raising actions against the medical
profession. Further studies would have to be
conducted and would require interviews with patients; 
this is was not feasable in the present study - some 
of the claims were raised many years after the 
original injury and resolved several years later and 
claims originated over a wide geographical area.
30
under-represented. The probable explanation for this 
is that legal costs and expenses and the application 
of the rules for legal aid preclude certain patients 
from raising an action, irrespective of whether the 
claim may be valid in law. 
b) Characteristics of Practitioner
As suggested earlier, before rational and 
effective measures can be taken by doctors and health 
authorities to avoid or reduce the number of medical 
negligence claims there needs to be at least an 
attempt to identify those characteristics of 
practitioners which suggest that they may be likely to 
be vulnerable to a negligence action.
The survey identified a total of 1,441 medical 
and dental practitioners in the 1,000 claims and 
covered doctors and dentists engaged in hospital and 
general practice. The total number of medical 
practitioners in hospital service was 1,074 (74 per
cent); general practitioners constituted 216 (15 per
cent) of the sample, dentists represented 151 (11 per
cent) of the total. A summary of the distribution of 
the 'categories of practice' itemised is provided by 
figure 6. It clearly indicates that the bulk of 
medical negligence claims are made against 
practitioners in hospitals; while not surprising, it 
is likely to reflect the extent to which claims are 
linked to the manner in which health care is provided,
Figure 6
Categories of Practice
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0 2jO 40 60 80
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but more importantly, to the nature of the procedures 
which may lead to a negligence action. While the 
'categories of practice' gives information about where 
claims are most likely to arise, it is only by 
identifying the professional 'status' or 'rank' of 
practitioners can an adeguate assessment be made of 
those practitioners against whom claims are made and 
more likely to be made.
Status/Rank of Practitioner
From the study, the status of medical
practitioners identified those involved in negligence
claims and those more likely to be vulnerable.
Status was defined in terms similar to those used by
21the National Health Service gradings. From the
distribution illustrated by Figure 7, all status 
groups are represented in the study; 'Clinical 
Assistant' included visiting practitioners. Table 4 
gives a more detailed summary of the findings.
The data indicate that the greatest proportion 
of claims are raised against Consultants who represent 
45% of the total. Senior House Officers represented 
11% of the total, whilst the remaining five groups 
represented 33% of the total in the study. Before 
any attempt could be made to explain these findings it
21. See Report of Joint Working Party on Medical 
Staffing Structure in the Hospital Services, in 
Hospital and Health Service Yearbook 1983, H.M.S.O.
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was essential to establish whether the results were in 
any way significant. For example, it is quite 
possible that there are four times as many Consultants 
employed in the National Health Service as compared 
with Senior House Officers and therefore little 
importance could be attached to the findings. In 
other words, it was necessary to establish whether the 
findings shown were a true function of 'status'. To 
show whether this was the case it was thought useful 
to compare the findings of this study with those 
figures that might have been available from the 
National Health Service regarding the distribution of 
various status groups. Such a comparison was not 
possible because data of this type were not available 
on a national level. The alternative was to select a 
region or health board which could be taken as 
representative of the national distribution of status 
for medical practitioners. Greater Glasgow Health
Board (G.G.H.B.) was selected for comparison for
77 -several reasons; for present purposes it is
sufficient to note that it represents the largest
health board in Scotland and has the greatest number
of staffed available beds in Scotland.
Not all the status groups provided by the 
Greater Glasgow Health Board could be used due to
22. This is discussed later in more detail.
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classification difficulties; general medical and 
dental practitioners were not compared due to lack of 
information from the Health Board. Therefore the 
population of both studies had to be readjusted and 
brought to normality. Table 5 (i) represents the
populations being compared and as we can see, the 
status groups are confined to those which are found in 
a hospital environment. By establishing ratios 
vertically between the two sources, it was then 
possible to compare the data horizontally and so allow 
a comparison of relative ratios. By adopting this 
approach it was possible to equate 'ratio' with 'risk 
factor'. From table 5 (ii) we can argue that, for 
example, a Consultant is three to four times more 
likely to become involved in a negligence claim as 
compared with a Senior Registrar, Registrar or House 
Officer. Similarly we can show that a Senior House 
Officer is almost twice as likely to become involved 
in such a claim as compared with all groups with the 
exception of Consultants.
Thus figure 7 illustrates the distribution and 
relationship among status groups within the study 
while Figure 8 demonstrates the relative propensity 
for practitioners belonging to certain status groups 
to become involved in medical claims by using relative 
ratios which can be equated with 'risk factor'.
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Comparison of status of practitioner with GGHB+.
Table 5 m
Consultant Sen.Reg. Registrar S.H.O. H.O.
%* _ 45 
%** " 30 
Ratio 1.50
3.6 10.4
9.7 22.8 
0.40 - 0.46
11.0 
14 . 4 
0.76
3.2
7.4
0.40
These figures required adjustment and brought 
normality, because not all of the categories 
specialties were included in the GGHB. data, 
result is shown below in table 5 (ii).
to
Of
The
Table 5 (ii)
Consultant Sen.Reg. Registrar S.H.O. H.O.
%* 61.5 
%** 35.7 
Ratio*** 1.72
4.92 14.2 
11.5 27.1 
0.43 0.52
15.0
17.1 
0.88
4.4 
8 . 8 
0.5
*n = 1055 (data population claims * Kroup) ♦
**n = 1783 (G.G.H.B . population)
*** Ratio can be equated with 'risk factor'.
+ The author acknowledges the Greater Glasgow Health 
Board for supplying figures for comparison. Ail other 
figures derived from M.D.D.U.S. files by author.
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The findings at first appear to be very striking 
and in sharp contrast to the popular view that medical 
negligence is really a phenomenon that ought to be 
found in the comparative newcomer. There are however 
several explanations for the high figures for 
Consultants - it is firstly, and probably most 
importantly, a reflection of the hierarchical 
structure which exists within the National Health 
Service - Consultants usually have overall 
responsibility for the running of a particular 
department/specialty in a hospital and this includes 
not only the procedures or methods to be adopted, but 
also the delegation of responsibility to his/her 
staff. Thus the high figure can be partly attributed 
to claims alleging inappropriate delegation of 
responsibility to a junior doctor. This explanation 
is supported by Government reports and observations 
made by several members of the medical profession. 
The Report of the Joint Working Party on Medical 
Staffing Structure23 in the Hospital Service, 
defined a Consultant as,
". . . a doctor chosen by reason of his ability, 
gualifications, training and experience, to take 
full personal responsibility for the 
investigation and/or treatment of patients 
without supervision in professional matters,"
23. ibid. at p.692, section 19.
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and then went on to make the observation, following
investigation, that work properly belonging to
Consultant posts was regularly being discharged by
members of more junior grades. Indeed, in the recent
proceedings of the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
24
Gynaecologists concern was expressed about
Consultants inappropriately delegating duties to 
junior doctors, so much so that the Society suggested 
guidelines in the following terms, namely that,
"Delegation of surgery should be practised only 
after careful training and critical assessment 
of the trainee's skills and ensuring that advice
is readily sought when appropriate."
25Pugh, M . A . , stressed the importance that ought to 
be attached to the training of junior doctors and the 
responsibilities of Consultants in effecting adequate 
training. He argues,
"The way in which our juniors are trained can 
influence greatly the risk of being involved in 
an accident. Further, it is crucial in 
determining how problems are met and the effect 
of accidents corrected. Careful supervision of 
a surgeon in training will encourage the
24. ibid. at p.86 . • ,
25 " Accidents in Gynaecological Surgery - Clinical,"
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Study Group, ibid., p.75
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development of a safe technique. The
delegation of responsibility is an especial 
topic for litigation. The Consultant at the 
head of the team may have no direct involvement 
in an accident when one of his juniors does an 
operation but his awareness of the ability of 
that person to undertake a particular surgical 
task may be called into question. It is the 
Consultant's duty to be aware of the ability of
his juniors and to ensure that a surgeon in
training is directly supervised when necessary 
or to know when the surgeon in question can be 
allowed to operate with a supervisor present, 
nearby or who can be safely entrusted with the 
operation without supervision."
From the discussion in Chapter 1 concerning the 
legal liabilities attached to practitioners for 
inappropriate delegation of responsibilities and 
duties we can see from the findings in this study that 
such legal principles are in fact being applied,
possibly in the majority of claims. Certainly as a 
matter of practical sense a patient's solicitor will 
attempt to widen the ambit of liability wherever
possible and therefore involve the Consultant whenever 
a junior doctor is involved. A further explanation 
is that certain medical/surgical procedures are mainly 
conducted by practitioners of considerable expertise
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t h i s  a g a i n  t e n d s  t o  b e  f o u n d  w i t h  d o c t o r s  of
C o n s u l t a n t  r a n k ,  w o r k i n g  i n  a r e a s  o f  m e d i c i n e  w h i c h
usually involve procedures having a high risk of 
mis h a p .26
Explanations for the findings for Senior House 
Officers although more complicated are mainly 
explained hy what has been said above. It can be 
argued that Senior House Officers tend to be involved 
with patients at a crucial stage of the doctor-patient 
relationship, s/he is usually the first doctor a 
patient is likely to see on being admitted to a ward, 
further s/he is usually involved at the initial stages 
of formulating a diagnosis - this applies irrespective 
of whether the patient's attendance is unannounced as 
in the case of accident and emergency or by referral 
from his/her general practitioner. It is therefore 
possible to argue that patients are more likely to 
identify the Senior House Officer as the doctor 
responsible for his/her grievance because doctors in 
this grade tend to be involved with the day-to-day 
examination and care of the patient. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, sometimes the patient does not know the 
identity of the surgeon or Consultant ultimately 
responsible for the treatment and so it is more likely
26 see next section for areas of medicine/surgery 
identified as 'high risk'.
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t h a t  t h e  r e c e i v i n g  d o c t o r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  n a m e d  i n  a  
claim. A n o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  t h a t  S e n i o r  
House Officers are o f t e n  h a v i n g  t o  a c t  i m m e d i a t e l y  o n  
the basis of t h e i r  i n i t i a l  d i a g n o s i s ,  w h e r e a s  t h i s  
cannot be said g e n e r a l l y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  s t a t u s  g r o u p s  i n  
hospitals. As w e  s h a l l  s e e  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  
diagnostic—related g r i e v a n c e s  t e n d  t o  b e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
feature of m e d i c a l  n e g l i g e n c e  c l a i m s .  I t  i s  
sufficient for p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  f r o m  
the role played b y  S e n i o r  H o u s e  O f f i c e r s  i n  t h e  
treatment or c a r e  o f  p a t i e n t s  a n d  f r o m  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
claims concerning f a i l e d  o r  i n c o r r e c t - d i a g e o s i s , I t  i s  
not surprising t h a t  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  a  ' h i g h  r i s k '  g r o u p  
for propensity t o  b e c o m e  I n v o l v e d  i n  n e g l i g e n c e  
claims. This f i n d i n g  d o e s  I n d e e d  i m p l i e d l y  q u e s t i o n  
the adequacy of t h e  t r a i n i n g  o r  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  j u n i o r  
doctors in a h o s p i t a l  environment. C e r t a i n l y  t h e  
types o f  grievances w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  I d e n t i f i e d  b e l o w  
suggest that S e n i o r  H o u s e  O f f i c e r s  d o  n o t  i n v e s t i g a t e  
the patient's c o n d i t i o n  i n  s u f f i c i e n t  d e p t h  -  t h i s  m a y  
be due t o  d e f i c i e n c i e s  I n  t h e i r  c l i n i c a l  t r a i n i n g  o r  
the m a n n e r  in w h i c h  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e i r  c l i n i c a l  
judgment i s  s u p e r v i s e d .  A n o t h e r  f e a t u r e  o f  t h i s  
g r o u p  i s  t h a t  t h e y  t e n d  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  s p e c i a l t y  I n  
w h i c h  t h e y  w o r k  m o r e  f r e q u e n t l y  t h a n  o t h e r s  I n  o r d e r  
t o  o b t a i n  w i d e r  c l i n i c a l  t r a i n i n g  b e f o r e  a s s u m i n g  
expertise in a chosen specialty - this nay have a 
b e a r i n g  o n  t h e  f i n d i n g s -
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The low findings for Senior Registrars and 
Registrars again is a reflection of the hierarchical 
structure within the National Health Service. They
tend not to have initial contact with patients; 
involvement is usually at a later stage after the 
receiving doctor has formed a diagnosis and possibly
acted on the basis of such diagnosis. Indeed, both
posts are essentially training ones w i t h i n  a defined 
specialty where the degree of expertise is higher;
these factors are more likely to make such 
practitioners conscious of seeking advice from 
Consultants who are closer at hand as compared with 
their availability for very junior doctors. Another 
explanation for the low figure is that Senior 
Registrars do not have the ultimate responsibilities, 
both clinical and administrative, that are attached to 
a Consultant's post and so in medico-legal issues
their role is likely to be limited. Therefore Senior 
Registrars and Registrars would appear to be cushioned 
by their position in the hospital hierarchy - they do 
not deal with patients initially who may arrive 
unannounced under conditions of emergency, nor do they 
carry the ultimate and often onerous responsibilities
attached to Consultants.
The low finding for Junior House Officers is 
largely explained by the very limited clinical
responsibilities undertaken by them in hospitals.
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Further, junior doctors tend not to be involved in 
invasive treatment or therapy and therefore do not 
participate in those medical and surgical procedures 
where the risk of a mishap arising during the 
treatment of a patient may be high. Another 
explanation is that Junior House Officers do not work 
under the extreme pressure often faced by other 
practitioners - with the exception of work conducted 
in Accident & Emergency departments. It can be 
argued that the reason why Junior House Officers tend 
not to become involved in medical negligence claims is 
because they work beside practitioners belonging to 
higher status groups acting in a supervisory capacity 
who may be held to be legally responsible for the 
junior doctor's acts or omissions.
The data gives new and very important 
information and suggests great grounds for concern.
It highlights the degrees of responsibility attached 
to practitioners according to their position on the 
National Health Service hierarchy. More importantly 
however, it demonstrates deficiencies in terms of the 
delegation and assumption of responsibilities by 
doctors working in the hospital environment. It 
would appear from the data that junior doctors may 
undertake procedures before being competent to do so, 
while Consultants may fail to delegate clinical 
responsibility competently. It is possible that
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Consultants and other senior doctors fail to 
understand the extent of their responsibilities and 
duties, a criticism could be that, 'ordinary clinical 
work' is taken too lightly as something anyone can do, 
or is of secondary importance compared with other 
demands on the Consultant's time such as 
administration, teaching or research.
Therefore from the data above we can assess, in 
a limited manner, the extent to which there may be 
truth in the notion that the relative experience or 
training of practitioners is a function of negligence 
claims.
Indeed there is scope in the hypothesis, from 
the analysis so far conducted, that the manner in 
which health care is provided and the training and 
experience of doctors may partly explain the 
increasing trend for patients to raise actions for 
medical negligence.
While the conclusions are based on an analysis 
of 'rank' or 'status' and therefore could be 
misleading, it was considered necessary to seek 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis. One possible 
source was the number of 'years in practice' of 
doctors.
Years in Practice
The distribution of 'years in practice' of 
practitioners is shown in figure 9 although
Y
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the number of 'years in practice1 was not available 
for all practitioners since they were not all members 
of the Scottish Medical Defence . Union, thereby 
reducing the sample from 1,441 to 882. it must be 
emphasised however, that the figures are derived from 
the date of registration with a medical defence 
society. and the date of incident giving rise to the 
claim. The figures are accurate with respect to 
National Health Service practitioners since it is a 
condition of service that they must either be members 
of a defence society or subscribe to an insurance 
arrangement approved by the Government. Figure 9 
shows that all-years of practice are represented with 
the trend generally downwards. Forty practitioners 
were the subject of claims within the first year of 
practice (3.5 per cent), while only four doctors were 
complained against after fifty years of practice (0.35 
per cent). The total number of doctors involved in 
claims within five years was 180 (16 per cent) while
the number involved within ten years was 370 (33 per
cent). The figures remain uniform for practitioners 
of between 10 to 30 years of practice (ranging from 10 
per cent to 14 per cent) . There was a noticeable 
drop in claims involving practitioners of thirty or 
more years in practice with only 64 (5.5 per cent)
practitioners having practiced for over forty years. 
Therefore the data would appear to lend support to the
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p reviously untested assumption that the negligence of 
doctors is in some way linked to their level of 
'experience'. 'Experience' used in this sense has 
nothing to do with experience in the sense of years of 
expertise w i thin a specialism - it refers more broadly 
to the number of years in practice. Certainly there 
would appear to be a link with the 'status' of 
practitioner and 'years in practice' although it must 
be acknowledged that, at the lower end of the National 
Health Service hierarchy, practitioners may change 
specialty a few times over a number of years and so 
inaccuracies may be present in the sample. While the 
other extreme end of the 'years in practice' spectrum 
shows that only 5.5 per cent of practitioners have 
practised for over forty years, it is difficult to say 
whether this figure is useful because it cannot be 
compared w ith the total number of doctors of this 
practice range in the National Health Service. It 
must be noted that doctors with more than forty years 
practice must be general practitioners because they 
are the only group that can continue in practice after 
the age of sixty-five and, given that most people 
qualify at the ages of twenty-three to twenty-five, 
anything over forty-two years is unlikely to indicate 
that the doctor is a specialist in hospital. The 
twenty to thirty range shows a gradual increment 
this again reflects the number of Consultants against 
whom claims are made and. it is submitted, does not 
run counter to the hypothesis that negligence claims
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n
may be a function of the number of years in practice.
Thus from an examination of 'years in practice
of practitioners we can conclude that doctors withi
the first ten years of medical practice show a greater
propensity to be involved in medical negligence claims
than doctors in later years of practice. This
finding requires further explanation because it
normally takes a specialist ten years to reach
consultant status; it is submitted that the figures
for this group include young general practitioners and
a certain number of junior doctors against whom claims
are high. The findings for this factor is partly
supported by the findings for status groups, where,
w i t h  the exception for Consultants, junior doctors
d i s play a similar tendency towards involvement in
medical negligence claims.
Number of practitioners in each claim
27
Reports by other observers have assumed that 
because the delivery of health care has become 
' irapersonalised', through the extensive use of 
hospitals and the 'team' approach to patient care, 
this must have a bearing on the patient's perception 
of the doctor/patient relationship in such a way that 
s/he is more likely to raise a negligence action.
The notion being that a patient is more likely to sue 
an impersonal institution or a practitioner working
2 7  F o r  e x a m p l e  Professor M . C .  M a c N a u g h t o n ,
" L i t i g a t i o n  i n  Obstetrics a n d  G y n a e c o l o g y " .
o f  the F o u r t e e n t h  S t u d y  G r o u p ,  idi.i. ? . S
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w i t h i n  such an institution rather than a family 
practitioner. These observations are derived mainly 
fro m  personal experiences and secondary sources and it 
has so far remained untested whether the increases in 
m e d ical negligence claims are linked to the so called 
impersonal nature by which health care is provided.
It is submitted that any attempt to 'measure' 
•impersonality' as a motivating factor for the patient 
to raise a claim is necessarily flawed because of the 
inherent complexities of the subjective concept 
' i m p e r s o n a l 1. As a value judgment it is bound by its 
v e r y  nature to vary from patient to patient and also 
the degree to which it is regarded as an important 
m o t i v a t i n g  factor. Further, the extent to which 
'impersonality' alters a patient's perception of 
heal t h  care providers - doctors and nurses - is also 
beyond accurate measurement despite the variety of 
psychological tests and follow-up studies which may be 
designed. It is possible, however, to examine 
factors which indicate as oppose to measure the extent 
to w h i c h  the provision of health care has become in 
any way impersonalised. This section therefore 
attempts to assess the validity of the above 
hypothesis, through empirical analysis, by examining 
two factors, namely the number of medical 
practitioners involved in each claim and the number of 
claims raised against hospital boards. To support 
the v i e w  that a team-based approach to treatment and 
care is in some way impersonal and therefore makes it
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easier for the patient to raise an action against a n  
impersonal body, it would be expected that t h e
majority of claims ought to be raised against at least
more than one doctor and that most claims would
be raised against an impersonal institution such as
the health board. Figure 10 details the distribution 
of the number of practitioners involved in each claim 
and suggests a contrary result; 54 per cent of claims 
involve a complaint against a single doctor, whereas 
claims involving two and three practitioners represent 
30 per cent of the total. Cases of four
practitioners amounted to only four per cent while  
those of five six, seven and eight practitioners 
reflect claims against group practices (twelve per 
cent). All claims involving five or more
practitioners represented claims made against group 
practices and included both medical and dental 
practices. It is possible to argue that the reason 
why there is a high proportion of 'single' doctor
claims is because the identity of the other 
participating practitioners is unknown. While this 
explanation is plausible it is unlikely to have much 
force because, as we shall see later, claims w h ich 
come to the attention of the defence organisation from 
the hospital board at which the patient received 
his/her treatment or care usually state all the 
doctors and nurses involved in the care and attention 
given to the particular patient. Therefore the
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defence societies usually do know the number28 of 
doctors involved in each case - this further
emphasises the inadequacies of studying judicial 
records because the inaccuracies would without doubt 
be far greater. Another explanation for the 
u nexpectedly high findings for 'single' practitioner 
claims is that the figure includes General and Dental 
practitioners who represent 15 and 11 per cent
respectively of the total practitioner population. 
This distortion is however not as great as first 
appears since twelve per cent of the claims are 
identified as being made against group practices. 
Fro m  the data 33 per cent of claims involved more than 
one practitioner in each claim working in a hospital
environment and again this includes doctors from
general medical practice acting in a locum capacity.
The number of claims raised against health 
boards was examined; the survey showed that 711 from a 
total of 1,000 claims involved health boards, the 
remainder were raised directly against the doctor or 
dentist. The main explanation offered for this 
f nd i n q- reflects the relationship among the medical 
practitioners, the defence organisations and the
health board.
T h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  H e a l t h  a n d  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y
2 8  U n a w a r e n e s s  a s  t o  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  m a n a g i n g  a  p a t i e n t  i s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  o n e  o f  
t h e  m a n y  o b s t a c l e s  f a c e d  b y  t h e  p a t i e n t  o r  h i s / h e r  
l e g a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
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insist on doctors and dentists being members of one of 
three defence organisations, or a similar State 
a p p r o v e d  scheme, as an arrangement which provides 
s u f f i c i e n t  and proper protection for medical and 
d e ntal staff employed in the hospital service. 
Indeed it is a requirement of such employment that 
m e m b e r s h i p  of a defence organisation is obtained and 
continued. The position is slightly different in 
g e n e r a l  and private practice because here, there are 
no government regulations which require that 
pract i t i o n e r s  are in benefit with one or other of the 
d e f e n c e  organisations, although only a few will not be 
me m bers. If a claim arises as a result of an alleged 
f a i l u r e  of the practitioner in private or general 
m e d i c a l  or dental practice, it will almost certainly 
be the case that the individual practitioner or the 
p a r t n e r s h i p  will be cited in the claim. In such a 
case it is very unlikely that the regional or area 
h e a l t h  board will be named in the claim, unless they 
are to be regarded as parties to the action because of 
their employment of, and vicarious responsibility for, 
staff such as district nurses.
D i f f e r e n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a p p l y  i n  a  h o s p i t a l  
c o n t e x t  w h e r e  a l m o s t  w i t h o u t  e x c e p t i o n  h o s p i t a l  
m e d i c a l  a n d  d e n t a l  s t a f f  a r e  e m p l o y e d  b y  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  r e g i o n a l  h e a l t h  b o a r d .  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  v i c a r i o u s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  h e a l t h  b o a r d s  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  m e d i c a l  n e g l i g e n c e  c l a i m s .  a s  w e  h a v e  
i d e n t i f i e d .  c i t e  i n  t h e  c l a i m  a s  d e f e n d e r s .  t h e
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evant health board on the basis that they will b e
vi c a r i o u s l y  liable. Another explanation is that it
would seem as a matter of practical sense for t h e
patient legal adviser to raise the claim against t h e
appropriate health board where the identity of t h e
alleged practitioner or practitioners is unclear t o  
the patient.
o u sSince the legal position regarding the vicari
liability of hospital authorities was clarified by the 
2 9
courts there has been a noticeable trend in
claims, pressed as far as judicial proceedings, t o  
cite the hospital authority as the principal 
defender. Further, the patient's legal advisers 
recognise that it is not worthwhile pursuing a claim 
if the defender does not have the means to settle 
it. It is very clear that in the vast majority o f  
cases damages are not paid by individuals but b y  
insurance companies under liability insurance policies 
or by large organisations such as Government 
Departments which act as self insurers.30
While these are probable explanations for the 
findings as to why the majority of claims are raised 
against an impersonal body such as the health board, 
the extent to which a patient's decision to raise a
2 9 .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  1 ,  v o l . l
3 0 .  T h e  P e a r s o n  C o m m i s s i o n  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  8 8 %  o f  t h e
n u m b e r  o f  c l a i m s  a n d  9 6 %  o f  t h e  a m o u n t s  p a i d  i n  
p e r s o n a l  i n j u r y  c a s e s ,  w e r e  c a s e s  d e a l t  w i t h  b y
i n s u r e r s .  V o l . 2  p a r a .  5 0 9 ;  s e e  a l s o  I s o n ,  T . G . ,  T h e
F o r e n s i c  L o t t e r y . ( 1 9 6 7 )  A p p .  E .  p p . 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 ;  a l s o  
A t i y a h ,  P . S . ,  A c c i d e n t s .  C o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d  t h e  L a w . 
1 9 8 2 ,  p p . 2 6 0  - 2 9 1
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claim is influenced by considerations of 
'impersonality' still remains untested. Whether we 
can conclude with certainty from the findings in this 
study that there is substance to the proposition that 
the increase in the number of medical negligence 
claims can be attributed wholly, or in part, to the 
allegedly impersonal manner in which health care and 
treatment is provided through hospitals and group 
practices remains doubtful. The finding for the
number of claims against health boards indicates a 
clear tendency to raise claims against impersonal 
health boards, however the reasons for this are quite 
different and reflect the normal procedures and
negotiation processes in claims of this type. It 
must be emphasised however that any attempt to examine 
the scope and depth of the impersonal nature of 
medical services would have to go beyond the mere
examination of claims of medical negligence. The 
present study does not do this, however, as an
indication that there is an increase in patient 
dissatisfaction with the National Health Service the 
Health Service Commissioner's Annual Report for 
1983-84^^" shows a clear increase in complaints. 
These findings do not suggest that the increase is due 
to the patient perceiving the provision of hospital
31. See table 6.
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Table 6
Analysis of complaints received by 
the Health Service Commissioner 1973 - 1983*
Year No. of Complaints
1973 361
1974 493
1975 504
1976 582
1977 584
1978 712
1979 562
1980 647
1981 686
1982 798
1983 895
* These figures are derived from the Annual Report 
for 1983-1984. Health Service Commissioner, "Analysis 
of activity". Fifth Report. Appendix G, p.48. HMSO. 
London The figures are based on complaints received 
from England. Wales and Scotland. The trend for 
Scotland is upwards.
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care as impersonal. if we examine the nature of the 
grievances giving rise to claims these might reveal 
whether there is any force to the proposition that 
impersonalisation of medical care leads to a greater 
propensity of patients to raise actions against 
doctors. This is only possible if we can distinguish 
those claims where the grievance does not relate to 
invasive treatment or therapy but rather to those 
w h ich are indicative of a particular attitude adopted 
by the doctor, nurse or hospital board towards the 
patient.
While such a detailed analysis was outwith the
scope of the present study, research conducted by the
Royal Commission on the National Health Service,
•Patient's Attitudes on the National Health 
32 .Service', is m  some ways instructive.
The Merrison Report conducted a national survey 
of patient's attitude to and experiences of National 
Health Service hospital services. The survey dealt 
with five main areas for both inpatients (800) and
outpatients (2,300); these included the following:
i. the provision of hospital transport for patients
to and from the hospital;
ii. the length of time spent waiting for a first
outpatient appointment or as inpatients for a
hospital bed;
32. Research Paper Number 5. 1978. Merrison. A.W.
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iii the provision of facilities and amenities in the 
outpatient clinics for patients and those 
accompanying them, and similarly the facilities 
in the hospital wards and rooms for inpatients;
iv. communication between hospital doctor and 
patient;
v. the degree of privacy afforded to patients.
The report of the Commission is not d i s c ussed in 
detail - only two findings are examined insofar as 
they may be considered as having an effect on the 
patient's perception of hospital care or treatment as 
being in some way impersonal.
A  criticism of the National Health Service w h ich 
is frequently voiced is the time that non-e m e r g e n c y  
patients have to wait for a hospital bed to become 
available, or for their first outpatient 
appointment. The Merrison Committee observed that 
one in five patients were distressed or inconvenienced 
by the wait for admission - the distress was generally 
attributed to the pain caused by the patient's 
condition. They noted that this contrasted sharply 
w i t h  the views expressed by outpatients; nearly half 
were concerned at the delay in waiting for their first 
appointment. Such patients stated that
dissatisfaction was based on their concern to find out 
what was wrong with them or how serious their 
condition was. It is understandable that a patient
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who considers his/her 'waiting period' to be
unacceptably long is likely to feel that s/he is only
another individual participating in a very complex
system of health care provided by the National Health
Service. Such circumstances may lend themselves to
the view that health care is impersonalised through
the use of hospitals as they are presently
administered under the National Health Service. This
interpretation, along with the view that patients may
become anxious or inconvenienced or suffer unnecessary
pain while waiting for a hospital bed or treatment, is
likely to make them consider litigation when a risk or
33injury occurs during the course of treatment.
The other factor considered as having a possible 
effect on the patient's perception of hospital care or 
treatment as being in some way impersonal was 
communication between patient and hospital staff.
The Merrison Committee showed that nearly one in 
three patients felt that they had not been given 
enough information about their progress and 
treatment. They also showed that young men and women 
patients between the ages of 17 and 34 were more 
likely than older patients to want to know more.
33. see Chapter 3 , p.24 of the Royal Commission on
the National Health Service 'Patients Attitudes to the 
Hospital Service' Research paper Number 5 for a 
detailed analysis of waiting time for admission to 
h o s p i t a l s .
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Overall, nearly one in seven of all the inpatients
interviewed had been given what they felt was
insufficent information about their progress, and felt
unable to ask any of the doctors to tell them what
they wanted to know. The two most frequent reasons
given by patients feeling unable to ask questions were
the doctors seemed "so busy" and were "in too much of
a hurry" to have time to answer questions; this
amounted to twenty-eight per cent of the total number
of patients interviewed (113). Twenty-Seven per cent
of patients said that they were deterred from asking
questions because of the doctors' attitude. They
stated that they found the doctors' manner very abrupt
and felt that doctors regarded them as being incapable
of understanding their explanations or were very
off-hand and gave the impression that it was not the
patient's place to ask questions. The research paper
showed that 15% of outpatients experienced difficulty
in understanding what doctors had told them about
their condition and treatment. Such patients
expressed a preference for an explanation to be given
in everyday language rather than the medical
34
terminology which was used by doctors.
In addition, situations which cause the patient 
embarassment or distress will undoubtedly affect
34. Merrison Report. ibid. chapter 9 page 109/110 
table 9.8.
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his/her attitude to treatment and care. This may
happen, for example, if the patient is apparently
ignored or excluded from discussions; made to feel
that s/he is treated as an exhibit as opposed to an
individual. This might occur when medical students
are present in the ward along with the doctor during
routine ward round examinations. The Merrison
Committee found that one in four adult inpatients said
that doctors had discussed their condition or
treatment with other people 'as if they weren't
there'. The research paper further showed that
overall more than one in three felt that they had been
3 5treated as 'just another case'. A p art from the
patient feeling ignored and having no control over 
what is happening to him/her, such circumstances may 
also have the serious consequence of making the 
patient feel that some unpleasant truth is being kept 
from him/her. Another finding was that there was 
some evidence to show that for any age group women 
were more likely to be distressed or annoyed at being 
treated in this fashion than men, while older 
patients, both men and women, were more likely than 
younger patients not to bother or take any notice of 
doctors discussing their condition or treatment with 
other people as if they were not there. This
35. Merrison Report, ibid. page 115 table 10.4.
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supports the explanation offered in the earlier part 
of the chapter for the low number of post-working age 
group patients raising an action of negligence found 
in the present study.
Unfortunately, the Commission did not ask
patients about their satisfaction with their actual
treatment and/or the standard of medical care they had 
3 6
received. This was because they felt that there
was no objective standard against which to set their 
answers and secondly, it was felt that the patient's 
own views on his/her treatment would not be a sound 
basis on which to make recommendations for changes or 
improvements.
It is submitted that there would appear to be 
sufficient evidence to suggest that medical care is 
perceived by certain patients as being in some way 
impersonal; whether this is important as a factor to 
influence them to raise an action against the doctor 
or health board is difficult to ascertain.
Specialty of Practitioner
While we have so far concentrated on the number, 
status, and years of practice of practitioners
36. It would have been useful for' the present study 
if the Royal Commission had undertaken a detailed 
study for the time that patients had to wait to be 
admitted to hospital from a list, or for a first out 
patient appointment, compared for different medical 
specialties.
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involved in medical negligence claims in order to 
identify characteristics which may suggest a
propensity to become involved in claims, any
conclusions would be seriously misleading without an 
adequate examination of the various medical
specialties to which such practitioners belong. 
There is a clear need for identification of the 
various medical and surgical specialties involved in 
negligence actions because such an analysis may
identify those disciplines in medical practice which 
are most prone to become the subject of a negligence 
action as a result of patient dissatisfaction. 
Indeed, it may be possible for the medical profession 
or hospital boards to implement effective and specific 
measures for the 'high risk' specialties thus 
identified in order to reduce the number of grievances 
raised by patients. Further, the implications for 
the medical defence societies are important, if the 
suggestion that private insurance companies are 
considering entering into the field with differential 
rates for high - and low - risks specialties has any 
basis. The ramifications from such a policy could 
have very important effects, possibly deleterious, on 
any specialty considered to be a 'high' risk. The 
implications in terms of the overall provision of 
health care and treatment for the public is likely to 
be affected - these will be examined in Chapter 3.
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The specialties within which practitioners were 
involved at the time of the incident were identified 
and categorised according to those specialties used by 
the National Health Service, ^  it must be borne 
in mind that the categorisation suggest a precision 
that does not exist in fact because certain 
disciplines, for example accident and emergency and 
orthopaedic surgery, overlap.
The results of the study are detailed in figures 
11 and 12; figure 11 shows the distribution of all 
hospital-based specialties while figure 12 illustrates 
only those which are surgically based. Figure 11 
illustrates some striking features - for example the 
number of practitioners involved in obstetrical and 
gynaecological procedures represent 18 per cent of the 
total claims. Practitioners working in general 
surgery constituted 12 per cent of the sample, while 
orthopaedic based claims represented 11 per cent and 
those in Accident and Emergency, 7 per cent. The 
remaining sixteen specialties, which included general 
medical and dental practice, represented 52 per cent 
of the total.
37. H o s p i t a l  and Health Service Yearbook 1983, 
H.M.S.O.
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Figure 12
Distribution of Specialties/ 
Surgically-based Grievances
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Before any conclusions can be drawn about 
whether it is possible to rank practitioners into 
'high risk' specialties - in the sense that practice 
in a particular specialty leads to a greater 
propensity to be involved in an action of negligence - 
it was essential to assess the extent to which a 
particular specialty in the sample was over - or under 
- represented. One method considered was to compare 
ratios between the findings of this study to those 
figures that might be available from the National 
Health Service in the U.K. Such a comparison was not 
possible because data of this type from the National 
Health Service was not available. Alternatively to 
compare the findings of the present study with those 
that might be available from a single health board or 
authority which could be considered as representative 
of the overall situation in the U.K. Greater Glasgow 
Health Board (GGHB) was selected for comparison for 
several reasons: firstly it has the largest %
population allocated to its region - 19% of Scotland's 
population; secondly, and more importantly however, 
the number and percentage of medical negligence claims 
was greatest in this region — for both Scotland (42%) 
and Great Britain (19.5). It must be borne in mind 
however, that the comparison cannot be direct because 
G.G.H.B. is taken only as a representative of Health
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Boards and so inaccuracies may be present. Such 
inaccuracies and distortions are likely to be less 
important because many of the cases, as we shall see 
later, emanate from those hospital boards which serve 
large populous regions. These factors taken together 
were considered sufficient to select this health board 
for comparison- It was unfortunate that not all 
specialties described in the G.G.H.B. data correlated 
with those used in the survey undertaken in this 
study. The G.G.H.B. data did not give an indication 
as to the number of general medical practitioners 
working in the region, therefore the populations, when 
compared, had to be normalised, i.e. adjusted to allow 
for a valid comparison. This necessarily reduced the 
size of the populations compared; the survey 
population was accordingly reduced from 1441 to 1055 
and the G.G.H.B. population was reduced from 2115 to 
1727 .
A comparison between the percentage of 
practitioners in the present study involved in medical 
negligence claims arising from a particular specialty 
and the percentage of practitioners within GGHB 
working in these specialties is shown in table 7. In 
order to assess whether a particular specialty was 
over/under-represented, relative ratios were compared 
(column iii); the results are shown in table 8
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Table 7*
.Comparison between % survey practitioners and 
specialty and practitioners in specialty in GGHB.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Specialty % GGHB % Med. Nea. Ratio
General Surgery 11. 24 12 . 00 1.07
Thoracic 2 . 6 0.80 0.31
Genito-Urinary 1.66 1.70 1.02
Neurosurgery 0.89 2.20 2 .47
Orthopaedic 4 .20 12 . 00 2.86
Paediatric 1.48 0.80 0.45
Accident & Emergency 5.39 7.00 1.30
Ophthalmic Surgery 3 . 37 1.60 0.47
E.N.T. 2 . 54 1.30 0.51
Plastic Surgery 0.95 1.50 1.58
Obs. & Gyn. 7 . 28 18 .20 2 . 50
Psychiatric 9 .53 1.40 0.10
Pathology 5.27 0.40 0.08
Radiology 6 . 63 3.50 0.53
Anaesthesia 11. 30 4 . 80 0.43
Paediatric Med. 3 . 60 1.30 0.36
Geriatric Med. 4 .73 0.20 0.04
General Med. 16.81 4 . 80 0.29
* The author acknowledges figures presented by the 
GGHB. All other figures derived by author from 
M.D.D.U.S. records.
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Table 8*
Risk rating of specialties
High Risk factor
Orthopaedic Surgery
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 1.0
Neurosurgery
Upper Intermediate
Plastic Surgery
Accident and Emergency 0.3
General Surgery 
Genito-Urinary
Lower Intermediate
Paediatric Surgery 
Radiology 
E.N.T.
Ophthalmology 
Anaesthesia 
Paediatric Medicine 
Thoracic Surgery 
General Medicine
Low
Psychiatry 
Pathology •
Geriatric Medicine
0.1
0.05
*A11 figures derived by author from M.D.D.U.S. records.
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where 'risk-rating' of specialty is divided into four
sections according to multiples of the first group.
From table 8 we can observe that the specialty
in which a practitioner works appears to have a 
bearing on his/her propensity to become involved in 
medical negligence claims. Thus for example, a 
practitioner in Orthopaedic surgery is almost seven 
times more likely to become involved in a negligence 
claim as compared with a practitioner in Anaesthesia, 
or twice as likely to be involved in such claims as 
compared with a practitioner in Plastic surgery. 
Similar relative ratios apply to practitioners in
Obstetrics and Gynaecology and those in 
Neurosurgery. These findings are important insofar 
as they clarify doubts expressed by some members of 
the medical profession as to the relative positions of 
the various specialties in terms of medical negligence 
claims. In addition they provide useful data for
hospital boards to consider when proposing
recommendations for improving the provision of 
services.
Any explanation for these findings must be
trG3 t6d with caution because of the influence of two
important factors, namely the volume of patients
attending the various specialties and, the 'inherent 
risks' present in any particular medical or surgical
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procedure. it was not possible to obtain reliable 
figures from G.G.H.B. regarding the number of patients 
attending different specialties. Therefore, to
assess the extent to which the findings are affected 
by the volume of patients attending the various 
specialties, the number of hospital beds accorded to 
the different specialties within Greater Glasgow 
Health Board was examined. The results are shown in 
table 9.
The findings in table 9 do not allow any valid 
correlations to be made; the probable explanation lies 
with defects in the primary data source: the hospital
bed data excluded the following beds: labour as
distinct from maternity beds; beds in reception wards 
unless they were in psychiatric hospitals and in 
permanent use; temporary beds; observation or recovery 
beds and cots. A further limitation is that not all 
specialties could be detailed due to inconsistencies 
in describing particular specialties, for example 
general surgery. Indeed the hospital bed data did 
not have beds allocated to the following specialties 
which were categorised in the present study: 
anaesthesia; radiology; and pathology.
A major source of discrepancy between the number 
of beds accorded to a specialty and the number of 
complaints arising from such a specialty is that the 
duration of patient 'stay' in bed is not uniform, nor
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Table 9 +
Specialtv 3. Available beds*
General Surgery 57 .00
Thoracic 0. 54
Genito-Urinary 2.00
Neurosurgery 1.00
Orthopaedic 4.81
Paediatric 0.07
Accident & Emergency 0.50
Ophthalmic Surgery 1.21
E.N.T. 3 .78
Plastic Surgery 0.72
Obs. & Gyn. 6..10
Psychiatric 10.10
Pathology nil
Radiology nil
Anaesthesia nil
Paediatric Med. 1.07
Geriatric Med. 11.20
General Med. 0.70
*n = 18.313
+ Data derived from Hospital Services Yearbook. 
Section 8, Statistics, p.408-409, 1983.
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does it necessarily reflect, for example in Accident & 
Emergency, the high turn-over of patients who come to 
hospital unannounced and are seen and treated 
otherwise than at a consultative session. It is 
quite possible therefore that the findings in Table 8 
may be a reflection of the nature of the work 
undertaken by each of the specialties. Thus for 
example Accident & Emergency will have a high volume 
of patients but only a few will require a period of 
stay in bed. Similarly, it is possible that any 
discrepancy between the number of beds and the number 
of complaints in gynaecology and obstetrics could 
largely be explained by the brevity of stay of most 
patients who are possibly numerous.
The inherent 'risks' found with certain
procedures in particular specialties is very probably
3 8reflected in the findings. This factor may
explain the findings for Neuro-surgery in table 8 
where the residual impairment or damage resulting from 
a risk materialising in this specialty may be 
extensive, beyond remedy, and severely disabling. If 
this is the case then the victim may be more likely or 
even compelled to raise a claim in negligence. There 
is little doubt that certain procedures carry very
38. It must also be noted that GGHB may not be wholly 
representative because it may contain very high risk 
specialties compared with another region.
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high risks of mishaps occurring, the nature of these 
will be examined below.
This section has attempted to identify those 
characteristics of practitioners which suggest that 
they may be likely to be vulnerable to a negligence 
action. The data have both substantiated and 
invalidated previously untested assumptions about the 
nature of the practitioners involved in medical 
negligence claims. The majority of claims are raised 
against practitioners working in hospitals where the 
type of treatment, and the manner in which it is 
delivered is different to that provided in a General 
Practitioner's consulting room. The results also 
show that practitioners of all 'status' groups are 
vulnerable to a negligence claim; the reasons for the 
discrepancies among different groups is largely 
explained by their relative positions in the hospital 
hierarchy. The combination of both the
practitioners' 'status' and 'years of practice' 
suggest that there may be deficiencies in the training 
of doctors which manifests itself in the quality of 
health care which is being provided. The data 
supports the notion that practitioners fail to 
appreciate the scope of their own clinical and 
administrative responsibilities and the limitations of 
the clinical experiences of their junior colleagues.
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The findings suggest that there is scope for 
arguing that health care provision is to some extent 
•impersonal' although the extent to which it is 
important as a motivating factor for patients to raise 
a medical negligence action is still unclear. The 
•team' approach to hospital care may partly explain 
why Consultants are involved in many claims and, in 
combination with the number of claims raised against 
hospital boards, tends to suggest that patients' 
perceptions of medicine and hospital services have 
altered. However, it is clear that other factors 
have an influence on and may explain the increasing 
trend for patients to raise claims.
A  very significant and important finding is the 
specialty in which a practitioner works. The 
importance of this finding cannot be ignored because 
of the clear link between propensity to become 
involved in medical negligence claims and the 
particular specialty, (see table 15). It is clear 
from the study that it is possible to recognise a 
specialty which can be said to be a "high" risk in 
terms of the likelihood of a claim arising against a 
doctor within such a specialty. The ramifications of 
this finding are very serious, for the medical 
profession, the patient, and the provision of health 
services in this country.
80
c) Nature of Grievance
It is submitted that only by identifying the 
nature of the grievances which form the basis of the 
claims under examination can a fuller understanding of 
the problems faced by patients, doctors and lawyers be 
properly gained. Further, once this key component in 
medical negligence claims is properly identified can 
effective measures and recommendations be proposed. 
Much of the literature identifying the nature of such 
claims invariably refer to anecdotal isolated 
incidents or a series of similar incidents without 
reference to the whole range of grievances that do in 
fact occur. It can be argued that such literature 
simply adds force to the distorted views on medical 
negligence held by the public. The distortion 
becomes even greater when it is usually the 
'outrageous' complaints that receive attention by 
and the media. As discussed in chapter 1 
below, all medical procedures - preventive, 
and therapeutic - carry some risk of harm to 
For some of the procedures the risk may be 
when an adverse outcome occurs it may be 
and cause loss of time from work. On the 
there are some procedures where the 
for an adverse outcome is quite high and the 
losses are financially burdensome to the 
This study attempts to identify, by working
academics 
and shown 
diagnotic 
patients. 
very low; 
transient 
otherhand, 
potential 
resulting 
patient.
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with a large sample of medical negligence claims, the
spectrum or range of grievances that exist in medical
negligence and to explore the nature of these
grievances. Studies which have examined the larger
subject of personal injury claims have erred by
attempting to f ormulate definitions or criteria for
'medical injury' because this inevitably excludes
certain categories of grievances which do have a
bearing on the overall picture. For example, the
3 9
Pearson Commission defined 'medical injury' as,
"... an impairment of a person by a physical or 
mental condition arising in the course of his or 
her medical care."
'Impairment' being qualified by the terms 'acceptable' 
and/or 'accident'. The Pearson survey was of a 
different population: it covered injured people who
had been treated in hospital or by a doctor, and whose 
injury had led to at least four days' incapacity for 
work or for other normal activities such as
housework. The Commission recognised that certain
complaints presented problems in terms of
categorisation because they were considered to be
' borderline' cases according to the criteria which 
they had laid down. Therefore, for example, skin
complaints, allergies or emotional reactions to trauma
39. Pearson Commission, Chpt.24 p.280
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could not be considered. Another approach has been 
to avoid defining the population studied in medical 
terms or 'causes' of disability but in terms of the 
extent to which a person's capacity to carry on a 
normal life had been damaged or impaired. The above 
criterion, while suffering from the pitfalls which 
stem from the use of the terms 'normal', ‘capacity1
and 'damaged' certainly focuses on the consequences of 
physical and mental disabilities rather than the
causes. This clearly has implications for the 
criteria to be used for compensation since the
question that must be faced is whether it is important 
to make the distinction between those medical 
grievances that cause losses for which compensation 
should be made and those that do not.
This study avoids a definition of medical injury 
but rather explores the nature of those grievances 
which have been identified and quantified. In order 
to display the vast range of grievances found in the 
study it was necessary to segregate the complaints
into distinct groups. The total number of
grievances, 1,287 from 1,000 claims, was divided into 
four categories! Diagnosis; Treatment; Management and 
Service. The decision to classify the grievances 
into four sections was taken only after alternatives 
had been considered. Earlier attempts suffered from 
being too narrow thereby excluding data; or too wide.
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allowing very little scope for interpretation. The 
classifications presented are a compromise of several 
systems and closely approximate to those used by the 
H e a l t h  Service C o m m i s s i o n e r . ^
From figure 13. which illustrates the 
distribution of categories of grievances, it is clear 
that treatment-based grievances accounted for the bulk 
of the complaints — 65 per cent, while
diagnosis-related problems attributed to 18 per cent
of the total number of grievances. Management-based 
grievances accounted for 15 per cent, whereas 
service-related grievances, a mere 2 per cent. A
detailed analysis is shown on tables 10 to 13. The
very low figures for service-related grievances is 
largely explained by the fact that in such instances 
liability is usually attached to hospital boards for 
breach of their statutory duties which do not involve 
doctors. They include instances of equipment
failure; defective appliances; and general mishaps, 
such as falling from a trolley. The extent to which 
service—related grievances represent a significant
source of patient dissatisfaction with the provision 
of care and treatment by hospitals cannot be 
determined from the data derived from the defence 
organisation's records since these records are only 
concerned with
40. ibid. Annual Report 1983-84; H.M.S.O. 1984.
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Table 10*
Diagnosis related grievances 
Number %
87 35 Failure to diagnose fractures
3-67 65 Incorrect diagnosis
254 100
Table 11*
Treatment related grievances
Number %
79 9 Incorrect treatment elected
144 16 Side-effect of treatment
173 19 'Accident' during treatment
96 11 •Dissatisfaction' with outcome 
of treatment
63 7 Fractures
40 5 Anaesthesia
70 8 Drugs - misprescription/dose
48 5.3 Sterilisation
55 6 Retained instruments & swabs
28 3 Incorrect site
796 100
Table 12*
Management related grievances
Number
77 37 Delay in treatment/referral
37 18 Failure in communication
13 6 Absent case history
13 6 Failure to obtain consent
11 5 Failure to attend
22 10 Inappropriate delegation
37 18 Other management failures
210 100
Table 13*
Number
8
9
10
27
Service related grievances 
X
30
33
37
100
Equipment failure
Falls from trolleys/chairs
Other accidents
* All tables derived by author from M.D.D.U.S. records.
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grievances which involve members of the organisation 
and not simply those which relate generally to the
hospital's liabilities. To conclude from the
findings in this study that failures in the provision 
of services do not represent an important source of 
grievance would be erroneous. A very useful, though 
limited, indication of the scope of this problem can 
be obtained from the Annual Report of the Health
Service Commissioner for England, Wales and
41 3Scotland. The Health Service Commi sooner in 1984
received a total of 895 complaints which was 12 per
cent more than the previous year. Thus there would
appear to be an increasing trend for patients to
express dissatisfaction with the provision of services
from hospitals. An interesting finding is that 67
per cent of such complaints were rejected and only 7
per cent were rejected because a legal remedy was
available. We can conclude therefore that while the
findings for patient dissatisfaction with hospital and
medical services in this study are low, the dimensions
of the problem are in fact larger than the study
indicates. In addition the trend of increasing
medical negligence claims is paralleled by a
corresponding increase in the number of grievances
41. following section 119(4) National Health Service. 
Act 1977; section 96(5) National Health Service 
(Scotland) Act 1978.
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being referred to the Health Service Commissioner. 
Taken together these findings do lend support to the 
notion that dissatisfaction with the provision of 
health services is a growing area for concern in the 
U.K.
By contrast, from figure 13, treatment-based
grievances represented the greatest source for
complaints leading to actions for negligence. A
detailed analysis is shown in table 11 where we can
see that 'accident' and ' side-effect' accounted for 35
per cent of the claims raised in this category by
patients. Although ' incorrect-site' represented only
3 per cent of the total number of grievances this
figure is alarming because, based on the findings in
this study, on average, every year four operations are
42performed on the 'wrong' side of the patient. 
'Dissatisfaction' with outcome of treatment (11 per 
cent), occurred mainly in Orthopaedic surgery, plastic 
surgery and dentistry. The dental claims principally 
involved dissatisfaction with fitting of dentures and 
fillings. 'Accident' during treatment (19 per cent) 
was a finding mainly in surgically based claims. 
Explanations for the findings in treatment related
42. These cases include those where the wrong limb was 
treated and which inevitably attract the greatest 
attention from the media.
grievances is unlikely to prove useful at this stage 
in the investigation because the results are too broad 
based and therefore open to many possible
interpretations. We can best understand these 
findings if the circumstances surrounding such claims 
are examined in more detail; for example we could 
further analyse the claims in terms of those settled 
in favour of the patient; against the practitioner in 
a particular specialty; and the status of the
practitioner against whom such cases are settled. 
This is done in the next section where the 'outcome' 
of claims, in terms of settlements or otherwise, is 
examined, (tables 15 and 16).
From table 10 we can see that there were 254 (18
per cent) diagnosis-related problems, 35 per cent of
which were attributed to failure to detect 
fractures. Missed diagnosis of fractures was a 
feature of the 'Accident & Emergency' specialty, and 
significantly. Senior House Officers in this specialty 
had the greatest number of claims settled against them 
in favour of the patient.
Number of Grievances in each Claim
It would be unrealistic to expect every patient 
to be completely satisfied with the treatment and care 
provided; we can see from this study that patient's 
grievances or dissatisfaction are expressed in almost 
every specialty and against practitioners belonging to
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all status groups. It has not yet been shown whether 
most patients have a few complaints or whether few 
patients have many complaints. From figure 14, which 
details the distribution of grievances in each claim, 
we can see that 65 per cent of the claims involved one 
grievance. Claims involving two grievances (30 per 
cent) mainly represented diagnostic errors associated 
with subsequent treatment. Claims of three and four 
grievances (15 per cent) were usually the result of a 
combination of the first three grievance categories.
If we had found that only a small proportion of the 
total patient sample was dissatisfied and had many 
grievances, then any improvement in the provision of 
treatment or care would make little difference to the 
overall number of patients who would have no 
complaints. From the data it is clear that the
majority of patients in fact had a grievance - this 
indicates a pressing need to re-examine the manner in 
which treatment and care is provided. An excellent 
indicator of the deficiences within particular 
specialties and specific status groups of
practitioners can be seen in those cases where the 
medical defence union have considered medical and 
dental claims as 'indefensible'. These and other 
findings are examined in the next section dealing with 
'outcome1 of claims.
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d) Outcome of Claim 
Delay in complaint
There is often delay before an injured patient 
considers raising a claim against the medical or
dental practitioner for alleged negligent treatment or 
care. As discussed in Chapter 1 the legal system 
places the initiative on the patient, but it is a 
reasonable supposition that the patient's first 
concern is, understandably, his/her medical treatment 
and physical recovery. In order to assess the 
importance of this factor in the present study the 
interval between the grievance and complaint was 
assessed. Figure 15 indicates the distribution of
the interval between the grievance and complaint and 
as we can see the majority of claims were raised 
within the first 12 months (43 per cent), with over 25 
per cent of the total within 6 months. The longest 
interval was 96 months (2 claims). Although figure 15 
shows a clear trend for claims to be raised within the 
first year of the alleged grievance - indeed the data 
showed that 75 per cent were raised within three years 
- the findings do give cause for serious concern. It 
is significant from the findings of this study that
nearly a quarter of the patients' claims were 
time-barred.
There are several probable explanations to 
account for the patient delaying in raising a
M
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claim. The patient may be unaware that an injury has
occurred and assume that the discomfort is only a
‘n o r m a l 1 and expected result of the treatment. in
some instances an injury may not manifest itself until
several months after treatment, as for example where
the treatment involved drug therapy and the
contra-indications were not observed until later. It
is possible that some cases of delay may be due to the
patient feeling that there may be little evidence to
support his/her claim and therefore does not consult a
solicitor until a considerable period has lapsed.
Without doubt the patient's legal advisers are likely
to experience difficulties in handling the claim as a
result of the delay between the time of the incident
and the time they were consulted. The difficulty
most likely to be encountered by such delay is in
collecting evidence from hospital boards and possibly
43the practitioner(s) involved. Another
explanation for the delay may be the patient's fear of 
legal expenses and as we have seen, legal aid is not 
automatically available until the merits of a claim
43. Harris, D. , in "Compensation and Support for 
Illness and Injury", Chapter 3, 1984, suggests from
his study that the longer a claimant delays in 
consulting a lawyer. the worse his chances of 
obtaining damages. He goes further and argues that 
for those claimants who delayed more than six months, 
the chance of obtaining damages dropped from over 70 
per cent to 45 per cent.
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are assessed by the local legal aid committee. in
addition to the assumed legal difficulties in
providing evidence of liability and the fear of legal 
costs it is conceivable that some patients may not 
want the fuss attached to bringing a claim and only do 
so once the injury becomes more disabling or is seen 
as such.
If these probable explanations are accepted 
then it is understandable that patients may assume 
potential legal problems without proper advice and shy 
away from the anxieties involved in litigation. 
Indeed, where patients have limited knowledge of their 
legal rights and fear legal expenses, it is hardly 
surprising that few initiate claims against the 
medical defence o r g a n i sation^).
Delay in disposal
44 . 45Many academics , Government Committees
and studies46 have highlighted the problems
associated with delay in the settlement of personal
injury claims - 'settlement' in this context means
that an award of damages was made in favour of the
claimant. This study goes beyond the presentation of
data on purely 'settled' claims, it also shows the
44. See for example Ison, ibid. 'Appendix C', 23: 178 
4 5. Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries
Litigation (Cmnd 3691 1968) (Winn Committee) sections
3 and 9; see Report of the Personal Injuries
Litigation Procedure Working Party (Cmnd 747 6)
(Cantley Committee Report);Pearson Report, ibid. at
46. Harris et al, ibid. at p.79
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variety of paths that medical negligence claims in 
fact take once they have been initiated. Figure 16 
indicates the distribution of the interval between the 
complaint and its 'disposal'. 'Disposal' was chosen 
.to indicate the outcome or status of the claim, that 
is, whether it was 'settled' (brought to a conclusion 
by negotiation); 'abandoned' (brought to a conclusion 
after three years had lapsed without any further 
action by the patient after intimation); 'frivolous' 
(no prima facie or reasonable cause of action); 
'ongoing' (negotiations in progress at time of 
investigation). As we can see twenty-four per cent 
of the claims were disposed of in the first six months 
with forty per cent of the total within 12 months, 
while 75 per cent were resolved within three years. 
The longest period between a complaint and its 
disposal was 72 months (one claim).
The results for 'disposal' may give cause for 
concern in that only a quarter of the claims are 
resolved within six months, when we explore the paths 
that many claims take it can be argued that the time 
taken to resolve claims may force many patients to 
have their claims resolved unfavourably, for example 
either 'abandoned' or 'settled' with low sums being 
awarded. The extent to which delay may serve as a 
negotiation strategy by the medical defence 
organisation will be discussed later.
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From table 14 (i), which details the disposal
of claims, it was shown that 536 (54 per cent) of the
claims were repudiated by the Medical Defence Society 
from the outset, with liability being accepted
initially in only 235 (24 per cent). The total
number of claims brought to a conclusion in favour of 
the patient, (damages), was 241 (24.1 per cent). The 
number of unsettled claims, which included those 
initially repudiated, was 759 (76 per cent). A
breakdown of these claims, table 14 (ii), showed that
407 (54 per cent) of the total of unsettled claims
were 'abandoned*. A further 342 were assessed as
‘ongoing*, while only 10 claims were considered 
'frivolous *.
The data highlights many important features on 
the process by which the patient's legal
representatives and the defence organisation negotiate 
settlements. The explanations for the above findings 
lie in the many practical difficulties facing
patients, for example the pressure to settle because
of uncertainties arising from the evidence available 
to prove fault or from the medical reports; the risk 
that a court might find that the patient was partly to 
blame, (contributory negligence - although we have 
shown in Chapter 1 that this is unfounded for medical 
negligence claims), the fear of legal expenses and
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Table 14 (i)«
Pi sposa
Claims
Examined
•Repudiated (Outset) 
Liability (Outset)
Writs Issued
Settled
Unsettled
of claims
No. %
1,000 100
536 54
235 24
166 17
241 24
759 76
Table 14 (ii)w
Disposal unsettled claims
Claims N o . \
Examined 759 100
Abandoned 407 54
Ongoing 342 42
Frivolous 10 1.3
Others 20 2.7
* All figures derived by author from M.D.D.U.S. records.
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other difficulties arising from the law or from the 
practices of the medical defence organisations.
The Negotiation Process
Before discussing the negotiation process in 
d e t a i l , the role of the medical defence organisations 
in relation to medical negligence claims must be 
considered.
Medical defence actions against doctors are
almost invariably actions where the assistance of one
of the three medical defence organisations44 is
apparent. These organisations stand alongside
doctors and dentists in the same manner in which the
regional and area health boards stand alongside the
majority of hospital employees who are not doctors or
dentists. None of the defence organisations is an
insurance company for the purposes of the Insurance
45Companies Act 1974, and membership does not, by 
contract or otherwise, confer upon the doctor a right 
to indemnity in the event of liability being found 
against him/her at the conclusion of a medical 
negligence action. In practice, however, the medical 
defence organisations withhold their discretionary
44. In London, the Medical Defence Union and the
Medical Protection Society; in Glasgow, the Medical 
and Dental Defence Union of Scotland.
4 5. Medical Defence Union v. Department of Trade 
[1979] 2 All E.R.
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powers to afford assistance to doctors only in the 
most exceptional cases.
The first formal notification of a claim for
damages comes in a letter written by the patient's 
46
solicitor to the Health Board responsible for the 
particular hospital at which the patient attended.
With a few exceptions, all the regional health 
authorities retain the services of a solicitor as a 
full-time legal adviser, who co-operates closely with 
the legal advisers retained by the medical defence 
organisations. Once a claim for medical negligence 
has been raised against the health board, their legal 
advisers examine the records and identify the 
practitioners involved. Once the practitioner(s) 
informs the health board as to the particular defence 
organisation to which s/he is a member, either the 
hospital board or the practitioner contact the defence 
society. Invariably, the practitioner is required to
46. From the survey about two per cent of the claims 
were initiated by the patient without legal 
assistance. While this finding is low it should give 
cause for concern because the legal rules, 
particularly those on the assessment of damages, and 
the negotiation process are so complicated that no 
layperson can safely rely on commonsense to guide 
him/her. Studies by others [note 43 above], show 
that most claims, where the patient is involved in the 
negotiation procedures, tend to be settled for amounts 
well below the levels where solicitors would advise 
acceptance. It is possible to argue then that this 
group might be undercompensated.
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prepare a report for the defence organisations before 
the claim is considered.
It is hardly surprising that the medical
defence organisation repudiate claims from the outset;
however, what is in fact remarkable from the findings
in this study is that they will acknowledge liability,
from the outset, in about twenty-four per cent of the
claims. This is in clear contradiction to the views
47expressed by some writers who suggest that the 
medical defence societies admit liability only 
rarely. The repudiation of a claim does not imply 
that the claim is 'lost' from the patient's point of 
view - it usually implies that the medical defence 
organisation will not consider the claim until the 
patient's solicitor or legal adviser gives detailed 
information as to the grounds of the alleged 
negligence. At this stage, the patient's legal 
adviser will be obliged to collect evidence, in the 
form of statements, medical reports, expert opinion 
and so on. The problems attached to this have been 
highlighted in the previous chapter. What can be 
argued is that repudiation of a claim may have the 
effect of creating further anxiety for the patient who 
may then decide not to continue with the claim.
47. Siraanowitz, A., "Action for victims of medical 
accidents", (1986) Medico-L.J., pt.2 vol. 54
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Therefore almost immediately we can see how the 
negotiation strategies by the medical defence 
organisations diminish a patient's incentive to
continue with a claim. From the records examined, it
is safe to say that the delay involved at this stage
could quite easily extend beyond two years. Without 
doubt the delaying tactics of the defence
organisations and the time for a patient's solicitor 
to establish a reasonable claim, often operated in a 
manner detrimental to the patient.
Once a patient has had a claim repudiated from 
the outset s/he has the choice either to continue with 
the claim or otherwise abandon it. The 'abandoned' 
claims in this study highlight many of the 
difficulties before the patient in attempting to 
achieve compensation. While the study shows that the 
majority of claims are abandoned, it is impossible to 
state exactly why patients abandon medical negligence 
claims. Several possibilities are suggested.
A firm denial of liability by the defence 
organisation is likely to deter the patient from 
making a claim or encourage the abandonment of a 
claim. Further, the injured patient may see the 
defence organisation or hospital board as having the 
financial and institutional resources to support a 
denial of liability by having legal and medical
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advisers to defend any legal action brought against 
them. While the patient's solicitor may treat the 
denials of liability from the defence organisation as 
a bluff, it does nothing for the patient's confidence 
in proceeding with the . claim. Another possible 
reason why a patient may abandon a claim is because 
s/he is unwilling to face the anxieties associated 
with a claim because it takes too long to be resolved.
Another explanation may be that a patient will 
not continue with a claim against the medical defence 
organisation because of the fear of impairing a 
continuing relationship with the doctor or dentist. 
This is likely to be a reason in only a very few cases 
because such an explanation is more probable in those 
circumstances where a patient does not in fact raise a 
claim against the medical or dental practitioner. In 
fact, the doctor against whom a claim is raised is 
rarely involved with the proceedings and often not 
notified as to the progress or outcome of a claim.
If there is any scope in the above argument then it 
shows to some extent, that an action in delict may be 
inappropriate in medical injury claims.
In circumstances where the patient is 
ineligible for legal aid, then s/he and the legal 
adviser take risks. As we have seen from the 
findings in this study, the socio-economic group of 
those patients who are above the statutory financial
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limit for legal aid is under-represented from the
normal population, with the exception of 
socio-economic group l. it is likely that patients 
belonging to these socio-economic groups will abandon 
their claims for fear of legal expenses. The patient 
may not be prepared to undergo further anxiety caused 
from the financial risks involved in continuing a
A Q
medical negligence claim. As Atiyah argues,
"...less reputable insurers will not take a 
claim very seriously unless and until the
plaintiff makes it clear that the claim will
be vigorously prosecuted. And, so long as no 
legal aid has been obtained, the insurers may 
be content to fight a waiting battle since 
they know that, although solicitors will 
negotiate without legal aid, they will not
initiate proceedings without legal aid." 
Therefore it can be argued strongly that the fear of 
legal expenses will probably deter a patient from 
continuing with a claim. Although the majority of 
patients' solicitors rely on the medical defence 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ^ ) to meet their fees and expenses it may 
be that solicitors are less likely to do so in more 
uncertain cases.
48. ibid. at p. 301. see Ison Survey Appendix C 
table 29; Pearson Report Vol.2, Table 126
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It is submitted that the correspondence and 
records of claims in this survey suggested that 
problems associated with evidence must have been a 
very important factor in explaining the high number of 
abandoned claims. Where evidence was a problem, the 
main difficulty was the insufficiency of evidence to 
prove that the injury was caused by the doctor's 
fault. This can be strongly supported when we
examine the types of claims that were settled. It is 
probably the case that the decision not to proceed 
with the claim is based on the advice of the patient's 
solicitor. Therefore the failure of injured patients 
to obtain a settlement cannot be simply attributed to 
the limited access to legal services but to the 
severity of the legal rules themselves, for example 
where the onus of proof is on the injured patient. 
There is no doubt from reading the records that the
delay caused by patients in not raising their claims 
early affected the quality of evidence which was made
available to their solicitors. It is not
inconceivable that some solicitors may use alleged 
problems over evidence as a pretext to their 
disinclination for other reasons, to suggest 
abandonment. However, the files suggested that 
patients' legal advisers probably advised their 
clients to abandon claims because of lack of evidence.
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More convincing evidence from this study which 
may explain the high number of abandoned claims is 
that nearly twenty-five per cent of the claims were 
raised after three years from the date of the incident 
or injury. While there are exceptions and therefore 
extensions for the three year limitation period, 
discussed in Volume 1, this factor must represent a 
significant reason for patients, on advice from their 
solicitors, to abandon a claim. Therefore we can
measure, again, the extent to which legal rules of 
procedure influence the availability of compensation 
for injured patients.
So far we have examined the first option
facing a patient once the claim has been initially 
repudiated. The second option is for the patient to 
continue with the claim until a settlement is reached 
this represented only 241 claims from a total of
4  Q
1,000, (24 per cent). Assuming that the patient
has not been deterred from pursuing the claim against 
the defence society after the initial repudiation, 
then the patient's solicitor may disclose some 
evidence which suggests that the practitioner was
negligent, and also some evidence as to the extent of
49. see Atiyah, P.S., Chapter 11 for settlement 
figures in other areas of personal injury.
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the patient's injuries. The negotiation processes 
which take place between the defence society and the 
patients' solicitor is very similar to those which 
take place in other personal injury claims, and have 
best been described by Atiyah50 in the following 
terms:
"...neither side is usually at all anxious to 
disclose all that they know. There is a good 
deal of bluff and counter bluff in the whole 
process, and both sides are conscious that if 
negotiations fail the case may eventually come 
to court. ... The result is that both parties 
spend half their time skirmishing rather than 
actually trying to reach agreement."
Accordingly negotiations involved a mutual strategic 
release of information. In practice the medical 
defence organisation generally moved towards a 
compromise where they thought that the patient had a 
reasonable chance to prove fault or where they 
considered that the doctor's conduct was indefensible, 
for example where the wrong limb was removed. While 
the offer was a proposal to pay a sura of money in full 
and final settlement of all the claims which the 
patient had against the defence o r g a n i s a t i o n ^ ) which 
had arisen from the injury, it was not always the
50. ibid. at p.303
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optimal sum. If the proposal is accepted by the
patient, it creates a binding legal agreement between 
the parties; the medical defence o r g a n i s a t i o n ^ ) are
bound to pay the agreed sum, and the patient is 
precluded from pursuing his/her claim to a court 
hearing. The defence organisations made offers
quickly in doubtful cases as an important strategy 
because if the patient rejected the offer, s/he had to 
face not only the risks of further delay and expense
in going to court but also the risk that s/he may fail
to prove the case in court and so recover no damages
at all, or recover only a lesser sura in damages than
had been offered, which will have an effect on the
award of expenses of the action. Therefore we can
see that the outcome of the negotiations depends on 
the relative bargaining strength of the patient and
the medical defence organisation and the tactics which 
they adopt. If, for instance, the medical defence 
organisation know that the patient's claim is weak but 
they also know and hide weaknesses in their own 
position, they secure a much lower settlement figure 
than if the full facts were known to the patient's 
solicitor.
During the negotiation procedures, many 
pressures are placed on the patient and these are best 
understood when we examine the decisions made by the 
patient when the defence organisation make an offer.
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When an offer is made, the patient, or rather the 
legal adviser, must weigh up several factors. The 
patient faces the uncertainty about the strength of 
the evidence available to him/her; is the evidence 
which can be presented by his/her expert witness 
sufficiently strong to establish that the accident was 
caused by the practitioner's negligence? The 
patient's legal adviser can only guess what 
contradictory evidence might be available to the 
medical defence organisation. Further, even if the 
patient is confident that negligence can be proved, 
there may be uncertainty as to whether causation can 
be established, or indeed whether the full extent of 
the injuries and losses can be ascertained.
Another frequent problem for the patient is 
uncertainty about the medical prognosis because a 
conflict of medical opinions on his/her future 
prospects is likely to produce serious anxiety about 
how the judge might assess his /her chances of either 
recovery or future deterioration. Even in the 
absence of difficulties over prognosis, as we have 
seen, the assessment of damages for intangible losses 
like pain and suffering, or the loss of the ability to 
lead a normal life, depends on the subjective 
impressions formed by the judge on all the evidence, 
and despite the unofficial 'tariff' system, cannot be 
predicted with accuracy. The patient will
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acknowledge that a rejection of an offer from the 
medical defence organisation will inevitably cause 
further delay and also increase the legal costs which 
may be incurred if the claim ultimately fails. The 
cumulative effect of these uncertainties is that if 
the patient is under financial pressure, as many can 
be assumed to be according to the findings in this 
study, s/he will be more willing to accept a lower sum 
which is immediately available to meet urgent needs or 
debts than to suffer continuing pressure in the hope 
that a greater, unknown, sum may be offered at some 
unknown time in the future.
Another possible pressure on the patient to 
accept an offer is the anxiety over legal fees. An 
offer by the defence society usually incorporates 
their willingness to pay the costs of the patient's 
solicitor. Other research studies on personal injury 
claims suggest that only a few solicitors in personal 
injury claims advise their clients to apply for legal 
aid and the majority appear to rely on the expectation 
that in nearly all cases they will be able to 
negotiate an offer from the defendants and so obtain 
payment of their fees. If this is true, then we can 
see that an offer from the medical defence 
organisation may create a conflict of interest for the 
patient's solicitor in cases not covered by legal 
aid. If the solicitor advises acceptance, his/her
Ill
fees will be virtually guaranteed, whereas if the 
advice is to reject the offer in the hope that a 
larger sum will be offered or awarded by a court, s/he 
runs the risk that the claim might ultimately fail, 
with the result that s/he would require the 
uncompensated patient/client to pay the fee. Some 
legal advisers might feel that the extra fees to be 
earned by negotiating for a higher offer are not worth 
the extra effort involved, or not justified in light 
of the further delay and inconvenience which would be 
imposed upon the patient.
From the records of the claims, the medical 
defence organisations adopt similar strategies to 
those employed by the patient and so the offers made 
depend largely on their assessment of the same factors 
which the patient makes. Thus, when deciding whether 
to make an offer, the medical defence organisation 
will make a judgment about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the particular claim, in light of all 
the factors, such as: their knowledge of the strength
of the defence evidence, of what the damages might be 
for 'full' liability, and of what view a judge might 
take of the medical prognosis. There are, however, 
some additional factors which go beyond the patient's 
assessment. The medical defence organisation is in 
the business of handling medical negligence claims;
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it will be concerned therefore, to minimise its total
costs, namely, the total of the damages and costs paid
to patients and its own costs in defending 
51
claims. Although the medical defence
organisation has the resources to fight many cases to
the stage of a full hearing in court, they estimate in
each case whether it will be cheaper to settle out of
court, perhaps for a slightly higher figure than a
court might award, than both to pay a court award and
also incur further expense on its own side in
preparation for, and during the court hearing. As 
5 2earlier work indicated, small but unfounded claims 
have a 'nuisance' value to the medical defence 
organisation, since it will often be cheaper to settle 
them by making some offer than to incur the expense of 
fighting them for as long as the patient persists.
The nature of the parties will also make a 
difference to settlemerats; what is routine for the 
medical defence organisation is unique for the 
patient. The defence organisation deal with many 
claims for damages and can spread their risks over all 
their cases; this is not possible for the patient, the
51. See Simanowitz's A., trenchant criticism of the 
medical defence organisations in, "Action for victims 
of medical accidents", (1986) Medico-L.J . pt.2 vol.54
52. Jandoo, R. , Harland. W.A., "Legally Aided
Blackmail", New L.J. vol 134 1984
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claim is an exceptional experience which is unlikely 
to be repeated. The patient is almost always 
concerned about the risks and uncertainties of the 
case, and the delay in reaching a settlement. It is 
possible to argue that because there is no continuing 
relationship between the patient and the medical 
defence organisation, the organisation exploit to the 
full all of its negotiating advantages.
The medical defence organisation also form an 
opinion about the degree of specialisation and the 
negotiating skills of the patient's solicitor which 
may well depend not only on the solicitor's experience 
but also on his/her willingness to press a claim as 
far as court proceedings. If the solicitor is known 
to specialise in personal injury claims, with 
extensive experience in litigation, the threat to take 
a case to court will be regarded more seriously than 
one from a generalist with little experience of 
litigation. The extent to which specialisation is a 
serious consideration is debatable since a solicitor 
can always consult an advocate or barrister 
specialising in this area of litigation, although the 
solicitor's negotiating experience with bodies similar 
to medical defence societies may be important. An 
offer allows the patient's solicitor to assess the 
defence organisation's settlement 'range'; the refusal 
of an offer allows the defence organisation to assess
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the patient's expectations and intentions. if
reasons are given for the rejection they are likely to 
be indications of the strength of the patient's case 
and the defence organisation can then estimate more
accurately what figure the patient expects. The 
medical defence organisation attempt to reduce the
patient's expectations by suggesting weaknesses in 
his/her case; any doubts are used as skilful weapons.
While we have examined the delay in the 
disposal of claims generally, it is clear from what 
has been said above that the complexities of 
negotiating the settlement of a medical negligence
claim or of preparing a claim for a court hearing 
inevitably lead to delays.
The following section demonstrates the delays 
involved in the actual settlement of claims and the
deficiencies of the rules of delict which cause 
them. Figure 17 illustrates, for settled cases, the 
interval between the grievance and the time taken by 
the patient to raise the claim against the medical 
defence organisation. As we can see, thirty-five per 
cent of such claims are raised within the first six 
months, while a total of fifty-four per cent of 
settled claims are raised within one year. From 
figure 17, there is a clear downward trend as the
115
Figure 17
Interval between Grievance and 
Complaint of Settled Cases
72
4 8 -
No. of 
Cases
24-
0
-3C
-15
6 18 30 42 54’
Months
% of 
Cases
116
interval between the grievance and the complaint 
increases; over seventy-five per cent of settled 
claims are raised within two years, while 90 per cent 
are brought to the attention of the medical defence
union within three years. These findings are in fact
higher than those found for the interval between 
grievance and disposal, where 75 per cent of the 
claims were raised within three years.
It is submitted that similar considerations
might apply for these findings, as suggested earlier, 
for the delay taken by patients to raise claims 
generally. However, it is possible that in some of
these cases the solicitor may have advised the patient 
not to pursue the claim until medical reports were 
available. Since there may be uncertainty about 
medical prognosis it is conceivable that the patient 
may have been advised to delay until medical treatment 
was complete or his/her condition had stabilised 
sufficiently for an accurate prognosis.
The interval between the complaint coming to 
the attention of the medical defence organisation and 
its eventual settlement is shown in figure 18. While
twenty-three per cent of claims were settled within
the first six months of being raised and forty-five
per cent within one year, seventeen per cent of the 
claims were settled after three years had lapsed.
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Indeed one claim took five years to settle while 
another took eight years. Before examining the 
reasons underlying the delays, it is worthwhile 
combining the data comprising figures 17 and 18 to 
appreciate the overall time that a patient had to wait 
before getting compensation. As we can see from
figure 19 there would appear to be a clustering of 
settled claims within the first two years; forty-eight 
per cent were resolved in favour for the patient, 
while ninety per cent took six years. It was not 
possible to assess whether the longer delays occurred 
in the more serious cases because, unlike the Pearson 
Report, no indicators could be used for measurement, 
for example length of time off work and delay in 
settlement, nor was it possible to contact patients to 
assess the extent of 'disability'.
In terms of delay, the findings in this survey
generally confirm the pattern found in earlier
54personal injury studies. According to the
insurance survey conducted for the Pearson Commission, 
almost one half of the claims are disposed of within
one year, by the end of two years from the injury
eighty per cent of claims were settled.
54. Pearson Report, ibid. vol.2, table 17, 113 - 116
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55
Ison found that the average time taken for
successfully negotiated claims was about fifteen 
months. Clearly, from the data in the present study, 
we can see that the process of negotiation takes a 
considerable amount of time even in cases which are' 
eventually settled. These delays are partly inherent 
in the process and partly a result of the tactics
adopted by the medical defence organisations.
The factor which explains the range in time 
taken to negotiate the settlement of claims is closely 
linked to the type of injury or grievance which the 
patient is alleged to have suffered. Cases settled
within one year, (forty-five per cent), were those 
which the medical defence organisation considered to 
be 'indefensible', in other words, the act was one 
which no reasonable practitioner should have done. 
Such cases comprised the following grievances: swabs;
sterilisation; diagnosis of fractures; retention or 
careless use of instruments; incorrect site; and 
'physical accidents'56 From the distribution of 
settled grievances against specialty, shown in table 
15, we can see that the greatest number
55. Ison, T.G.. The Forensic Lottery, 1967, Staples 
Press, appendix C, 23. p.178; see James, R. , "The 
Causes and Effects of Delay in Personal Injury
Claims", N .I .L .0. Autumn 1985, p.222; also Report of 
the Personal Injuries Litigation Procedure Working 
Party, (Cantley Committee Report), Cmnd.7476, 1979
56. See table 17 below for treatment related 
grievances that were settled. 'Physical accident'
included examples of 'slipped' instruments causing
trauma and spillage of flammable/caustic liquids.
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of settlements were in fact made against incidents 
involving diagnosis and accidents. Indeed, for
settled dental claims, the highest proportion, 32 per 
cent, represented cases of wrong tooth extraction, 
fractured jaw (predominantely lower), and retained 
roots following extractions. Claims settled in this 
category also included using defective instruments, 
inhalation of instruments and perforation of the root 
canal. In examining the 'indefensible* claims, it 
was quite clear from the reports of the medical 
defence organisation that they considered the 
application of the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur* by the 
patient in many of these cases. The delay in the 
indefensible cases was mainly due to negotiations in 
settling the amount to be paid for adequate 
compensation for the patient and the time taken for 
reports to be made available to the patient's 
solicitor.
From the records of correspondence which took 
place between the patients' solicitors, the medical 
defence organisation and the health boards, it was 
clear that the delay for the remaining claims 
reflected the legal and procedural hurdles which the 
patient had to overcome in order to obtain any 
compensation.57 Many of the issues in dispute
57. in addition to the general administrative 
procedures.
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causing difficulties related to collecting evidence 
from medical reports; assessing medical prognosis; 
establishing liability (proving the practitioner(s )
negligence); accurate assessment of prognosis; and
assessing the quantum of damages.
The main criticism concerning medical reports 
related to their availability to the patients' legal 
advisers. From the medical defence organisation's 
correspondence and records it was quite clear that 
almost all the solicitors could not negotiate 
settlements until all the medical records had become 
available to them. The delay involved at this stage 
in the negotiations was not entirely the fault of the 
medical defence organisation because in fact they 
faced similar problems, although to a lesser degree, 
since they also had to wait for the practitioner's 
report and the hospital board's records. A further 
complication was that in just less that half the
number of claims, as we have seen, more than one 
practitioner was involved in the treatment or
therapy. This was invariably compounded by the fact 
that in such cases the practitioners belonged to 
different medical defence organisations, each having 
different individual doctors' medical reports. 
Therefore delay at this stage was inevitable because 
the medical defence organisations had first to acquire 
the reports for their own case before they could be 
released to the patient's solicitor.
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One of the most important causes of delay was 
in the assessment of an accurate prognosis, 
particularly in those claims where the injury was 
extensive, for example in claims concerning 
'anaesthetic accidents'. Even though the medical 
defence organisation, after examination of the medical 
records, admitted in some cases that its member was 
liable, both they and the patient required expert 
opinion for assessing the prognosis reliably. In 
several claims the medical defence organisation have 
had conflicting expert opinions requiring further 
recourse to medical experts; the delay involved for 
such opinion would sometimes extend over six months. 
While it is trite to state that the patient, to be in 
a bargaining position, must have similar recourse to 
expert opinion, the time taken for them to have 
suitable expert opinion must be considerably longer 
because of the difficulties in obtaining just one 
expert opinion. This difficulty has been voiced on 
several occasions by the Action for Victims of Medical 
Accidents^®; they have very strongly criticised the 
medical profession for adopting an attitude which only 
serves to damage an injured patient's claim.
58. Simanowitz, A., Director for Action for Victims of 
Medical Accidents, "Medical Negligence, Lawyers' 
Paradise, Doctors' Nightmare - is A.V.M.A. bridging 
the Gap?", Address to Medico-Legal Society. Bristol 
1985; James, R., "The Causes and Effects of Delay in 
Personal Injuries", 36 N . I.L .0. 1985, 222
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It cannot be over emphasised that so long as 
the law insists on a once-and-for-a11 settlement then 
delay in assessing the prognosis is inevitable. 
While it can be argued that it is advantageous for the 
medical defence organisation to delay the negotiation 
process so that the patient's condition stabilises and 
becomes easy to assess, a clear risk they face is that 
during this period the patient's condition may in fact 
deteriorate, thus requiring greater damages to be
paid. The defence organisation are extremely skilled 
in assessing these risks and this is demonstrated by
the low number of successful claims where the injury 
related to side effects of treatment and the 
relatively low number of claims concerned with 
drugs. There is no doubt that in some of the 
'indefensible' claims, where the injury or residual 
injury to the patient was severe, the medical defence 
organisation paid damages very quickly indeed, partly 
based on the risk that the prognosis of the patient
was very poor, and that it would be expedient to 
settle early to minimise costs.
The most significant cause for delay before a 
settlement was reached was in establishing liability, 
and in particular, the problem of proof of 
causation. This was often found in those cases where 
the surgical procedures were invasive and involved a
high degree of risk of mishap. Similarly, in those
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cases involving a number of practitioners belonging to 
different specialties. In some claims experts found 
it difficult to distinguish between those cases where 
the disability was due to alleged negligence and those 
where the disability was due to the natural
progression of the original disease or injury. This 
was often the case with those grievances categorised 
under 'dissatisfaction with outcome', for example in 
orthopaedic cases where restitution to normality is 
sometimes not possible. Although the medical defence 
organisation rarely hesitated to settle 'indefensible' 
claims, whenever doubt existed, then delay in 
negotiation and settlement was inevitable. From the 
files of the medical defence organisation it was 
apparent that the most difficult cases, involving 
medical questions, took the longest time to settle.
The assessment of damages was another
important factor which contributed to the delay 
experienced by patients in raising medical negligence 
claims. From the records it was not possible to draw 
any correlation between the size of the claim and the 
time taken to settle it. Although there was some
tendency for larger settlements to be associated with 
longer delays, there were also many smaller claims
which were delayed for over two years. This was not 
unexpected because the problems which cause delay in 
the tort/delict system are not necessarily confined to
128
larger claims. While the data on damages was not 
assessed in any detail in this study, it is submitted 
that the views expressed by Atiyah59 apply in the 
context of the present study,
"It seems evident that the correlation between 
the size of the claim and the time taken to 
. settle it is inherent in the system ... in 
more serious injury cases, a longer time must 
elapse before a firm medical prognosis as to 
the effect of the injuries can be given. 
When more is at stake, the haggling is apt to 
be more prolonged and more vigorous."
If this analysis is correct, then it would 
appear that the more serious a patient's injuries the 
longer s/he has to wait for compensation. Another 
feature of delay in medical negligence claims was that 
the defence organisation often disputed the 
apportionment of liability with the other defence 
societies and the health boards.
As we can see from the findings only ten cases 
(1%) were regarded as 'frivolous', in the sense that 
there was no basis in fact or law for a claim in 
negligence. These cases were complaints about the 
time taken for ambulance services; rudeness of 
practitioners, and expenses for certain items, 
including travelling expenses.
59. Atiyah, P.S., ibid. at p.314
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Only 48 claims, (less than five per cent), 
reached the stage of court proceedings because the 
patient and the defence union could not reach an 
out-of-court settlement on the issue of quantum, 
although liability was only in dispute in about half 
these claims. A major implication from this is that 
the role of judges in actually deciding medical
negligence claims is very limited in relation to the 
total number of medical incidents, and to the total 
number of claims made. This does not imply that 
judges do not have a crucial role in establishing, 
developing and clarifying the legal standards for 
liability and quantum. The legal costs and delay 
involved in pursuing a claim to the final stage of a 
court hearing are strong incentives to patients to
settle at the highest figure which can be negotiated 
out of court. While the patient is under pressure
for a variety of reasons to accept an offer, the only 
pressure that can be placed on the defence
organisation to make an acceptable offer to settle is 
when the patient is in the unusual position to press a 
claim as far as court.
This section has attempted to show the variety 
of ways in which a patient's claim of medical 
negligence can proceed. The paths taken are a 
reflection of the many hurdles which the injured 
patient faces when raising an action in negligence.
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Data on the disposition of claims indicate that the 
majority are resolved with no payment to the
patient. Very few claims proceed to final resolution
at trial; as we have seen, most claims are either 
settled or abandoned prior to trial.
Summary
The medical negligence survey showed that 
there has been an increase in the number of claims
raised against medical and dental practitioners over 
the years. The trend is clearly upwards and does not 
suggest anything other than that more increases will 
be raised within the next few years.
The survey also showed that only a small 
minority of all medically injured patients who 
initiated claims obtained compensation for the losses 
they suffered. For all types of grievances taken 
together, the figure was 24 per cent of claims, but 
there were important differences in the success rates
among and within different categories of grievances.
Elderly victims and young victims appeared to 
raise proportionately fewer claims for damages. 
Women appeared to claim more often than men, although 
it is difficult to suggest reasons other than that 
obstetrical and gynaecological claims were 
disproportionately higher than other hospital/surgical 
procedures.
Patients in the lowest and highest socio­
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economic groups were proportionately more likely to 
raise claims in medical negligence than victims in 
other groups. This suggests the importance of being 
financially sound before initiating claims - either 
from personal wealth or from provisions made by legal 
aid. This was supported by the fact that the 
remaining groups claimed proportionately less often 
that would have been expected. It is possible to 
argue that for victims who have accidents on the road 
or at work there are normally certain procedures for 
reporting the accident which have to be followed and 
during which advice about claiming may be 
spontaneously offered. This is not available for 
housewives, the elderly and children - they are more 
isolated than those at work from networks of 
information and advice. Trade Union activity in 
advising to claim for damages may provide an important 
impetus for patients to initiate a medical negligence 
claim.
The propensity for hospital medical 
practitioners to be involved in medical negligence 
claims reflected their relative positions within the 
hospital hierarchy and the responsibilities attached, 
(table 16). The findings suggest that deficiencies 
may exist in the manner in which medical 
responsibility is delegated and conducted.
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Hospital specialties, from which negligence
claims emanated, were identified in terms of
propensity to become involved in medical negligence 
claims. It appeared that they could be ranked in 
order of "risk."
The actual system for obtaining compensation 
from the medical defence organsation placed pressures 
on many patients. The patient faced many risks: the
risk that the evidence might not prove fault on the 
part of the practitioner (s ) or that the medical 
reports oh his/her prognosis might be wrong; the
uncertainties about whether s/he could bear the
further delay and expense of waiting for a court 
hearing, and about how much a judge would award for
the injuries.
The cumulative effect of all these 
uncertainties was that many patients agreed to the 
sums offered in out-of-court-settlements.
Delay cannot be avoided in the. present delict 
system. In the survey, it was clear that the 
majority of claims took a considerable period from the 
time of the incidence to the actual settlement. In 
some cases it was possible that solicitors advised
delay in order to wait until medical treatment was
complete or until the medical condition of the patient 
had stabilised. The two main problems for solicitors 
were to establish liability and to negotiate the
amount of damages.
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Conclusions
The overall finding from the medical 
negligences survey, while removing some myths and 
providing a sounder foundation upon which 
recommendations may rest, do have have implications 
for wider questions than those normally presented by 
advocates for reform of the present system whereby
injured patients are compensated.
The study has identified patients, in terms of 
their age, sex and socio-economic group, who are most 
likely to raise a claim in negligence. The results 
raise several questions, in relation both to the
manner in which legal rules operate and the manner in 
which medical procedures are conducted.
Only for the first time has a systematic 
analysis of the specialities, the status of 
practitioners, and the nature of the grievances 
suffered by patients been conducted in the context of 
medical negligence. The findings are significant 
because they may provide an alternative or an
additional base from which improvements could be made, 
by both the medical and legal professions, to
alleviate the hardships that patients suffer.
We have shown that the financial losses from 
medically related adverse outcomes are sometimes 
recouped through claims being raised against medical 
defence organisations and Health Authorities, but they 
are more often absorbed by the injured patient and by
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the social welfare provisions which they use.
The data show how rarely medical negligence 
claims reach a court hearing before a judge. The 
complex rules of law and procedure are designed to 
produce solutions in a rare situation, because for 
medical negligence claims, out-of-court settlements 
are the norm. While rules may be ideal for achieving 
justice in individualised decisions by judges, they 
may not be ideal for achieving justice in direct 
negotiations between the patient and the medical 
defence organisations, although it must be stressed 
that all negotiations which take place are conducted 
according to what findings the courts might hold 
applicable in each case. It is possible to suggest 
that to overcome this anomaly judges should have 
greater powers of discretion in assessing the 
evidence, and in choosing between conflicting medical 
reports or prognosis. However if delict or tort is 
to be the appropriate remedy available for the injured 
patient, and virtually all claims are to be disposed 
of out-of-court, then the rules of law and procedure 
may need to be re-assessed because of the differences 
in the relative bargaining strengths between the 
patient and medical defence organisation.
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This situation has been adequately assessed by 
Knookin and Kocnhauser when they suggest that 
while it is comfortable to assume that the 
impartiality of the judge will prevent any inequality 
between the parties in court, such protection is 
lacking when they must normally, 'negotiate in the 
shadow of the law'. The findings, in addition to
providing valuable data for the basis of future policy 
considerations place some of the arguments, outlined 
in volume 1, into perspective. The overall factual 
and procedural circumstances examined in this study 
can be summed up by adapting the analogy of an 
obstacle race.61
The injured patient is placed at the starting 
line along with others, and is told that if s/he 
completes the whole course, the umpire (judge) at the 
finishing line will compel the race organisers
(medical defence organisations) to give him/her a
prize. The amount of the prize remains uncertain 
until the last moment because the umpire has the
discretion to vary it. The runner is not told the 
distance that s/he must cover nor the time it is 
likely to take. Some of the obstacles in the race 
are fixed (rules of law), while others can without
60. 'Bargaining in the shadow of the law', (1979), 88 
Yale Law Journal 950
61. The unmodified analogy was first used by Donald 
Harris in Compensation and Support for Illness and 
In iurv. Cpt.3, Harris et al. Clarendon, Oxford: 1984
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warning, be thrown into the path of a runner by the 
race promoters, who have every incentive to restrict 
the number of runners who can complete the course.
The runner's physical fitness and mental 
stamina for the course will vary with other runners, 
as indeed will the relative difficulty of the 
obstacles. As there are many uncertainties 
particularly the difficulties which could be presented 
by unknown future obstacles - many runners drop out of 
the race at each obstacle, a few will continue but are 
weakened by their exertions. At any stage of the 
race the promoters alongside the race-track are 
permitted to induce a runner to retire from the race 
in return for an immediate payment, which they fix at 
a figure less than the prize which s/he expects to be 
awarded by the umpire upon completion of the course.
In view of the uncertainties about the remaining 
obstacles, the runner's ability to finish the course, 
and the time it might take, eventually a fatigued 
runner might accept an offer and retire. The very 
few hardy ones who actually complete the course may 
still be disappointed with the prize money.
The next chapter examines whether
alternatives, based on new factual data, can ease the 
burdens faced by the patient and the medical and legal 
professions in dealing with the circumstances where a 
patient is injured as a result of undergoing treatment 
or care in hospital.
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Chapter 3
From the preceding chapters of the analysis 
of the legal and factual circumstances surrounding 
medical negligence claims it is clear that medically 
injured patients face many hurdles in their attempts 
to gain compensation for injuries arising from their 
care and treatment. The claims records showed that
for the patient concerned, the consequences
frequently included pain, suffering, loss or impaired 
earning capacity, and the restriction of social 
activities. For reasons outlined in Chapter 1, and 
amply demonstrated in Chapter 2, liability for 
negligence at present is without doubt a capricious 
and unsatisfactory method of compensating a patient 
whose injuries arise from or during medical treatment 
or care. However, over the years the issue of
personal injury compensation in general, which 
includes medical injury as a subset of all personal 
injuries, has attracted considerable debate and empty 
rhetoric, for example twenty years ago. Lord Chief 
Justice Parker1, stated that,
"... The law and its administration ... is 
out of date, lacking in certainty, unfair in 
its incidence and capable of drastic"
1. Presidental address of Lord Parker to the Bentham 
Club. London. 16th February 1965, published in 1965 
Current Legal Problems, pp.l, 5 and 11.
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iitiprovements. Surely in these circumstances
the time has come when we should recognise
that the present methods, even if capable of
improvement, are no longer adequate and that
some other method is called for."
Similarly. American scholars have been criticising
liability for negligence for decades without
delivering anything substantial in the way of
2
improvements; for example Ehrenzweig , wrote that,
"A maturing society will have to replace this 
fault formula by one less burdened with 
pseudo-moral considerations and more 
responsive to present needs, however devoid 
the new formula should prove of emotional 
satisfaction."
Indeed in changed circumstances where many
3systems presently co-exist m  this country to meet 
the needs of particular categories of people, the 
situation still attracts considerable criticism 
because, it is argued that the law has been developed 
in a piecemeal fashion without any apparent overall 
strategy. The result has been criticised by
2. Ehrenzweig, A., "A Psychoanalysis of Negligence", 
1953, 47 Northwestern U.L.R. 855 at 869, cited in
Ison, T.G., ibid.at p 29, 1967; •Comment*,
"California Negotiated Health Care: Implications for
Malpractice Liability", 21 San Diego L.Rev. 1984, 455
3. A situation described by Atiyah as, 'A plethora of 
systems'; see Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, Compensation 
and the Law, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 3rd. 
Edition, 1982, Chapter 18, p.443
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Harris et al4 as,
"...absurdly complex, as embodying serious
anomalies, as inefficient, and as 
unnecessarily expensive to administer."
5
Ison identifies the situation in the following
terms,
"Moreover liability combines with other 
sources of relief not to form a comprehensive 
or rational system of Income security or loss 
compensation, but a hotchpotch under which 
the distribution of losses and the financial 
destiny of the victim and his family depend
on a series of chance factors interacting to 
produce results in each case that depend very 
largely on sheer luck."
Critics have proposed drastic reforms; many 
commentators6 have suggested that the only
effective answer to personal and medical injury 
compensation is the ultimate abolition of the 
delictual claim - the vacuum being filled by
4. Harris et al. Compensation and Support for Illness 
and Injury, Oxford Socio-legal Studies, Clarendon 
Press, Introduction, p.l, 1984
5. Ison, T.G., The Forensic Lottery, Staples Press,
London, pp.28-29, 1967.
6 . For example, Ison. T.G., ibid. p78; Holyoak, J.
"Accident Compensation in New Zealand Today", 
Accident Compensation After Pearson, Allen et al.
London 1979, pp. 179-196; Atiyah, P.S.. "What Now?", 
Accident Compensation After Pearson, Allen et al.
London 1979, pp.227-254
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'no-fault' compensation. Others7 have gone
further by suggesting that all cause^-based systems 
of compensation should be abandoned.
While the existing mechanisms for 
compensation have come under severe criticism and 
attracted a variety of proposals, it must be 
acknowledged that in the context of the present study 
these recommendations are based on the very few 
unrepresentative medical negligence claims that are 
pressed as far as judicial proceedings and are 
reported; they also presuppose that the present 
fault-based system of compensation is beyond further 
consideration. It is submitted that the research 
presented in thi6 thesis casts serious doubts over 
some of the proposals that are suggested.
This concluding chapter therefore examines 
whether such alternatives, and those based on new 
factual data which are more representative of the 
types of circumstances which become the subject of 
medical negligence claims, can ease the burdens faced 
by patients and the medical and legal professions in 
dealing with the circumstances surrounding medical 
injury.
7. For example, Harris et al.. Compensation and 
Support for Illness and Injury. Oxford Socio-legal 
Studies. Oxford, 1984
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Several alternatives to the present delictual 
system for compensation for medically injured 
patients are explored. The proposals presented 
reflect a wide range; from modifications of the 
existing delict-based mechanisms for compensation to 
the development of a national social insurance 
scheme. Based on the analyses in this study, the 
suggested alternatives are grouped according to the 
standard for determining in what circumstances 
compensation ought to be made. These are divided 
into three main categories:
a) those that limit compensation to physical 
injuries caused by an act or omission by the 
medical/dental practitioner;
b) those in which compensation is determined in 
advance of occurrence of the medical injury according 
to ‘lists' of specified events; and
c) those in which compensation is available for all 
adverse consequences of medical care and treatment, 
irrespective of whether the practitioner was at fault.
The study shows that in order to evaluate any 
of the suggested approaches for medical injury 
compensation it is essential that several criteria 
are used. The criteria, outlined below, can be 
identified as the most important characteristics of 
compensation systems; they further ensure that the 
various proposals are compared according to certain
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common elements. They are:
a) Access to compensation - this assesses the 
relative ease or difficulty of access to any given 
compensation system;
b) Scope of compensation - this includes an 
examination of the predictability of receiving 
compensation;
c) Procedures for resolution of claims - this is 
used to review procedures by which a medical 
negligence claim is initiated, validated and 
ultimately resolved. The procedural aspects of any 
compensation system must be assessed because of 
their importance and implications for the overall 
fairness and efficiency, not only for the patient but 
also for the medical defence organisations and/or 
hospital boards;
d) costs and financing - this criterion is essential 
because of its importance in comparing the funding of 
any scheme. Unfortunately this cannot be used with 
any degree of precision or accuracy because of lack 
of data on costs. Therefore, in this context, 
financing is limited to a description of allocation 
of costs attributable to medically related injuries 
among practitioners, medical defence organisations 
and society as a whole;
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e) I n centives for injury avoidance - the capacity 
for a compensation scheme for reducing the incidence 
of medical injury. Any measures may be direct, 
indirect or a combination of both;
Integration - it is clear that any specific 
proposed system must be examined in terms of whether 
it is free-standing or complementary to existing 
schemes for compensation.
It must be emphasised from the outset that 
the selection of the evaluation criteria is based on 
the overall problems found in medical negligence 
claims and is an attempt to isolate certain key 
aspects that ought to be addressed by any 
compensation system. The evaluation is based 
primarily on the data provided by the survey in this 
thesis and to some extent on the observations made by 
other researchers. It must also be acknowledged 
that there are limitations of comparing existing 
compensation mechanisms with hypothetical proposals 
for new compensation schemes.
Approaches based on fault
In theory compensation for medical injury is 
obtained through the legal process of litigation 
which many assume to be a court—room procedure, 
whereas wq have shown that in fact it comprises 
numerous pre-trial procedures and a majority of cases 
never reach a court room. Since the bulk of medical
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negligence claims are disposed of by negotiation, 
then it follows that for effective comparisons to be 
made with other compensation schemes, the evaluation 
of fault-based compensation must take into account 
not only trial procedures, but also the process by 
which claims are resolved before trial.® it is 
clear therefore that any fault—based approaches 
associated with traditional litigation can only be 
applicable to a small number of fault-based 
compensation claims.
The search for solutions to the medical 
negligence problem in the U.K. may require 
considerable legislative activity. Such activity 
might be primarily aimed at correcting perceived 
deficiencies within existing procedures. While the 
medical negligence problem is one which is shared
9
with many other countries , it is submitted that 
the proposition that a particular legal mechanism 
adopted by a different legal system, could be 
modified and applied to the present system for
8 . it is for this very reason that the
recommendations proposed by earlier studies must be 
treated with caution.
9. Liability for personal injury in France, based on 
Article 1382 and 1384, is fault-based and the trend
has been to move away from fault to no-fault
compensation. Liability in Sweden is imposed by the 
Tort Liability Act 1972. The Tort Liability Bill of 
1972 expressed an intention eventually to replace 
tort liability for personal injuries as a principal 
means of reparation with compensation from social
insurance and private collective accident and 
sickness insurance.
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compensation for medically injured patients, reflects 
an oversimplistic understanding of the 
difficulties. Five possible alternatives to the 
present system are examined; the first, which has 
attracted attention, is the American Pre-trial 
Screening Panel.
1- Pretrial screening panels
In an effort to find an answer to the 
•malpractice problem*, many American States initiated 
considerable legislative changes. The most common 
legal change made was the setting up of pretrial 
screening panels for medical negligence claims. 
They were developed to allow early settlement of 
meritorious claims and discourage frivolous 
litigation.10 By condition (f) - integration, any
pretrial panel could only be seen in this country as 
an additional component of litigation rather than as 
a substitute compensation system. Where it is seen 
as such then the submission of a claim to a panel 
could be either voluntary or mandatory before 
trial. Assuming that such a structure could be 
grafted onto the delict/tort action, the composition 
of the panel and its scope of inquiry would present a
10. Department of Health. Education and Welfare: 
Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice (PHEW Publication Number [OS ]__ 73-881,
Appendix, p.97, 1973; 'Comment', "An Analysis of
State Legislative Responses to the Medical 
Malpractice Crisis", 1975, Duke L.J. 1417
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considerable stumbling block. A typical panel might 
have from three to seven members, coming from the 
medical and legal professions.
In terms of criterion (a) the primary 
difference between judicial examinations and 
screening panels is that immediate access to the 
courts would be hindered where pretrial screening is 
compulsory. As an adjunct to litigation, screening 
panels would operate with the same concepts as to 
what type of situations ought to be compensated, 
indeed the determinative issue for screening panels 
would be whether a substantial likelihood of medical 
negligence exists. with respect to integration, 
(f), a major difficulty which would give rise to 
considerable litigation is the extent to which the 
preliminary determinations of liability made by the 
panel are binding or merely persuasive on a 
subsequent judicial hearing. Such panels would be 
precluded from assessing the level of damages to be 
awarded as compensation since this function would be 
left for the courts to determine.
From observations made about pretrial 
screening panels in America11, they differ from 
traditional litigation in the means by which the 
merits of the grievance are assessed. The
difference is achieved firstly, by screening panels
11. Chalphin, D . , "New York's Medical Malpractice 
Crisis". Col. J. Soc. Prob. 11: 49-91, 1975
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being procedurally less formal than courts; the 
methods for obtaining access to evidence are 
non-adversarial and oaths are rarely required during 
hearings. Secondly, where review by screening 
panels are in private, transcripts are generally 
prohibited and cross-examination is not permitted.
A clear disincentive for the introduction of 
screening panels in this country would be the lack of 
finality of their decisions, this would therefore 
mean that their introduction would only add another 
layer to the resolution of medical injury claims.
If the findings of a pretrial screening panel are to 
be construed only as advisory then an important 
question that must be addressed is whether they can 
or cannot be introduced into evidence at a subsequent 
t r i a l .
Under criterion (c), in terms of overall 
fairness, the composition of a screening panel might 
affect the likelihood of a decision being made in 
favour of either the patient or the doctor/hospital 
authority.12 Certainly a panel made up entirely 
from members of the medical profession is less likely
12. One study indicated that panels composed 
entirely of medical practitioners were likely to find 
in favour of the patient about 14 per cent of the 
times; this compared with a likelihood of success in 
25 per cent of claims before other panel 
compositions. See Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare: Report of the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice (DHEW Publication Number [OS] 
73-88), Appendix, p.246, 1973
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to find in favour of the patient than are panels with 
other types of composition.
The administrative costs, criterion (d), of
having pretrial screening panels as an adjunct to
delict or tort is difficult to assess. It could be 
argued that the overall costs of delict—based actions 
would be reduced by expediting the settlement of 
claims at the pre-litigation stage and by eliminating 
frivolous claims. However the findings in Chapter 2 
show that the number of frivolous claims, as assessed 
by the Scottish medical defence organisation, was
negligible. It is unlikely that the introduction of 
pretrial screening panels would prevent enough claims 
from reaching the courts to offset the duplicate 
costs of reviewing claims twice in those instances 
where the patient proceeds to trial. We have
already shown that only a negligible proportion of
claims reach court hearings.
The injury avoidance incentives of any
pretrial screening panel, criterion (e), would be 
essentially the same as those that operate in delict 
or tort, namely: deterrence of carelessness;
retribution; and the need for an inquest. However 
the private nature of a screening panel eliminates 
any impact, no matter how little, the public nature 
of a trial may have on the future actions of medical 
practitioners. It could be further argued that 
panel judgments on standards of care would not
necessarily be communicated to other practitioners
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or the public. However, from the study it was clear 
that the above criticism, could to some extent,
equally apply in the out-of-court settlements that 
13were made.
The only real advantages with pretrial 
screening panels fall under criterion (c) where it is 
claimed that they encourage early settlement of 
meritorious claims and discourage frivolous 
litigation. While they do not foreclose the option 
of proceeding to litigation for those who are 
dissatisfied with the panel's decision and facilitate 
speedier decision-making through having informal 
discovery, procedural, and evidentiary rules, such 
advantages have severe shortcomings.
For instance, under (a), while allowing fault 
to be the basis for compensation, the requirement 
that a potential medically-injured patient must first 
bring a claim before a screening panel places an 
unacceptable restriction on that patient's access to 
the courts.^4 Under (b), (c) and (f), the
13. This is examined later.
14. In America, because such impediments are imposed 
only on medical malpractice claims and not on all 
pursuers in all tort claims, screening panels have 
been challenged on equal protection grounds. 
Similarly, another legal question raised by screening 
panels was whether the practice of allowing judges to 
sit on screening panels along with laypersons made 
the process a trial that lacked the constitutional 
protections of regular judicial proceedings.
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advantages of having such panels operating alongside 
the delict claim are more apparent than real because 
in the final analysis, the injured patient would be 
no better off since the same criteria for obtaining 
compensation apply, namely, liability for 
negligence. Screening panels fail under criterion 
(e) since the situation does very little in the way 
of reducing the incidence of medical negligence even 
indirectly.
2 . Arbitration15
Another fault-based approach that could be 
applied to the resolution of medical negligence 
claims is arbitration. In terms of (f), arbitration 
as a dispute-settling process may be seen to be a 
substitute for litigation,16 based primarily on 
principles governing private contracts and may be 
consensual (i.e. founded on the agreement of the 
parties) or statutory (i.e. arising out of a statute
15. Arbitration procedures have been adopted in 
America for many years for the resolution of medical 
negligence claims. Specific medical arbitration 
statutes have been enacted in 11 States.
16. There are significant differences between the 
Scots law of arbitration and the English law. The 
general Scots law of arbitration is almost wholly 
common law; the arbitration code now comprising Part 
1 of the Arbitration Act 1950 does not apply to 
Scotland. (1950 Act, s.34, as amended by Arbitration 
Act 1975, s.8(2) (c)). Nor does the Arbitration Act 
1979 extend to Scotland (1979 Act, s.8 .(4)). 
Statutory provisions that do affect the Scots law of 
arbitration deal with specific aspects only; the 
Articles of Regulation of 1695; Arbitration 
(Scotland) Act 1894; Administration of Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1972. s.17; Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980
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which provides for disputes of a particular class to
be determined by arbitration). Walton. speaking
generally of arbitration procedures in his foreword
to —  1 1 :---^  haw— of Arbitration.17 acknowledges
that arbitration is likely to become ever more
popular in the future and reasons that there is,
"... growing realisation that arbitration
does in truth afford the parties a choice of
law and a choice of the judges that they do
want, and, more importantly, an opportunity
to reject the law which, and the particular
judges whom, they do not wan t.'1
It is submitted however, that this choice can only be
made effectively if there is a proper understanding
of what arbitration can provide and how it works.
In the context of medical and dental negligence, the
proposal could only operate where there is 
18agreement between the patient and the medical 
profession and/or health board to submit their
17. Walton, A., Gill: The Law of Arbitration, 3rd 
Edition, E .A. Marshall, London, 1983, Foreword, v
18. As suggested, the basis for any form of 
arbitration between a patient and the practitioner or 
National Health Service would be a contract that 
stipulates the means by which any medical injury 
claim would be resolved. It is submitted that such 
contracts may be predicated on an assumption of 
equality in knowledge and bargaining position between 
the parties. However, equality may be illusory in 
many of the medical injury claims because of the 
greater knowledge and experience of the providers of 
health care and treatment. If knowledge or 
bargaining power of the parties is vastly different, 
o n if coercion is applied in the execution of the 
contract, then such a contract could be held to be 
voidable by the courts.
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dispute to one or more arbiters for resolution. In 
the case of a dispute arising between a patient and a 
practitioner working in the National Health Service 
or a particular health board it is likely that 
statutory provisions would need to be enacted 
reguiring allegations of medical or dental negligence 
to be referred to specially appointed arbiters.19 
While the proposal sounds promising and would appear 
to alleviate some of the difficulties faced by 
patients - such as ready access to an inquiry - it 
must be acknowledged that any agreement to have a 
medical negligence claim submitted for arbitration 
would eliminate access to traditional litigation
19. It would be essential that in the context of the 
National Health Service that statutory provisions be 
made regarding medical and dental negligence claims 
to be of a class to which arbitration must apply 
since the Department of Health circular, HM(54)32, 
stipulates the need for practitioners to be insured.
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processes , except under rare circumstances and 
for narrowly limited purposes. From the differences 
in judicial attitudes towards arbitration in Scotland 
and England, there would need to be a clear 
understanding whether arbitration is to be mandatory
20. There is a marked distinction between Scots and 
English law in the attitude of the courts to 
arbitration. One of the leading provisions of the 
English law of arbitration is that if a party to an 
arbitration agreement commences court proceedings, 
the court may make an order staying these proceedings 
(1950 Act, s.4(l)); in Scotland the court has no such 
discretion: it must give effect to the parties'
agreement to arbitrate. See Sanderson & Son v. 
Armour & Co. Ltd. (1922) where Lord Dunedin said,
"The English common law doctrine,
eventually swept away by the Arbitration Act 
of 1889 - that a contract to oust the
jurisdiction of the Courts was against public 
policy and invalid, never obtained in
Scotland. In the same way, the right which 
in England pertains to the Court under that 
Act to apply or not to apply the arbitration 
clause in its discretion never was the right 
of the Court in Scotland. If the parties 
have contracted to arbitrate, to arbitration 
they must go."
On questions of law, an arbitrator's decision on 
questions of law is to some extent controlled by the 
courts; (Arbitration Act 1970,s.1). In Scots law 
the arbiter's decision is final both on questions of 
fact and law and there is no appeal to the courts.
According to Lord Jeffrey, in Mitchell— v_. Cable
(1848):
"On every matter touching the merits of the 
case, the judgment of the arbiter is beyond 
our control; and beyond question and cavil.
He may believe what nobody else believes, and 
he may disbelieve what all the world 
believes. He may overlook or flagrantly 
misapply the most ordinary principles of law; 
and there is no appeal foe those who have 
chosen to subject themselves to his despotic
power." , _  _
Lord Jeffrey went on to explain that
decree-arbitral can stand only when the arbiter has 
done his/her duty 'fairly'.
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or voluntary, binding or nonbinding.2'1' An
advantage with arbitration under criterion (a), at
least from the injured patient's point of view, is
that once an agreement is made between the
defender(s) and the patient, access to potential
compensation is more predictable than in court
proceedings. However, as with any fault-based
approach, compensation is payable under arbitration
only where the injury can be shown to be caused by
the negligent or intentional acts of the
practitioner. Under (c), arbitration may have some
advantage over judicial consideration; when a
dispute concerns a technical matter - the data in
this study showed that this was the case with the
majority of the claims - the persons chosen to
arbitrate may possess the appropriate special
qualifications. In terms of fairness stipulated in
(c), this procedure must allow both the injured
patient and the medical profession and/or the health
board to invoke the arbitration procedure whenever a
medical or dental injury claim is made. It has to
be recognised that arbitration is unlikely to make
22
any changes to the prehearing discovery devices
21. The particular statute may expressly exclude the 
1950 Arbitration Act or it may include special 
provisions where the conduct of the arbitration is 
inconsistent with the 1950 Act.
22. The extent to which these are a problem in 
medical negligence claims have been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1.
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that presently exist although there may be fewer 
formal requirements. For this proposal to operate 
most records or documents would have to be 
voluntarily made available by the parties. From the 
nature of arbitrations in general, the setting and
procedures tend to be informal and the review of a
claim is usually conducted in private. Not
surprisingly, the process of arbitration is similar 
to the operation of a screening panel, the main 
differences are that arbiters are likely to be 
specially trained in the techniques of dispute 
resolution; have specialised knowledge; the authority 
to make a final determination of liability and; 
assess damages. Any arbitration award would be
filed with the appropriate court for enforcement if 
the agreement to arbitrate so provided.
A possible procedural problem with 
arbitration is that it would only bind those parties 
who agree to be bound by its provisions. In the 
context of medical negligence claims arising from 
dissatisfaction with treatment or care from a 
hospital institution, (almost 70% of the claims in 
this study referred to problems arising from 
hospitals), the injury might result from the conduct 
of multiple health care providers where at least one 
may not be a party to the agreement for arbitration, 
for example the specialist consultant acting as an 
independent contractor. Therefore where an
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arbitration agreement was only executed with one, but 
not all, the parties, this would mean that the 
patient would have to seek compensation through both 
arbitration and litigation. Clearly, the contract
with hospital boards and independent contractors 
would have to be redefined in a such a way as to
allow for the possibility of arbitration as a
mechanism for compensation to operate.
Another concern is that the arbitration 
process may be vulnerable to the development of bias 
m  favour of an organised institution such as the 
health service as opposed to individual patients.
It is possible that even initially neutral parties, 
such as lawyers, may defer to the medically qualified 
members of the arbitration team because of their
technical knowledge and expert judgment.
23
Marshall argues that arbitration can be 
speedier than litigation, but, in the context of 
medical negligence it is difficult to see how this 
would be the case because of the delays involved; 
both in terms of the interval between the grievance 
and complaint; and the interval between the complaint 
and its disposal where much of the delay is due to 
difficulties in ascertaining technical advice. As 
long as there is fault and need for proof of
23. Marshall, E.A., Gill: The Law of Arbitration.
3rd Edition, at p.3. London, 1983
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causation, which still remains with arbitration 
procedures, then delays of this type will be 
inevitable, regardless of how informal the discovery 
procedures may be. in fact this is supported by the 
preliminary findings of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners24 which indicated that, 
although the hearing procedure may be faster and 
simpler under arbitration, the actual time elapsed 
between making a claim and final resolution may offer 
no great advantage over court proceedings.
The only scope for reducing delay in such 
claims is where, as Marshall25 suggests,
"The convenience of the parties as to time
and place has first consideration."
At the beginning of Chapter 2 it was argued that the 
incidence of medical injuries was probably higher 
than the number of claims of medical negligence which 
are raised. If this is accepted then where 
arbitration, with many of its relaxed procedures, is 
seen as a substitute for a claim in delict, its 
ability to deal with claims speedily may be impaired
24. N.A.I.C. Malpractice Claims, Vol.l No.4. 1977 
pp.20-21, where the average time to dispose of a 
malpractice claim was 22 months for a settled claim 
and 14 months for a resolved but unpaid claim. In 
those States with mandatory arbitration procedures 
for malpractice claims, the average time for 
disposition of settled and unpaid claims was 19.1 and 
13.4 months, respectively.
25. Marshall, E. , Gill: The Law of Arbitration. 3rd 
Edition, London 1983, p.3
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if more claims are presented for compensation.
Under criterion (d) - costs and financing,
proponents .of arbitration have asserted that 
administrative costs should be much lower than for 
litigation since arbitration hearings can be held 
anywhere, thus reducing costs for personnel and 
facilities. A further reduction in costs might be 
possible if the informality of the procedure were to 
lead to shorter hearings. But arbiters, unlike 
judges, have to be paid.
The discussion so far has assumed that all 
claims of medical and dental negligence would 
automatically go to arbitration; this is not the case 
since such procedures do not preclude prehearing 
settlements. Therefore a system which allows 
private negotiations between the patient and the 
medical defence societies/hospital board will never 
be fully utilised. All the hazards attached to 
out-of-court settlements, outlined in the last 
chapter, would still be present and operate, possibly 
with more vigour, in an attempt to reach some type of 
pre-hearing settlement. Although no figures were 
given,26 only a small number of medical negligence 
claims reach final determination by arbitrators in 
those States where arbitration is available; the bulk 
of the claims were settled through private
26. Lippmann, M.E., Arbitration as an Alternative to 
Judicial Settlement. Maine L. R e v . 24: 215
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negotiation, which, as we have seen earlier, is slow 
and costly to the patient.
According to (e) - incentives for injury
avoidance, arbitration would appear to offer no 
advantage over litigation and may even reduce 
incentives for medical and dental practitioners. 
Participation by medical experts as arbiters, the 
diminished possibility for social stigma resulting 
from publicity because the process is private,27 
and the relatively lower cost of the system for the 
medical profession could serve to lessen the medical 
professions' concern with the incidence of injury.
As with alternative 1, arbitration lacks any 
professional disciplinary functions for medical and 
dental practitioners who are found to be at fault. 
This is a major failing with the present situation 
where the bulk of the claims are settled out-of-court 
without reference to any form of discipline of the 
practitioner(s).
Arbitration may possibly offer advantages 
over delict by criteria (a) - access, (b) - scope,
and (d) - costs; however these are offset by several
disadvantages.
27. Marshall, E . , ibid., p3, suggests that the 
private nature of arbitration is an advantage; with 
the present judicial system, which encourages
out-of-court settlements, the private nature of these 
settlements would appear not to have any built-in 
mechanism by which the medical or dental practitioner 
at fault addresses the question of injury avoidance.
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T h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  d e f i c i e n c i e s  l i e  i n  t e r m s  o f
(c) - p r o c e d u r e ,  a n d  (f) - i n t e g r a t i o n ,  w h e n e v e r  t h e
substantial issues between the parties raise a
question of law. Although this does not occur with
the majority of cases of medical negligence, any
finding would need to make reference to legal 
2 8
standards. Under (c), the relaxation of
procedural and evidentiary rules may lead to 
unfairness in the resolution of disputes and there is 
no doubt that according to condition (e), the private 
nature of such proceedings would do little to 
encourage reduction in medical injury. Clearly the 
voluntary nature of arbitration, which is how it 
currently operates in non-medical disputes, would be 
seriously undermined if hospital boards or private 
practitioners or medical indemnity insurers were to 
insist on an arbitration agreement to be executed as 
a condition of receiving medical care.
Alternatives 1 and 2 still require the 
patient to prove fault using the criteria found in 
delict and allows all the deficiencies associated 
with out-of-court settlements to operate. Both 
pretrial screening panels and arbitration fail under 
criterion (f) - integration, since the relaxed
28. The main advantage with arbitration over the 
normal process of law arises when the dispute 
involves principally differences of opinion on the 
issues of fact.
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procedures would create more litigation with respect
to any decisions that arise from their findings; as
Walker states,29
•..a decree-arbitral bars a later action in 
court on the same issue but not where 
questions are later raised which had not been
referred to the arbiter and could not
competently have been dealt with by him.“
It is very conceivable that the courts would be 
called on to examine issues such as the validity of 
the terms of the arbitration agreement; its scope; 
its enforcement; alteration and amendment; 
repudiation, frustration and abandonment. Without 
doubt, awards made by arbitration would be challenged 
in the courts and therefore this alternative would be 
no better and possibly worse under (d) - costs and
financing.
Therefore, attempts to view the problem as 
one which could only be solved by replacing or 
adapting the existing legal structures with 
substitutes are unlikely to improve the situation for 
the patient or the medical profession. While there 
may be deep concern expressed with the existing court 
procedures, any other mechanism, based on proof of
29. See Walker, D.M., The Law of Contracts and 
Related Obligations in Scotland, 2nd. Edition, 
pp.362-368, Butterworths 1985
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fault, is unlikely to alleviate the problems
identified. At best, the attempt to circumvent 
existing judicial procedures may create more pleasant 
superficial structures within which the medical 
negligence debate may continue but at a possibly 
greater cost to the injured patient.
Alternatives 3 and 4, Adverse Medical Outcome 
Insurance and Elective no-fault30 respectively,
assume that compensation for medically injured 
patients through any fault—based approach is too 
cumbersome and costly, and that many claims worthy of 
compensation go uncompensated, or are
undercompensated. The data in Chapter 2 can be used 
as the basis for the development of Adverse Medical 
Outcome Insurance in the United Kingdom which retains 
certain characteristics of litigation and also 
attempts to remedy some of the shortcomings of the 
delict fault-based approach to compensation.
Before examining these proposals in detail, 
it is important to state that both 3 and 4 share 
certain basic assumptions. Firstly, changes in
30. Elective no-fault schemes have been considered 
since 1973 in the United States. See O'Connell, J., 
•Elective No-fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds 
of Accidents': A Proposal; Insurance Law J 628:
495-515, 1973; see also, Moore & O'Connell,
"Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt 
Tender of Economic Loss", 44 La. L.Rev. 1984, 1267
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delict or tort law for medical injury compensation 
have very little long-term impact on the present 
medical indemnity insurance premiums that 
practitioners pay to their respective defence 
organisations. Secondly, that medical and dental 
practitioners or rather medical defence organisations 
can designate in advance of occurrence a list of 
specified events that ought not to occur during the 
course of medical care. Such events, assuming 
adherence to certain standards of medical or dental 
procedure, are generally recognised as 'avoidable' by 
the profession. Thirdly, the specified events
should be compensated with no further evidence or 
verification required than that the event occurred, 
and fourthly, the injury avoidance incentives,
assumed to operate within the delict fault-based 
system, should be retained and strengthened by 
financial burdens being placed on the practitioner.
It has to be admitted that there are several 
difficulties with specified events approaches in
trying to move them from a theoretical framework to 
practical application. A key problem is the
consensus required among expert judges about the 
avoidability of a specific outcome of medical 
treatment or care since medicine is not an exact 
science and there is great variation in the responses 
of patients to medical interventions. These
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characteristics of medical and dental practice make 
it difficult to specify in advance that a particular 
outcome ought not to have occurred. In addition to 
the problem of compiling lists of specified events is 
the fact that medical practices or techniques are 
often in the process of change, thus creating some 
uncertainty about what is considered 'acceptable1 
practice by the profession.
The fourth assumption supports the notion 
that common sense morality is valid in compensation 
claims. For example, Williams and Hepple*^ argue,
"At best, English law regards compensation as 
the expression of a moral principle..." and, 
"Common sense morality suggests that a man 
who has been negligent ought to pay 
compensation to those whom he injures."
32Atiyah suggests that,
"If the fault principle has any justification 
at all, it must be that it rests on some 
ultimate moral judgments which would be 
generally acceptable in society today."
The members of the Pearson Commission also imply that 
the fault principle may be justified by recourse to
31. Williams, G.. and Hepple, B.A., Foundations of 
the Law of Tort, London: Butterworths 1984, p. 136
32. Atiyah, P.S., Accidents. Compensation and the 
L a w , (3rd Edn.), London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson at p.475
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accepted concepts of justice or common sense morality
3 3when they write,
"There is elementary justice in the principle 
of the tort action that he who has by his 
fault injured his neighbour should make 
reparation. The concept of individual
responsibility still has value."
These statements imply that abandoning fault 
as grounds for compensation would in fact run counter 
to the common sense morality held by society. 
Therefore the third alternative attempts to retain the 
need for individual responsibility without attracting 
all the impediments attached to the fault principle in 
delict and tort.
3 3. Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability 
and Compensation for Personal Injury, Vol.l, p.65 
London: Cmnd.7054
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 ^* Adverse Medical Outcome Insurance
This alternative has three essential 
characteristics: a list of events or incidents
designated in advance of occurrence for which 
compensation is automatically available; a modified 
insurance system based on the one used by the medical 
defence organisations, the difference being that 
premiums for practitioners are assessed according to 
their claims experience; and reliance on the delict 
fault-based system for claims falling outside the 
list of occurrences for which compensation is 
automatic. The rationale is that avoidable medical 
injuries can be deterred through financial 
incentives. In order to achieve this the list of 
events is limited to outcomes of medical care that 
are deemed 'relatively avoidable'.
The notion of 'relative avoidability' means 
that medical experts, for example those practitioners 
presently working full-time in the field of medical 
negligence with the medical defence organisations, 
would select adverse outcomes of medical treatment 
and care that they believe to be usually avoidable. 
Indeed precisely such judgments are made with some of 
the grievances that have been identified, for example 
failure to diagnose fractures due to failure to use 
x—rays; claims involving retention of instruments; 
certain types of failed sterilisations; wrong tooth
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extractions and so on. Such a list could be made 
from the data in this study although it must be borne 
in mind that for a comprehensive list, the claims 
which are managed by the two English medical defence 
societies would need to be taken into account.
In terms of criterion (a), access to 
compensation under the Adverse Medical Outcome 
Insurance scheme would simply entail registering a 
claim with the insurer (for example a medical defence 
organisation adopting this procedure). either 
directly or through the practitioner or health 
board. For grievances not on the list, the patient 
would seek compensation through a parallel system 
which could in fact be either litigation or 
arbitration procedures. The scope of compensation - 
criterion (b) - may remain as it presently does under 
delict, or could provide automatic indemnification 
for medical expenses and lost wages up to a 
predetermined amount. Damages for pain and
suffering could be included by designating in advance 
a specific amount for that type of relief.
In terms of predictability, benefits would be highly 
predictable under Adverse Medical Outcome Insurance 
for those outcomes on the list. Unfortunately, in 
return for predictability. individualised
case-by-case assessments of injury and loss would be
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forfeited.
A primary objective would be to provide more 
widespread and prompt compensation for injuries than 
is available with delict/tort. It is submitted that 
to accomplish this, the insurance scheme would have 
to reduce the average size of individual damage 
awards and provide for a uniform method for 
compensating different patients for the same 
injury. Benefits available from other sources
such as social security, disability allowances and so 
on would be deducted where there was duplication.
An advantage over delict would be that the 
scheme has the potential for reducing delay as well 
as eliminating many of the costs of litigation for 
injuries on the list. A weakness with the scheme 
proposed is that it fails under criterion (d) because 
of the difficulty of predicting administrative 
costs. It is questionable whether concentrating on 
relatively avoidable grievances will in fact reduce 
costs; certainly, compiling a list of occurrences 
which ought to be avoided would entail substantial 
costs, and further costs to keep it up to date.
As indicated earlier. Adverse Medical Outcome 
Insurance would be financed through medical and 
dental practitioners, privately or through 
institutions such as the medical defence
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organisations, purchasing insurance. Any policy 
would cover those losses associated with the
specified grievances. A very important element of 
this scheme is that, unlike the present system of 
indemnity available for medical and dental 
practitioners through the medical defence societies, 
the premiums would be merit rated according to the 
number and types of claims brought against the
practitioner. From the data provided by this study, 
it is clear that we can identify 'high risk'
practitioners and 'high risk' specialties. It would 
be possible therefore for insurance companies to 
devise a more sophisticated 'sliding' scale or
differential scale of premiums for practitioners.
The problem associated with insurance is that 
it can be thought of as a deterrence mechanism which 
is in contrast to the concept of loss distribution.
If we accept that loss distribution suggests that 
losses ought to be spread over as many people as 
possible, and general deterrence suggests that losses 
should be restricted or concentrated on those who can 
best avoid or minimise them, then merit—rated medical 
indemnity insurance may provide a conflict.
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34
Atiyah argues that it is possible to reconcile 
this position by having insurance with varying 
premium rates whereby,
“Insurance operates as a method of
distributing losses, and the varying premium 
rate operates as a form of general 
deterrence. The combination of the two 
seems to produce the perfect blend.”
Adverse Medical Outcome Insurance would 
incorporate financial incentives for practitioners to 
avoid medical injuries, and therefore merit-rated 
premiums preserve the concept in delict of
practitioners being held accountable for adverse 
results of medical treatment, although it is 
recognised that the delictual system, with respect to 
medical negligence claims, only indirectly encourages 
the reduction of medical injuries. The publicity 
associated with trials, which are very few in this 
context, may have deterrent effects on medical and
dental practitioners. At a minimum, judicial
decisions on appropriate standards of care alert
practitioners to the legal limits of acceptable
risk. While it can be argued that professional 
liability insurance reduces the injury avoidance
incentives generated by delictual liability, by
34. ibid. at p. 604; Havinghusrt, “Medical Adversity 
Insurance - Has Its Time Come?" for a discussion on 
the problems with this system, 1975 Duke L.J. 1233
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introducing differential scales of premiums this
might encourage greater care. It can be argued that
by moving away from fault as the basis of
compensation, the scheme recognises that technical
medical proficiency will not eliminate all adverse
medical outcomes. it is possible to argue further
that the fact that certain avoidable grievances on
the list of specified events might not always result
from negligence could stimulate attempts to perfect
the technique or clinical procedures or to minimise
the consequences of the adverse outcome once it
occurs. In addition. Adverse . Medical Outcome
Insurance has the potential for encouraging
improvements in the quality of care through
re-examination of procedures where the probability of
an adverse outcome is high. At the moment with the
present medical idemnity insurance schemes in
operation in the United Kingdom, very little
information is made available to the medical and
dental professions regarding the nature of grievances
3 5
which become the subject of negligence claims,
and so the opportunity to improve the quality of care 
is missed. A further advantage with the system 
offered is that because the list of adverse medical 
outcomes for which compensation is automatically
35. Except the chapter of 'horrors' often presented 
in the Annual Reports of the defence organisations.
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available is initiated and maintained by the medical
and dental professions it could be seen as an
effective means of peer review and professional 
3 6
regulation. For grievances included on the list
of specified events the scheme proposed would 
supplant traditional litigation, although the extent 
to which the existing delict or tort principles would 
be used is unclear.
Adverse Medical Outcome Insurance has many 
superficial attractions for example: access to
compensation for specified grievances entails a
simple administrative procedure; the fact that the 
practitioner remains accountable for the financial 
losses resulting from certain medical or surgical 
injuries is retained through differential rates of 
insurance premiums; compensation for outcomes 
included on the list is highly predictable; and 
finally, the scheme could begin as a limited 
compensation system and be expanded after experience 
was gained and data on costs were available.
However there are severe drawbacks in
attempting to move this particular system from a 
theoretical framework to practical application. For 
example the distinction between avoidable and 
unavoidable adverse outcomes of medical care and
36. The notion of peer review will be discussed 
later.
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treatment is very difficult to make, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 1. Indeed were such a list to be devised 
a major hurdle would be to distinguish between the 
'borderline' cases; these would give rise to 
considerable dispute leading to litigation. By 
criterion (c), the proposed list of specified events 
could only be limited to those present claims which 
are defined as 'res ipsa loquitur' cases,37 and in 
terms of the condition of fairness to both parties, 
the fact that the notion of 'relative avoidability' 
is solely judged by medical practitioners inevitably 
precludes any legal judicial control over acceptable 
professional standards. While it is possible for 
this scheme to begin as a limited compensation system 
with the ability to be expanded later, this would 
create considerable injustice for those patients who 
were refused compensation just prior to the expansion 
of the list of specified events. This knowledge 
might in fact discourage those charged with the 
responsibility to maintain the list to allow its 
expansion. Indeed, the maintenance does not exclude 
the possibility of a reduction of the number of 
grievances on the list. Similar injustices would be 
felt by patients refused compensation. This system
37. See data in previous chapter where such cases 
are settled relatively quickly.
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does not fully satisfy (a) - access, as it places a
considerable obstacle before the injured patient 
because once a grievance has been considered as one 
not covered by the list which ought not to occur, 
then the patient and his/her legal adviser know that 
the task in court will be uphill and they cannot fail 
to feel that the case has been pre-judged. The 
extent to which a judge might be influenced by the 
absence of the injury on the specified events list is 
very important. Therefore the precise nature of the 
relationship between the Insurance system and the 
Courts is very unclear. There is no doubt that 
while there is scope for a claim being raised in 
court, this will create more litigation regarding the 
validity and scope and 'fairness' of the compensation 
made available through the insurance system. Where 
the insurance scheme would be able to supplant a 
remedy in delict for a grievance designated on the 
specified events list, this situation could only 
assume that there would be no appeal procedure 
available in respect of such a claim. It is 
questionable if the judiciary would be prepared to 
abdicate total responsibility in such an important 
area of major social concern for purely financial 
expediency.
Another obstacle facing the introduction of 
the type of alternative suggested is that individual
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review of losses and determination of awards is 
eliminated - this situation would be considered 
virtually intolerable by many members of the legal 
profession and the public. This alternative would 
appear to be better than fault-based actions by 
criteria (b) and (e), but no better when considered 
by criteria (a), (c), (d) and (f).
We have so far examined some of the more 
obvious disadvantages associated with the Adverse 
Medical Outcome Insurance scheme; there is another 
dimension which must be examined - the impact of such 
a system on the quality of medicine. A very 
dangerous implication of the introduction of a 
merit-rated or differential rated insurance premium 
for medical and dental practitioners is that it might 
impair the availability and quality of medicine and 
dentistry that is currently available in the United 
Kingdom.
If this alternative retains the notion that 
medical and dental practitioners must be made to be 
financially accountable through differential rates, 
similar to those available for vehicle users, then 
there is a risk that practitioners might select less 
appropriate interventions in order to avoid the 
likelihood of a specified event occurring or even 
refuse to treat medically/surgically 'high risk' 
patients.
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3 8
Symonds , after examining litigation in obstetrics 
and gynaecology, expresses great concern when he says, 
"The fact is that most consultants in 
obstetrics and gynaecology have been sued, or 
are being sued, or will receive the unwelcome 
attention of a- litigious patient in the near 
future and none of us quite realise how far 
things have already moved. Unfortunately, we 
have now joined the ranks of the big spenders 
in medical litigation and it is going to get 
worse. Some insurance companies would like
to enter the field with differential rates 
for the high - and the low - risks 
specialties. Such a policy would have a 
disastrous effect on obstetrics and 
gynaecology because it would presumably not 
differentiate between the senior house 
officer undertaking his first job and the 
consultant and it would certainly have a 
deleterious effect on the already rather 
fragile recruitment to the specialty."
It must be noted that Professor Symonds at the time 
of writing was unaware of the findings in this study 
which demonstrate the categories of high risk 
practitioners. However his conclusions regarding
the problems that might be attached to various
38. Symonds E.M., "Litigation in Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology", Brit.J.Obstet. Gynaecol. 1985:92, 444-36
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specialties remain sound;
Who really wants to pay a lot of extra money 
for the pleasure of entering a discipline 
that is probably the most physically 
demanding of occupations in the medical arena 
and is rapidly becoming the most litigation 
prone discipline in medical practice?"
He then warns that,
"The impact of all this on the consultant and
his junior staff and the hospital is to
engender an ever more defensive attitude to
practice - more investigations, more
operative intervention and less and less
opportunity to test the efficacy of existing
methods of management. There must be a
better way to do business."
There is no doubt that such anxieties may be valid
but only where the range of differential
subscriptions is very wide and the financial
39implications severe. In reality it would not be
39. The B.M.A. published details of a proposed 
indemnity scheme whereby its members could obtain 
cover from commercial insurers sponsored by the 
B.M.A. The scheme involved differential rates for 
practitioners according to the number of years in 
practice and the nature of the specialty entered 
into. The major problem here is for insurers to 
produce the 'perfect blend', because the balance 
between general deterrence and loss distribution must 
be a fine one. Calabresi, 78 Harvard Law Review 
733-4, suggests that the balance would be dictated by 
market forces; that insurance companies vary their 
premium rates to the extent that it is economically 
profitable for them to do so. See Atiyah's criticism 
of this approach; ibid. p.605-6.
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the practitioner who is affected but ultimately the 
patient or rather the public. If the premiums for 
insurance represent a substantial proportion of the 
salary, for example of a consultant working in a high 
insurance risk category in the National Health 
Service, then, in order to avoid the decimation of 
such a high risk specialty his/her salary would have 
to be weighted to offset the loaded insurance premium 
being paid. Therefore, the rationale of Adverse 
Medical Outcome Insurance, namely that avoidable 
medical injuries can be deterred through financial 
incentives would ultimately fail if it lacked the 
•perfect blend' suggested by Atiyah.
The fourth alternative. Elective No-fault, is 
based to a large extent on proposals currently 
suggested in America and is more suited to the system 
of medicine found there. This however, does not 
exclude it for consideration because to some extent 
there are similarities between the types of medicine 
practiced in America and the United Kingdom, for 
example private medical practice.
4. Elective No-Fault
Elective no-fault is a system of compensation 
that would apply to all types of medical injuries.
At the moment there is nothing to prevent a 
medical/dental practitioner from not carrying 
indemnity insurance if s/he works privately or as a 
general practitioner but not within the National
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Health Service. Thus such a practitioner or even 
the health service could choose to purchase elective 
no-fault insurance for specific occurrences by 
defining in advance the adverse events for which they 
desired to be covered. With this scheme, it is 
envisaged that claims would be paid on an occurrence 
basis with no need to determine causation or legal 
culpability. As with the previous proposal,
fault-based litigation would be retained for those 
claims falling outside the list or schedule of 
specified events. Further, medical and dental 
practitioners and/or the health service could select 
not only those injuries to be covered, but also the 
types of losses to be reimbursed. Access to 
compensation would be virtually automatic for a
patient who sustains a covered injury, and as with 
most forms of indemnity insurance, the injured 
patient would file a claim and the practitioner or
health board would certify that the injury had in 
fact occurred. A feature of this system is that
elective no-fault would be voluntary in the sense 
that a practitioner could choose no-fault coverage 
for certain injuries or rely on liability insurance 
for all losses. It is envisaged that resort to 
litigation would be precluded for those claims 
falling within the prescribed sphere of losses. In 
theory there would be very few deterrents to patients
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bringing claims under elective no-fault because if 
the claim fell within the sphere of covered losses 
payment would be certain. According to American 
proponents, this system is said to encourage patients 
to bring claims composed primarily of demonstrable, 
financial losses. They further assert that the fact 
that a patient does not need to consult a solicitor 
to make the claim might encourage patients to seek 
compensation.
It is very likely that in such circumstances 
where patients become aware of access to 
compensation, this might expand the number of claims 
made and perhaps compensate for more losses than the 
present delict/tort-based mechanism.
Compensation through elective no-fault would 
not be based on a fixed schedule but rather on a 
case-by-case determination of injury and actual 
economic loss. Payment under this system would not 
necessarily be open-ended because insured 
practitioners could place a ceiling on the no-fault 
benefits available under the policy. If the claim 
made by the patient were to exceed the limit then the 
remedy would lie in delict.
The procedure for resolution of claims would 
be largely administrative, and if a loss fell within 
the prescribed boundaries of elected coverage, 
validation of a claim would be simple. Again, an
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issue that would arise is whether the injury and 
resultant losses were covered by the policy because 
any schedule must by its very nature create 
borderline cases. The proposed elective no-fault 
system in America does not allow either review of 
claims nor the amounts of compensation to be 
re-assessed; thus appeals are not a feature of this 
system. It is difficult to assess the cost
effectiveness of this proposal. Elective no-fault 
would be affected by other sources of compensation 
since it requires that any awards to the patient from 
sources other than the no-fault scheme be taken into 
account in determining the amount of compensation.
As proposed, elective no-fault is not linked 
in any way to professional regulatory measures such 
as disciplinary procedures. It is also unlikely 
that this system would have any influence on the
practitioner's incentive to avoid adverse medical or 
surgical outcomes.
Elective no-fault seems better than delict by 
criteria (a), (e) and possibly (d), but worse under
(b), (c) and (f).
Alternatives 3 and 4 attempt to give medical 
and dental practitioners some control by specifying
the injuries for which they would be financially
accountable, and the ability to limit liability. It
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has to be submitted that neither of the alternatives 
assures adequacy of compensation or fairness in the 
selection of specified events for compensation.
The data in the previous chapter could be 
used to form the basis for changes in the existing 
medical indemnity insurance system. While this is 
not necessarily a dangerous course, the implications 
for the quality of medicine in this country are 
clear. The medical defence organisations and the 
British Medical Association are considering the 
introduction of differential premium rates for its 
members. Such considerations have not, so far, 
examined the hazards with such an approach, nor have 
they taken cognizance of the difficulties encountered 
in American States where differential rates for 
medical practitioners are in operation.
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5. State No-Fault Insurance
Another possible approach to medical injury
compensation is a State sponsored no-fault insurance
40
scheme. Many people believe that real progress
towards justice and efficiency in compensation for
medically injured patients could be made by the
introduction of a no-fault system,4^ whereby
injured patients would be compensated by a central
fund without resort to the courts. The model which
has found great favour with many judges,42
academics,43 and politicians44 in this country is
the one presently operating in New Zealand.45
This section will therefore concentrate on the New
Zealand model only in as far as it is relevant in the
46context of medical/dental injury.
40. More attention is given to this system of 
compensation mainly because it is a 'working* 
mechanism and has demonstrated a few teething 
problems.
41. It is interesting to note that while The 
Woodhouse Report emphasised, that, "injury arising 
from accident needed an attack on three fronts" - 
safety, rehabilitation, and compensation, in that 
order of importance, many appear to have forgotten 
this emphasis.
42. Kilner Brown, J., in Ashcroft v. Mersey R.H.A. 
[1983] 2 All E.R.245; Lawton, L.J., Whitehouse v. 
Jordan [1980] 1 All E.R. 652 at 659
43.Holyoak, J., "Alternative Accident Compensation 
Strategies", Accident Compensation After Pearson, 
Allen, D.K., et al. Sweet & Maxwell, London 1979
44. For example J. Ashley, M.P., March, 1986, Central 
Television, Birmingham.
45. Accident Compensation Act 1972;
46. Most commentators have examined this scheme in 
terms of its overall implications for personal 
injuries in general.
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Before 1974 New Zealand had a system of 
compensation not dissimilar to the present one in 
this country. The Woodhouse Report^  described 
the existing system as a,
"... fragmented and capricious response to a 
social problem that cries out for 
co-ordinated and comprehensive treatment." 
Several years after publication of this report, the 
New Zealand Parliament eventually gave it statutory 
form in the Accident Compensation Act 1972; the Act
47. The most comprehensive proposal for reform of 
the tort law was first contained in the Report of the 
New Zealand Royal Commission on Compensation for 
Personal Injury, published in 1967 (Woodhouse 
Report). It proposed to replace tort law by a 
comprehensive State accident insurance scheme which 
would embrace road accidents, industrial accidents, 
criminal injuries, and all other accidental injuries 
which at present go uncompensated. The report 
contained a spirited attack on the common law system; 
too many injured people, it said, went uncompensated; 
the system was economically very inefficient; it was 
too slow; determining fault was unrealistically 
difficult; assessing lump-sum damages was 
speculative; and rehabilitation was hindered by the 
prolonged adversarial system. The Woodhouse Report 
went on to recommend a comprehensive state-run system 
of no-fault compensation for accidental injury.
The Government produced a commentary on the 
report by October 1969 and a select committee was 
established to consider the report. In 1974, The 
Accident Compensation Commission (now Corporation) 
was brought into being.
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came into force on 1st April 1974.48
The A c c i d e n t  C o m p e n s a t i o n  C o r p o r a t i o n  
operates three funds: the earners' fund; the motor
vehicle fund; and the supplementary fund. The 
income for the earners' fund is raised by a  levy on 
all employers and self-employed. The rate for
employers varies according to the risk classification 
of the employment; the money is collected by the
Inland Revenue. The money for the motor vehicle 
fund is collected b y  the Post Office as part of the 
motor licence fee. The supplementary fund comes 
from general Government revenue. Benefits are paid 
to earners from the earners' fund unless the injury 
was caused in a car accident when the earner was not 
at work. Car accident victims are compensated from 
the motor vehicle fund unless the accident happened 
as part of the victim's work, and all other cases are
charged to the supplementary fund. The benefits are
charged to those suffering "personal injury by 
accident", however the major difficulty, in the 
context of this study i s  to define what is an 
accident. The Accident Compensation Act does not
48. It is outwith the scope of this study to give a 
detailed review of the New Zealand system since this 
is adequately dealt with elsewhere, for example Ison, 
T.G., Accident Compensation. London, Croom Helm, 1980.
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define an accident.but says,
"Personal injury by accident"
(a) Includes:
(i) the physical and mental consequences of 
any such injury or of the accident;
(ii) Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid 
misadventure;
(iii) Incapacity resulting from an 
occupational disease or industrial deafness 
to the extent that cover extends in respect 
of the disease or industrial deafness...;
(iv) Actual bodily harm including pregnancy 
and mental or nervous shock, suffered by any 
person by any act or omission of any other 
person, and it is proved to the satisfaction 
of the Commission that the act or omission is 
within the description of any of the offences 
specified in ... the Crimes Act 1961 ... 
irrespective of whether any person is charged 
with the offence;
(b) Except as provided in the last preceeding 
paragraph, does not include:
(i) Damage to the body or mind caused by a 
cardio-vascular or cerebrovascular episode 
unless the episode is the result of effort, 
strain, or stress that is abnormal,"
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"excessive, or unusual for the person
suffering it, and the effort, strain, or
stress arises out of and in the course of
employment of that person as an employee;
(ii) Damage to the body or mind caused
exclusively by disease, infection, or the
ageing process."
A point often missed by medical practitioners who
advocate the New Zealand no-fault model is that, from
the section of the Act above, the intention is to
exclude disability and death resulting from
disease. This arbitrary distinction between
accident and disease creates many difficulties,
because the crucial question at this juncture is,
'when is an accident not an accident?' While it can
be said that the present delict-based system is 
49unfair, inequities of a lesser degree persist 
with the New Zealand system. For example, in a 
geriatric ward some of the patients will be there 
either because of strokes or fractured long bones. 
Both are the result of degenerative conditions, and 
yet the women with fractured femurs are eligible for 
the full benfits of the Accident Compensation
49. For example, where a child develops pelvic 
cancer and convinces a court that the cancer was 
caused by the use of a particular drug s/he will be 
awarded several hundreds of thousands of pounds; but 
if the child's cancer is considered as 'one of these 
things,1 the child will get nothing.
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Corporation, whereas most of those with strokes are 
not.
The moral arguments against this distinction
between accident and disease were made by a patient
50
interviewed by Ison,
"The Government has got the priorities wrong 
by using loose and ambiguous language. 
Their perception of ’accident' is a physical 
impact concept that ignores most victims of 
accident in a moral sense of that word. If 
a drunken driver injures himself by hitting a 
telegraph pole, they call that an accident.
I call it a self-inflicted injury. If a 
rugby player becomes paraplegic from impact 
in the scrum, they call that an accident. I 
call it a planned risk. If a small child
runs into a street because there is no fence 
to stop him and he is hit by a car, they call 
that an accident. I call it a predictable 
consequence. If someone* is crippled by 
multiple sclerosis, there is nothing he could 
possibly do to prevent that. We don't know
what causes it, so he could not possibly have 
avoided it. I call that a true accident.
But they say he is not covered."
50. Ison, T.G., Accident Compensation, London, Croom 
Helm, 1980; According to Ison, a fifth of the new 
disabilities in New Zealand result from accidents.
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Furthermor e , trying to draw the distinction between 
accident and disease5"*" creates many administrative 
difficulties, because some injuries might clearly 
result from accidents and others from disease, yet 
many may be described as either. For this particular 
no-fault system, where compensation is given to those 
suffering adverse consequences arising from accidents 
as opposed to those arising from disease, the 
distinction is crucial. Apparently, this situation 
has led to more appeals, more involvement of lawyers, 
more delays, and more unhappiness with the eventual 
results than there would be with a system that
compensated all disabilities regardless of cause.
52
While others have suggested that a no-fault scheme 
ought to be extended to cover disease, it would be 
clear that compensation would then be by need rather 
than by cause.53
51. Atiyah, P.S., ibid. pp.498-508, examines the 
difficulties with the distinction between accident and 
disease, and argues that it has prevented the
development of compensation systems and suggests that 
the time has come for the distinction to be
'jettisoned'.
52.Holyoak, J., 'Accident Compensation in New Zealand 
Today'; ibid. ppl80-196
53. Most would see the moral and administrative
justification for such a scheme, but the
counterargument would be that it would be too
expens ive.
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Another important argument - which stems from 
criterion (e) - against the introduction of a
State-funded no-fault compensation system, is that if 
everybody is compensated regardless of fault then 
there will be no legal or economic incentive for
medical and dental practitioners or hospital boards to 
avoid adverse occurrences; doctors might be less 
concerned about standards of care and treatment.
Many medical and dental practitioners think 
mistakenly that actions through delict for medical 
negligence would cease if there was wholesale adoption 
of the New Zealand scheme in this country. This is 
not the case, because all New Zealand practitioners 
still have to subscribe to the medical defence 
organisations - at lower subscription rates - even
though it is widely thought that the Accident 
Compensation Corporation will cover all cases where 
negligence might be alleged. This is because it is 
not clear which cases will be covered by the 
Corporation. What is certain is that once a claim is 
accepted then it is not possible to make a claim 
through the courts. The Accident Compensation Act 
specifically states that 'personal injury by
accident', includes "medical, surgical. dental, or 
first aid misadventure." What exactly constitutes 
medical/dental negligence for the purposes of
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compensation under the New Zealand no-fault scheme has
not been clarified; while the Accident Compensation
Corporation is quite definite that: 'it is not
necessary to show that there has been negligence on
the part of a medical practitioner before a claim will
lie for medical misadventure', it also states that:
'not all cases of medical negligence come within the
scope of medical -misadventure. While acts of
operational negligence will be included, an act of
ommission in failing to respond to a call for
treatment would not be included.'54 The
limitations of the Accident Compensation Corporation,
have been highlighted in several cases for 
55
example , where a patient entered hospital in 1974 
w i t h  a history of abdominal pain, diarrhoea, and 
vomiting for a few days. The patient was admitted 
and underwent a laparotomy at which his appendix was 
removed. He died the following day; a post-mortem 
examination showed that three feet of the small bowel 
were infarcted. The Accident Compensation
Corporation refused to compensate the patient's widow 
on the grounds that the death had resulted from 
disease and not from any failing of the surgeon. The 
failure to diagnose such an infarction was not deemed
54. See data in previous chapter on grievances which 
were 'non-operational' .
55. (1977) 1 NZAR 130. November 1976 ACC Rep. 58
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to be medical misadventure. A similar case in delict 
alleging negligence might have succeeded.
Another important case arose in 1974, and the 
conclusions reached by the Accident Compensation 
Corporation in 1978 provided a working definition of
C f.
medical misadventure. A patient, unwell for
several days, was prescribed some pills by his general 
practitioner and sent home. The next day his 
condition worsened, and his wife tried to obtain 
medical help but was unsuccessful. A day later she
called the duty doctor, who came and arranged 
admission to hospital, but the patient died before the 
ambulance arrived. The patient died from bilateral 
pneumonia. The Accident Compensation Corporation
dismissed the claim, and reported in the following
terms,
"Medical misadventure occurs when:
(a) a person suffers bodily or mental injury
or damage in the course of, and as part, of,
the administering to that person of medical 
aid, care or attention, and
(b) such injury or damage is caused by
mischance or accident, unexpected and
undesigned, in the nature of medical error or
medical mishap.
56. ACC, Report 1978; July 44-9
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The report continued,
"The non-availability of medical assistance is 
not a situation related to medical treatment 
of a patient, or to the actual delivery of 
such treatment. The patient therefore had 
not suffered medical misadventure. and the 
Commission's decision declining the claim was 
correct. Alternatively the application
failed because the deceased did not die as a 
result of personal injury by accident: the
events relating to the seeking of medical aid 
were no more than accompanying circumstances, 
and not accidents or an accident. The
application failed also on the grounds of
causation. The events in question did not
positively cause, or contribute, to the
deceased's death."
. . . . 57Interestingly, failed sterilisation claims have
received considerable attention under this system.
During laparoscopic sterilisation, the gynaecologist
experienced 'difficulties' with the use of forceps and
the patient later conceived. In this c a s e ^  the
57. The data in chapter 2 identified this area as an 
important feature of medical negligence claims. See 
also Brown, A.D.G., "Accidents in Gynaecological
Surgery — Medico—legal", in Litioation and Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology; RCOG, 1985, at p. 82  ^for
classification of gynaecological complaints raised
against the Medical Protection Society
58. ACC Report 1979; March:53;
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Appeal Authority held that:
"1. Medical mishap, which which is one of the 
two headings of medical misadventure, may 
occur where there are adverse consequences of 
proper treatment but those consequences must 
be beyond the range of normally and reasonably 
contemplated risk, before entitlement can 
arise.
"2. Applying this definition, two factors were 
decisive in determining that medical mishap 
had occurred in this case:
(i) The forceps 'problem' in the operation 
itself which was not within the normal 
contemplated risks of such an operation and
(ii) The patient's complete unawareness of any 
risk of failure in the operation and of 
possible subsequent pregnancy.
3. Accordingly, on the special facts of the 
case, the appellant had suffered medical 
misadventure. The totality of the sequence 
of events established a causation between the 
failure of the operation and the injury. (The 
unwanted pregnancy). The appeal was
therefore allowed."
Other failed sterilisation cases have been 
rejected by the Accident Compensation Corporation on
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the grounds that failure was well recognised to occur 
in some cases. The problems with the gynaecologist's 
use of the forceps and the fact that the patient was 
unaware that failure was a possibility were the 
crucial factors in this case.
It is evident that proof of causation is a 
feature of this system before compensation can be 
made; this would not remove possibly the most severe 
difficulty that patients presently face with delict 
fault-based claims. Proof of causation, as we have 
seen from Chapters l and 2, is a major stumbling block 
for medically injured patients pursuing claims; it is 
argued that this obstacle may explain in part why so 
many of the claims examined in the present study were 
abandoned. Further, almost fifty per cent of the 
claims analysed in the present study which were 
pressed as far as court hearings, were raised on the 
issue of causation.
Indeed, the need to regard the circumstance as 
one which is 'beyond the range of normally and 
reasonably contemplated "risk"' changes very little 
for the patient in terms of obtaining compensation, 
since this is an additional hazard that must be 
overcome in the present delict fault-based system.
The notion that the patient did not understand 
the risks of the procedure, raises the contentious 
issue of 'informed consent', which as we have seen has 
received short shrift from the Courts in this country.
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The Accident Compensation Corporation has not yet 
compensated a patient where the major issue was 
failure to obtain 1 informed c onsent1.
From the difficulties arising from the 
definitions of 'accident' and 'disease'; the need for 
proof of causation; and an assessment of 'risk', it 
is submitted that those who advocate the New Zealand 
system must recognise the 'need to broaden the 
definition of 'medical misadventure' before it could 
be seen as an effective alternative to the existing 
delict system. As the system currently operates, 
very few cases go as far as the high courts, and the 
whole process, even that of appeal, is much less 
formal than a rigorous legal hearing.
Access to this system of compensation is 
similar to that described in the previous elective 
no-fault scheme; the patient can submit a claim 
locally and send it to the head office of the Accident 
Compensation Corporation. If the receiving officer 
rejects a claim, his/her superior must endorse it; 
however if both agree that the claim is unmeritorious, 
then the patient is given a 'pre-decision' notice 
explaining that the claim may not be 
compensable.59 The patient can then provide
further information to support the claim. If the
59. After twenty-one days the Commission makes a 
formal decision to reject a claim.
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patient is dissatisfied with the decision, s/he can 
then request the Commission to review the decision. 
This formal review can consider any evidence which is 
made available to the applicant; is a fairly informal 
procedure, normally conducted by an official of the 
Accident Compensation Corporation with the patient and 
his/her trade union official or lawyer. If there is 
still dissatisfaction, an appeal may be made to the 
Accident Compensation Appeal Authority - normally a 
single judge, sometimes with an expert assessor 
which sits in public and reconsiders all the 
evidence. Further, on a question of law, an appeal 
lies to the Supreme Court, with either its or the 
Authority's leave, and then to the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal and, finally where appropriate, to the Privy 
Council.
One of the major problems that would be faced 
by the introduction of a State-run no-fault system in 
the United Kingdom is the adjustment that would have 
to be made from a legalistic system to the one that
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might be suggested by such scheme.60
61
Ison argues that the Accident Compensation Act is 
too closely integrated with private law and that this
orientation in private law has been entrenched by the
provision for appeals to courts of general 
jurisdiction. He continues that, almost inevitably, 
the result is that solutions to problems in the
interpretation of the Act are sought by referring to 
precedents in areas of private law rather than by 
referring to social insurance materials. The role of 
law in this system is peculiar, for example,
"An impressive feature of the ACC is the
fidelity to law shown in the decision-making 
process. ... probably higher than would 
commonly be found in government agencies and 
departments."61
60. The problem of adjustment faced by New Zealand 
was highlighted by the vexed questions, first, as to 
whether common law precedents and principles have any 
role to play in the new arrangements: and, secondly, 
whether the Accident Compensation Corporation's own 
decisions form precedents. As regards the first 
question the attitude of the Accident Compensation 
Corporation was that the common law notions did not 
apply and was not to be relied upon by the claimant or 
their legal advisers. As for the second question, 
this imposed great difficulties for the Corporation 
and no satisfactory answer has been given. The 
easiest answer seems to be that the Corporation does 
not bind itself by its decisions, but since its 
decisions at any time are meant to be expressions of 
its policy at that time, then in the interests of 
consistency, the Commission, in subsequent decisions, 
may be expected to follow at least the same general 
line unless of course, new policy considerations arise.
61. Ison, T.G., Accident Compensation. Croom Helm, 
London. 1980 at p.114.
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A point to be noted is that the annotated reports do 
not provide a rulebook to serve as the basic reference 
material for decision-making. The Accident
Compensation Corporation's manuals for guidance of 
claims officers responsible for decisions under the 
Act, are not published. They contain the relevant 
criteria for decision-making but the public do not 
have full access to the adjudicative criteria being 
used. Such a scheme, if introduced in this country, 
would have to produce and publish the guidelines for 
several reasons: publication would help to achieve
consistency since any deviation from the rules may be 
noticed and corrected more readily if the injured 
patients and their advisers could see what the rules 
are; the rules are derived from a public authority 
under statute - as such they should be published like 
any other other law; it is difficult for an injured 
patient, to submit evidence or argument if s/he cannot 
check its relevancy. The right of review or appeal 
is impaired if the patient cannot ascertain whether 
established criteria have been followed. Further it 
would be quite impossible to consider reforms within 
such a system if the existing rules are inaccessible.
In terms of (e), the maintenance of 
professional standards might be a problem. In the 
delict system it is argued that injured patients may 
sue doctors not only to gain compensation but also
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to see justice done ^ and a wrongdoer reprimanded. 
Atiyah suggests that the disappearance of actions for 
negligence might deprive the patient of his 
ombudsman-like weapon. He states,63
"... that the solution does not lie in the 
retention of the negligence action, but in 
devising some new form of public inquiry in 
which the power of initiation - subject 
perhaps to some screening process - lies with 
the citizen. Something of this kind would 
seem to be an essential prerequisite of the 
abolition of actions for damages for 
negligence."
However, the Accident Compensation Corporation is not
concerned with alloting blame; this might lead to
concern that there may be a decline in the standards
64of medical practice. It has been suggested that 
one of the ironies of the no-fault system is that in
62. For example see Atiyah, P.S., ibid., where he 
says at p.555,
"...it must be conceded that tort law does 
have something of great value which other 
compensation systems do not have. The fact 
that any citzen has it in his power to 
initiate open and public discussion about the 
behaviour of another party by issuing a writ 
alleging negligence, and bringing him before 
the courts, is an important consideration.
63. Atiyah, P.S., ibid. at p508
64. See Smith, R. , 'Compensation for medical
misadventure and drug injury in the New Zealand 
no-fault system: feeling the w a y ’; Brit. Med J , 1982;
284:1457
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many ways the grosser the error the more likely the 
Accident Compensation Corporation is to compensate the 
victim and the less likely the doctor to be involved 
in any dispute. The medical defence organisations in 
their submissions to the Royal Commission on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, stated 
that if there were to be a system of no-fault 
compensation, it should be in addition to the present 
system of tortious liability. They further stated 
that the,
"medical defence bodies and. we believe, the
medical profession would be opposed on 
principle to any new system which replaced the 
patient's right to sue a tortfeasor. This
could only result in a loss of clinical
independence and impair the doctor patient 
relationship. It might also carry with it a 
right for the state to recover a contribution 
from the practitioner or hospital concerned; 
this would conflict with the spirit of the 
present arrangements agreed between the 
Department of Health and the medical 
profession as set out in the Department's
memorandum HM(54) 32."65
The Medical Defence Union's memorandum for
65. This argument could be applied to the other 
no-fault schemes suggested earlier.
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submission to the Royal Commission on Civil Liability
and Compensation for Personal Injury66 reflected
considerable concern, though possibly over-stated, at 
the introduction of a no-fault scheme. They stated 
that clinical freedom was only possible if there was a 
measure of responsibility attached with it. The 
Union then argued that in the event of a state-funded 
insurance scheme, it,
"... regards it as unlikely that a goverment
department paying compensation would not also 
seek to prevent accidents. Action to prevent 
accidents would doubtless start as a 
recommendation, but it would soon be 
interpreted as a regulation. The advice
would be the best obtainable, which in effect 
would represent the orthodoxy of experienced
men. This maintains standards but inhibits 
those changes and experiments on which the 
development of medicine depends. The Union 
fears the stifling effects of an imposed 
orthodoxy."
Indeed they stated this as the reason why they 
accepted responsibility on behalf of its members 
whenever a hospital authority was sued in medical 
negligence. Further, the Medical Defence Union
6 6 . Unpublished memorandum; personal communication 
from Dr. J. Patterson, Secretary, M.D.D.U.S.
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argued for the imposition of penalties for its 
members! They stated that if there was a no-fault 
scheme and the absence of some form of penalty for 
doctors then,
"... these changes if uncorrected would tend 
to reduce the doctor's personal responsibility 
and the patient's opportunity of expressing 
his disapproval. This is most noticeable in 
hospitals. Patients do not choose their 
doctors and some would not know how to 
exercise a. choice if they had one. Nearly 
all patients have to be dealt with by several 
doctors so that individual responsibility is
spread and diluted ... his position cannot be
altered except in cases of gross misbehaviour." 
Conclusions on Alternatives
The analysis of the existing and proposed 
approaches to compensation for medical injuries has 
identified strengths and weaknesses of each. All the 
schemes have certain advantages over 'the present 
delict system for compensation for medically injured
patients. Each reflects, to varying degrees,
compromises on a variety of issues. They all fail to 
deal effectively with the problems associated with
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lump sum' payments , difficulties of prognosis 
which, as we have seen, are a significant feature of 
medical injury claims, and the effective reduction of 
pressures upon the patient once a claim is raised.
While there is an attempt to abandon the
Fi ft
concept of 'faultJ in some of the proposals, the 
need for proof of causation, particularly for medical 
injuries, limit any benefits that might arise from the 
absence of fault. It is submitted - assuming an 
ideal world - that if victims of medical injury
67. Regarding reforms, Atiyah, states that,
". . . the practical problems are formidable, and there 
is no doubt that nobody wants a system of periodical 
payments. Plaintiffs, defendants, insurers and legal 
advisers are all unanimous in preferring the lump sum 
award." in "What Now?" Accident Compensation After 
Pearson, ibid at p.249. New Zealand scheme allows for 
'lump s u m 1 payments as compensation for the loss or 
impairment of any bodily function and for loss of 
amenity, pain, and nervous shock; though formal 
medical assessment of the degree of impairment is 
required - this increases the costs of the system. 
Section 120 of the Accident Compensation Act 1972 
creates greater problems because its very terminology 
- "loss of amenities or capacity to enjoy life ... 
pain and mental suffering ..." is redolent of all the 
earlier uncertainties of the common law and, in 
dealing with claims which fall under this section, any 
assessment must be highly subjective.
6 8 . Professor Jolowicz, argues for the retention of 
tort if the whole system of compensation could be 
shaped in such a way 'as to place the burden of 
recurrent costs as accurately as possible on the 
shoulders of those who create . . . the risks of injury 
to others', by extended use of liability insurance.
He goes further and asserts that fault would serve a 
useful purpose in medical negligence cases where it 
may be difficult to know whether the plaintiff's 
worsened condition is due to his treatment or lack of 
it, on the one hand, or to inevitable natural causes, 
on the other; Jolowicz, J.A., 'Compensation for 
Personal Injury and Fault', 1979, 'Accident 
Compensation After Pearson, ibid. at pp.40-42
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ought to be compensated on the basis of 'need'69
rather than on the basis of what caused their
injuries, then this ought to imply that the focus of 
public policy and research should not be confined to
instances of medical/dental negligence because, in all 
probability, it constitutes only a small part of the 
injuries and losses that occur during the course of 
treatment, and more importantly, it is only a subset 
of all personal injuries.
While the medical negligence study has 
examined possible • alternatives to the delict-based 
action because of the demonstrated legal difficulties 
met by patients who attempt to secure compensation,
the overall picture of this particular subset of 
personal injuries must be placed into perspective.
As we have seen, many of the findings in this study 
are not peculiar to medical negligence claims. For
69. Stapleton has criticised advocates of such view
because of the restrictive interpretation applied to
•needs': "Compensating Victims of Diseases", 1985,
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p.248, Vol. 5 No. 2, 
where she says,
"The conventional wisdom is that tort ought to 
be abandoned in favour of a comprehensive form 
of public compensation for personal 
injuries. But although the stated rationale 
is the equal needs of the disabled, and
although a majority of these are disease
victims, a distinct preference for accident
victims emerges in actual reform proposals. 
This seems to be a remnant of the bias of
effective tort liability towards trauma ..." 
see also, Liebman, L., "The Definition of Disability
in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income".
89 Harv. L. Rev. 833, (1976)
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instance the data on the age-groups of claimants; the 
availability of legal aid; the time taken for
settlement of claims; the negotiation strategies 
adopted by the medical defence organisations and the 
legal procedural hurdles are all consistent with 
results obtained in other personal injury
70
studies. Indeed, the main findings and themes
explored in a very recent doctorate thesis on
compensation for victims of disease by Stapleton,71
suggest acceptable parallels.
The Pearson Report, while admitting that they
would not be the final word on the problems raised by
medical negligence or similar claims, scarcely touched
the problems attached to medical negligence; a member
72of the Commission , stated that
"... even after five years, [we] left a number 
of loose ends. We did not solve the problems 
of compensation for partial incapacity . .. and 
what we suggested about the steps for dealing 
with medical injuries were ... tentative."
It is submitted that the 'loose ends' were inevitable
70. These have been cited in the previous chapter.
71. A summary of the thesis cited by Stapleton, J., is 
available in 'Compensating Victims of Diseases', 1985 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.5 N o .2, 248. 
This thesis is presently being prepared for 
publication.
72. Lord Allen of Abbeydale, in. Introduction, 
Accident Compensation After Pearson, 1979, Allen, D.K. 
p. 3, London, Sweet & Maxwell
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since the Royal Commission did not have available data 
of the type which we have considered in this thesis. 
The medical negligence study has gone beyond the 1978 
Pearson Report in terms of its examination of medical 
negligence; the results would appear to support the 
conclusions reached by the Report,73 namely, that 
there would have to be a good case for exempting the 
medical profession from legal liabilities which apply 
to other groups. It necessarily follows that reforms 
instituted on the basis of a focus on medical 
negligence, which demand a restructuring of almost the 
entire corpus of the law of delict and tort, would 
create further anomalies and inconsistencies.
While one is almost forced to conclude that 
there are no ready-made solutions to the conceptual 
and practical issues raised by medical negligence 
claims, such a view is unduly pessimistic.
The concluding section therefore examines 
possibilities that might alleviate some of the 
problems outlined.
73. Pearson Report, vol.l para. 1344 p.287; in their 
recommendation, para.1371, suggested that
no-fault schemes should be observed and studied 
because circumstances may change to such an extent 
that the recommendation not to introduce no-fault 
might need to be reviewed. This possibility is even 
more remote in view of the difficulties found with the 
New Zealand scheme.
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The Retention of Delict
While the analysis of the law of delict in the
context of medical personal injury compensation has
highlighted many of its deficiences, its merits have
been understated.
Underlying the delict system is the notion,
contained within the fault principle, as a matter of
common justice that fault provides ground for payment
of compensation. Many academics^ ignore or reject
the importance of 'common-sense morality' - which here
would be, that a doctor ought to pay compensation to
those patients whom s/he injures. Perhaps the
rejections are based on the modern belief that it is
wrong to 'seek vengence' . The view that their must
be scope for individual responsibility in fault
liability is supported by Williams and Hepple,
2
when they argue that the fault principle,
"... may be attributed not to an eternal
principle of justice, but to a psychological 
reaction of a distinctly human kind. A 
person who has been wronged feels resentment, 
and society sympathetically identifies itself 
with the victim. The resentment of the"
1. See S. Lloyd-Bostock, "Common Sense Morality and 
Accident Compensation", [1980] Insur. L . J . 331; see 
Professor Tunc, "Tort Law and the Moral Law", [1972] 
C . L.J. 247
2. Williams G., Hepple, B.A., Foundations of the Law 
of Torts. London, Butterworths (2nd ed) 1984, p.136
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"victim and of society can be . . . satisfied by 
reparation."
To suggest that retribution is the only
important objective of fault liability - which is
absent for example in social security or any
state-sponsored scheme that has so far been examined -
would be to over-state the case. The matter is put
3
into perspective by Atiyah,
"Retribution in the law of torts is on a 
modest scale. We do not demand retribution 
by way of capital punishment, flogging or even 
imprisonment. Retribution here is on the 
prosaic level of hurting people by depriving 
them of some money".
Although it may be an unpopular notion for today's 
society, the moral element in such claims cannot be 
discounted.
Closely linked to this, particularly in claims 
of medical negligence, is the deterrent function of 
delict, although in this context, 'injury avoidance' 
or 'accident prevention' are probably better terras.
It is fairly clear that any system of compensation 
which purports to act as a deterrent against causing 
injury to patients must stem from a connection between 
the medical practitioner(s ) who cause the injuries and
3. ibid., at 552
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the person or body who pays compensation. Therefore, 
any state social security/insurance system can never 
deter a medical or dental practitioner from causing 
injury to a patient, since compensation is paid by the 
nation's taxpayers. it follows that the only 
compensation system which can operate as a deterrent 
is a system like the delict fault-based system,^ or 
one which retains the feature, in which a condition of 
legal liability is that the practitioner's conduct 
caused, or contributed to, the medical injury. As 
advanced in the third alternative scheme, only if a 
practitioner pays for the harm or injury caused to a 
patient will it be possible that s/he will cause less 
harm or injury in future. However, for delict to be 
an effective system for encouraging accident 
prevention, medical and dental practitioners must be 
able to undertake preventive measures in advance of 
the injury. This aspect of fault-based liability
4. Malleson exaggerates the influence of litigation 
on doctors' attitudes when he says that, 'Perhaps the
constant threat of litigation makes doctors and
hospitals more careful, but it also makes them hate 
their patients, and this in the long run will probably 
not be good for our health.1 in Need Your Doctor be So 
Useless?.(London, 1973) in Atiyah, P.S., Accidents. 
Compensation and the Law. 'Notes' no. 21, p.680 
For an American perspective see Slawkowski, "Do the 
Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital
Practices?" 22 St. Louis U.L.J. 452, 1978; Schwartz,
"The Competitive Strategy - Will It affect the Quality 
of Care?" Meyer,J., (ed) Market Reforms in Health
C a r e . 15, 20 1983
has been conveniently ignored and under-estimated by 
the medical profession over the years.5 A reason 
for this may be that, in the past, to have done
otherwise would have been an admission that there was 
a serious problem; not to mention the admission that
the threat of litigation was having an influence on 
medical practice. Although there may be serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of deterrence as a 
means of preventing medical accidents, it is submitted 
that the only way that medical and dental
practitioners will be prompted to avoid causing injury 
or harm to patients is by bringing pressure to bear 
before they become involved in accident-causing 
situations. This is only possible if the medical
profession recognise or are prepared to recognise such 
situations, and are able to make rational assessments 
of the risks involved.
Data to assist in achieving this objective are 
available from this study, although a much broader and 
more sophisticated medical analysis of some of the 
problems would be required. This will be discussed 
when we consider the responsibilities of those charged 
with the education of medical and dental
5. Preventive measures are considered below. See 
Schroeder et al. "The Failure of Physician Education as 
a Cost Containment Strategy", 1984. 252 J.A.M.A. 225
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practitioners. in relation to road traffic
accidents, Atiyah6 argues,
"... in order to reduce accidents it is 
necessary to study their causes very 
carefully. It is not enough simply to take 
road conditions and vehicle qualities as 
given. and assume that all accidents are 
•caused' by careless or negligent conduct."
He then suggests that,
"... the lesson from all this is that if we 
are to take seriously the business of 
deterring people from doing careless or 
dangerous things, we must give them more 
detailed guidance as to how to behave."
The analogy is quite clear. While the law of delict 
only gives guidance to the medical and dental 
profession after the occurrence of a medical or dental 
injury - which is the general requirement to take 
reasonable care, it would be foolish to conclude that 
the rules of negligence can never be used as a means 
of regulating the conduct of the medical profession 
and deterring accidents. The medical profession has 
only recently issued practice guidelines, in certain 
specialties, as a direct response to litigation.
Another feature of having a remedy in delict
6. Atiyah. ibid. at 561.
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is that it provides the patient with the opportunity 
to use the courts to initiate a public inquiry into 
the cause of his/her accident with a view to 
establishing whether it could have been avoided. 
The law may only occasionally fulfil this role of 
publicising the need for accident prevention since 
the achievement of this objective depends on the 
number of cases reaching a court hearing, not to 
mention responsible reporting by the media.
While there may be practical difficulties 
facing the patient- in attempting to claim damages, 
there is no doubt that in the compensation debate in 
general, damages can be considered to be a superior 
form of compensation in various respects since it 
attempts to compensate for non-income losses, such as 
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, cases 
of partial. as well as total incapacity, and in 
having no ceilings on the amounts recoverable. 
Furthermore, because of the limited resources which 
society can devote to social security payments, 
non-pecuniary losses cannot be given to all 
victims. While many of the above advantages claimed 
for delict are diminished because of the influence of 
contributory negligence, this factor, as argued in 
Chapter 1, is very rarely appropriate in medical 
negligence claims and did not present itself in the 
1,000 cases studied.
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The data in Chapter 2 shows very clearly that 
all age groups are represented in medical negligence 
claims. Entitlement to an award as compensation in a 
delict based claim is not restricted to a specified 
age limit, yet under a system like the present social 
security arrangement, initial entitlement is often 
restricted to certain ages; the majority of benefits 
are restricted to those in employment or of working 
age. Again under delictual liability the period of 
entitlement to benefits is unlimited in duration since 
the lump sum is assessed in respect of all future 
losses, whereas, for example industrial injury and 
sickness benfits are intended to be short-term, while 
long-term benefits for example, some invalidity 
pension, mobility allowance, terminate at retirement 
age when a retirement pension will normally become 
payable. The survey of patients' age groups showed 
that some of the claimants belonged to post-working 
age groups; the data for socio-economic groups was 
also incomplete partly because of the numbers in the 
■housewife* and 'student' category - both these groups 
would probably be inadequately dealt with by the 
present social security arrangements.
It is indisputable that a principle of 
liability which is general in its application, in
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addition to being flexible,7 can minimise 
anomalies. As demonstrated, a major failing of all 
the alternatives to fault liability is the amount of 
litigation that would arise from what can be described 
as demarcation problems.
However an appraisal of the merits of the 
delict system is unlikely to convince reformers. It 
is presented that the case for retaining delict as a 
mechanism to provide compensation for victims of 
medical injury can only be strengthened if there is a 
noticeable change . in judicial policy and serious
attempts are made to remedy some of the legal
difficulties identified.
Judicial Attitude
The judicial policy to restrict the ambit of a 
doctor's liability has been amply demonstrated; the
non-interventionist policies are manifest at all
stages of legal proceedings. We have seen that the
judiciary restrict the ambit of liability by:
overstating the notion of 'general and approved
practice'; placing an undue emphasis on the element
of 'risk' in treatment to defeat claims; unfounded
7. Regarding the flexibility of an action in delict, 
McBryde, W.W., argues that, 'The standard of care may 
alter not only with the facts of each case, but also 
with differing social conditions. The law can be 
applied because the categories are never closed." in 
'The Advantages of Fault', 1975 J .R. 32.
JI. Cmnd. 816 (1920) para. 28
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fears of, and invalid comparisons with the American 
malpractice experience; and the general judicial 
deference to the often uninformed views of doctors 
about their liability for negligence.
While the non-interventionist attitude of the 
courts can be seen as an attempt to discourage claims, 
the number of medical negligence claims intimated to 
the medical defence organisations are increasing. 
This does not mean that the courts' policies are 
unfelt - they probably explain the high percentage of 
claims which are abandoned because of the very 
restrictive parameters that the courts have defined.
If it can be argued that, with a fault based 
system, the courts are concerned not only with the 
needs of pursuers for compensation but also with 
justice for the defenders, then in the present 
context, the judicial attitudes suggest an imbalance
in favour of the medical profession.
The implementation of such policies, unless 
halted, will continue to give cause for concern since 
there is no question that some of the judicial 
statements are riddled with qualifications and
practical difficulties.
If the decision to compensate for losses 
arising out of treatment is dependent on value
judgments about the relative responsibilities of
doctors and society as a whole for certain adverse
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outcomes, then the role of the judiciary as the sole 
policy-maker in this context will continue to be 
challenged.
The procedures for obtaining compensation
The procedures for obtaining compensation for 
medical injury, outlined in both Chapters 1 and 2, 
demonstrate clearly that the initiation, validation 
and ultimate resolution of a claim place many 
pressures on the patient.
Access
Access to compensation through delict begins 
with the patient initiating a claim against the 
doctor(s)/dentist(s) and/or hospital board. As we 
have seen, bringing a claim is hindered by several 
factors; at the outset, the patient must evaluate the 
facts of his/her particular circumstances based on 
unfamiliar medical and legal considerations. From 
virtually all the claims analysed in this study, it 
was clear that the procedural complexities required 
the services of a solicitor or legal adviser. 
Clearly, at this stage, many of the problems, both 
real and assumed, would be removed if legal advice was
g
more readily available.
8 . The Report of the Committee on Hospital
Complaints Procedure, H.M.S.O. 1973, recommended an 
improvement in existing internal investigation 
panels. Regarding patients' solicitors, the Winn 
Committee considered that "too many firms are without 
adequate and appropriate staff to undertake personal 
injury cases which are not so simple to conduct as 
they imagine." op cit, para 208
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Access is further constrained by the rules
regulating the availability of legal aid; a patient's 
bargaining position is very weak if s/he is unable to 
risk going to litigation for fear of being ruined by 
having an award of expenses made against him/her.
The income limits for qualification for legal aid are
set too low, and as we have seen, many people with 
modest incomes are effectively barred from raising an 
action if there is even the slightest doubt about the 
issue. It has been suggested that any doubts are 
used as negotiating weapons by the medical defence 
societies, and particularly so when the patient is 
under financial pressure. From the correspondence 
and records of the medical defence organisation, with 
the exception of indefensible cases, the attitude was 
that unless the patient was in a strong financial 
position, the claim was to be repudiated.
It is therefore urged that legal aid should be
more readily available to patients by having the
financial limit for eligibility raised so as to
9
include the middle income group patients.
9. One wonders whether the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 
1986 might improve matters with the setting up of a 
Scottish Legal Aid Board; an independent 
non-departmenta1 public body which now assumes the 
responsibilities of the Law Society of Scotland in 
relation to the administration of civil legal aid and 
in relation to the assessment of financial 
eligibility. Sec 14 (1) (a) and (b) stipulate the
criteria for eligibility, which remain the same as the 
1967 Act. See Scottish Information Office - "A Guide 
to the Legal Aid (Scotland) Billn, in Scottish Law 
Gazette, June 1986, vol.54, no . 2
220
Limitation
The special problems attached to medical 
negligence claims were highlighted in Chapter 1 in 
relation to claims brought three years after the 
grievance. While the injustice caused to victims of 
disease precipitated a fundamental change in the law 
and the policy of the law of limitations, the finding, 
that almost a quarter of medical and dental negligence 
claims were rejected on the grounds that they were 
time-barred, is alarming. It can only be hoped that 
the courts will follow a more liberal interpretation 
of section 17 of the Prescription and Limitation
(Scotland) Act 1984.
Proof and Evidence
Compensation under delict is said to be full, 
yet the requirement that a causal relationship be 
established between the acts or ommissions of the 
medical practitioner(s) and the injury greatly reduces 
the number of compensable injuries. It has to be 
admitted that it is difficult to see any solution to 
the problems posed by the need to ascertain issues of 
causation in medical negligence claims. While such 
problems have been recognised in other factual
circumstances where a remedy is sought in delict, the 
difficulties are even more acute in medical injury 
claims - particularly because of the underlying 
clinical conditions that are almost always present.
We have seen that any evidence for proof of
causation must refer to the 'normal' or 'usual'
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practice tests; while there may be an 'acceptable' 
difference of opinion as to what constitutes 'normal'
practice, the success of a case will depend on how 
much scope there is for differences. The problem 
becomes even more sharply defined when there is an
assessment of damages. As suggested in chapter 1, 
the solution to the problems of causation may depend 
very much on the attitude of the judiciary - one which 
ultimately might reflect a more liberal judicial 
analysis.
In Chapter 1 is was argued that there was a
marked reluctance on the part of the courts to apply 
the res ipsa loquitur principle, moreso in medical 
negligence claims. The case-law analysis therefore
suggested that perhaps the application of the 
principle ought to be expanded, or further, that the 
doctrine be modified. In the preceding chapter
however, the analysis of the medical negligence claims 
that were settled out of court indicated a quite 
different attitude by the defence organisation towards 
the doctrine. The medical defence organisation, with 
legal advice, was always ready to concede that the 
injured patient could apply the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and therefore settled such claims relatively 
quickly. These findings indicate the extent to which 
reliance on judicial statistics can lead to a false 
understanding of the scope of the problem. From the
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facts derived from out-of-court-settlements, there 
would appear to be no need to expand the scope of the 
doctrine since the principle is applied more often 
than is realised, although again we cannot say how 
many claims were abandoned because of the restricted 
application of the doctrine.
Procedural reforms could be instituted whereby 
the disclosure of documents essential in order to 
establish whether facts exist which would justify 
raising a claim in negligence would be made easier.
It is submitted that this measure is unnecessary if 
the decision in the recent case Lask v. Gloucester 
Health Authority stands. The medical accident 
reports referred to in that case contain information 
which could remove many of the problems discussed. 
Such contemporaneous records of the grievances giving 
rise to claims would, in some cases, resolve the 
issues of causation; the identity of the 
practitioner(s) involved; and the problems of faulty 
memories undermined by the lapse of time and bias. 
Far more importantly, such records, if more freely 
available, would remove the enormous pressures and 
costs caused by delay.
Delay
Delay must be acknowledged as a serious 
problem in medical negligence claims causing great 
hardship to many patients, although it is conceded
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that many of the causes of delay are not unique to 
medical/personal injury actions, but in this area 
there is more likelihood of financial hardship than in 
most other fields. Most researchers have only been 
able to assess the delay in cases which reach the 
stage of litigation, rather than the majority which 
are settled out of court. The data in this study 
confirm the criticisms levelled at the efficiency of 
the delict system.
Blame for delay must be attributed to the 
medical defence organisations since they employ 
tactics which exploit every weakness of the patient's 
legal bargaining position. Contrary to public 
admissions of willingness to co-operate with patients, 
the medical defence organisations have failed to put 
such sentiments into practice. Overall, the effect 
of the negotiation strategies of the defence 
organisations was to strongly discourage patients from 
raising claims irrespective of whether or not they may 
be valid. From the records it was apparent that many 
solicitors were very inexperienced with handling 
medical negligence claims; there was no doubt that 
this was a contributory factor for delay in the 
resolution of claims. Those acting for the medical 
defence organisations had considerable expertise in 
this field and had rarely to seek the services of an 
advocate or barrister. It can be argued that delay
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could be reduced in some cases if solicitors 
understood better the difficulties that are 
encountered in medical injury claims rather than 
assume that a knowledge in general litigation is 
sufficient.
While delictual liability may be said to be 
out-dated, it is likely to remain as the appropriate 
compensatory system until, any new scheme which 
purports to supplant it, clearly considers the 
implications for distinguishing between risks of 
medical treatment and risks of life; the definition 
and measurement of the amount and severity of medical 
injury; the types and extent of loss from medical 
injury that should be compensated; reaching a balance 
between preserving all existing legal rights of the 
parties involved in medical negligence claims; the 
relationship, if any, with existing services available 
for minimising hardship; the appropriate measures for 
injury prevention in medical treatment; and finally, 
accountability of medical and dental practitioners for 
medical/dental injury.
Most commentators, and this includes medical 
as well as legal practitioners, have focussed their 
attention on the difficulties found in the rules of 
law and procedure, yet insufficient attention has been 
paid to, what can be said to be the 'root cause' of 
medical negligence - namely the state of medical 
practice.
225
The Reduction of the Incidence of Medical Injury
It is submitted that the factual circumstances 
and trends, hitherto unknown, can provide sufficient 
data for the medical and dental profession to devise 
guidelines which might reduce the incidence of medical 
and dental injuries. This concluding section
therefore considers the basis for any recomendations 
that might be made by the medical profession to 
achieve such results.
While there may be arguments about the 
effectiveness of delictual liability in cases of 
medical negligence - or any other system of 
compensation - as a device to provide incentives for 
injury avoidance, it is clear that such discussions 
have been directed at the practice of medicine and 
dentistry in general. Circumstances which become the 
subject of medical negligence claims have never been 
identified nor presented to members of the medical and 
dental professions in a useful manner which could 
allow an appraisal of the problem. This failure can 
be identified at two levels. Firstly, the medical 
defence organisations have noticeably failed to inform 
its members, either directly or indirectly through the 
British Medical Association, in a purposeful fashion 
as to the facts of medical negligence. Secondly, the 
medical schools in the United Kingdom - both under­
and post-graduate have, with a few exceptions, failed
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to appreciate the importance of the subject and this 
neglect is reflected in the various University 
curricula.
From the data in this study it is clear that
facts can be used in a informative manner by the
defence organisations; we have identified status
groups and specialties which have a propensity to
become involved in medical negligence claims. The
status group findings suggest that all status groups
become the subject of litigation and, in particular,
consultants fail to-understand the scope of their duty
of care; the judicial records and the defence
organisation records, in particular, consistently
demonstrate that consultants inappropriately and
negligently delegate their clinical responsibilities
to junior members of staff. This view has been
echoed on several occasions and there has been a clear
call for effective guidelines by those medical experts
10
often asked to assist m  claims for negligence.
However, a recent article in the Lancet11 
suggested that the accountability of doctors to other 
doctors was considered to be essential for the 
maintenance of high standards of patient care and was
10. See Simanowitz, A., "Discussion: Actions for
Victims of Medical Accidents", 1986 Medico-L.J. 2;
vol54 p.104
11. Dawson, A., "The Accountability of Doctor to 
Doctor11, The Lancet, August 10, 1985 p. 323.
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based on moral precepts as opposed to legal ones. 
The author stated that,
"...it is up to the profession as a whole to 
insist that the highest standards of patient 
care are practised. ... It is clear that moral 
pressure has to be paramount and will be more 
effective in everyday practice than statutory 
orders . .. [The] accountability of junior 
staff is obvious; efficient and compassionate 
care of the patient and the relatives, correct 
note-taking ... By insisting on this the 
consultant is seeking good standards of care 
for the patient and of training of future 
senior staff, but the obverse is important. 
The consultant in turn has a moral obligation 
to offer himself as an acceptable model to his 
juniors. Unfortunately this is becoming more 
difficult with increasing specialisation of 
senior staff, so that junior staff rotate 
through each firm with increasing speed to 
ensure that they are exposed to variety of 
clinical experience."
While there may be scope for a moral basis, it is 
submitted that any guidelines that might be introduced 
in this respect must be underpinned on the notion that 
responsibility lies with the consultant under whom 
the patient is admitted; if s/he delegates to somebody
who is not competent, then s/he is legally responsible 
for what that other person does. S/he must make 
certain, rather than assume that the .person delegated 
to is able to conduct the procedure properly. While 
this appears to be a trite recommendation, it is clear 
from the study that such an understanding is absent. 
Similar conclusions have been made by Symonds12 and 
MacNaughton13.
It is argued that the onus to remedy this 
defect is on the medical profession and the employing 
health board. Effective measures must made by the 
National Health Service whereby the relationships and 
responsibilities among medical staff are clearly 
defined. At a minimum, the guidelines can be 
incorporated within the conditions and terms of 
service between hospital medical staff and the 
employing hospital board, although there is no reason 
why they should not be applied nationally.
Closely linked with the above problem, as 
suggested in Chapter 2, is that there is scope in the 
hypothesis that the manner in which health care is 
provided is influenced by the training and experience 
of doctors and this may partly explain the increasing 
trend for patients to raise actions for
12. Symonds, E.M., "Medico Legal Aspects of 
Therapeutic Abortion", 1985, p.123, 78.
13. MacNaughton, M.C., 'Discussion' p.251 in 
Litigation and Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG, 198 5, 
London
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negligence. Recommendations regarding the quality
and method of teaching of medical ethics and
professional conduct, must come from the medical
profession and the General Medical Council.14
Before any recommendations can be made by the
appropriate body regarding the quality of teaching and
training of practitioners, it is imperative that there
is a proper understanding of the nature and scope of
grievances that arise in negligence claims. Only
then will modifications to training methods be
effective. For example in the diagnostic-related
category, different skills will need to be developed
as compared with those which are required for
grievances in the management-related category, for
15
example adequate communication. This has always
been assumed to be the case by teachers of medicine 
but the facts suggest otherwise.
The Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists have taken the lead in this respect due 
to the disproportionately high number of medical
negligence claims raised against this specialty. At 
the Proceedings of the Fourteenth Study Group , it
14. The broader role of the G.M.C. will be considered 
in detail below.
15. Research Paper Number 5. 'Patients' attitude to 
the Hospital Service, Royal Commission on the National 
Health Service, H.M.S.O. 1978
16. M.C., 'Discussion' p.251 in Litigation and 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, RCOG, 1985, London
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was recommended that, since there was a wide spectrum 
of problems in the management and decision relating to 
therepeutic abortion, certain guidelines could reduce 
the frequency of legal action and complications. 
These were, that,
"Junior staff are adequately trained to 
perform procedures before they are left 
without supervision; Adequate pre-operative 
counselling; Adequate explanations of
complications to the patient;" 
and specifically,
"a follow-up post-operative appointment for 
all cases - either by GP or by the clinic and 
a pelvic examination at that visit; while it 
is impractical to send material for histology 
on all occasions, it is advisable to send 
products for histology where there is any 
doubt about diagnosis and particularly where 
no fetal parts are seen in early pregnancy." 
Consider the response of anaesthetists, working in 
obstetrical and gynaecological cases, after three 
circumstances - gastric regurgitation; failed 
tubation; and hypotension - were identified as giving 
rise to the bulk of negligence claims in this 
particular area.
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Regarding gastric regurgitation of patients during 
1 7anaesthesia,
"Most experienced anaesthetists do not have a 
fear of it happening to them until it is too 
late. This slightly careless attitude may be 
passed on to those in training or with less 
experience, or one is too casual on occasions 
and disasters ensue. If a defence against a 
claim is to have any chance of success the 
following precautions should have been taken, 
either as unit routine or by the anaesthetist:-
1. Oral intake should be severely limited 
during labour, and intra-venous therapy 
substituted if required.
2. A regime designed to lower the gastric 
acidity and the total volume of secretion 
should be instituted as soon as practicable 
... there are many methods available.
3. Suitable suction equipment should be 
available and turned on ready for instant use.
4. The patient should be pre-oxygenated before 
induction of anaethesia. Inflation with"
17. Taylor, T.H., "Mishaps in General Anaesthesia", 
Litigation in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, pp.65-72, 
1985, RCOG, London
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"oxygen by a mask after paralysis is 
contra-indicated, unless it is unavoidable 
because of impending anoxia due to failed 
tubation.
5. Crico-thyroid pressure should always be 
used and sustained until the tube is safely in 
place with the cuff securely inflated. This 
requires a competent and committed assistant.
6 . If intubation fails, as it will even in the 
best hands in some patients, crico-thyroid 
pressure must be maintained until the patient 
is in a safe posture.
7. Additional measures that can be employed
include posture, omitting suxamethonium and 
increasing the tone of the lower oesophageal 
sphincter."
As regards failed intubation the anaesthetists argue 
that it is not possible to contemplate a defence in
any case where a patient had suffered damage from 
anoxia during induction of anaesthesia, if the cause 
is failed intubation. They then go on to make four
recommendations in their guidelines to avoid a claim 
arising from this procedure. Similarly, guidelines 
were recommended for hypotension.
Although this response to remedy defects was
made in the obstetrics and gynaecology and anaesthesia 
specialties, the data in this study indentifed other
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specialties of medicine and surgery which were 
designated as 'high' risk according to their 
propensity to become the subject of litigation. 
Responses, similar to those above could be applied to 
these specialties. It is clear that once members of 
the medical profession, within different specialties 
are given the opportunity to recognise the nature of 
grievances arising out of their area of expertise, it 
is possible for them, in most cases, to reduce the 
incidence of medical negligence claims so arising by 
re-examining the clinical or related procedures in 
operation.
There is further reason why there ought to be 
more information made available by all the medical 
defence organisations on claims. This is to be found 
in the few claims which the medical defence 
organisation rejected almost immediately; such claims 
were rejected because the circumstances were totally 
unrelated to the practitioner's conduct. They in 
fact reflected deficiencies in the availability of 
provisions and resources within the hospital. 
Clearly, in such circumstances the remedy must lie 
with the health board or more accurately, the 
Secretary of State. This matter was raised in 
proceedings18 where four patients sought a declarator
18. unreported. Court of Appeal, March 18, 1980
from the High Court that the Secretary of State was
under a duty, according to the provisions laid out in
the National Health Service Act 1977 sections 1 and 3,
to provide additional resources without which the
orthopaedic surgeon who had recommended operations and
had placed them on his waiting list, would be unable
to admit them without a delay of years. Mr. Justice
Wein declined to make the declarations sought by the
patients who then took the matter to the Court of 
19Appeal where the leading judgment was given by 
Lord Denning who reviewed the statutory, political and 
economic arguments. The appeal was dismissed.
This study has examined medical negligence 
claims which have been brought to the attention of the 
Scottish medical defence organisation. In order that 
effective measures can be taken nationally to avoid or 
reduce the incidence of medical injuries, a similar 
study would need to be conducted in England and 
Wales. The facts underlying medical negligence 
claims exist; the English medical defence societies 
have, for too long, remained silent on this issue, 
though doubtless their fears lie with the potential 
abuse that may be made by solicitors and the 
distortions perpetuated by the media when such facts 
come to the attention of the public.
19 unreported. Court of Appeal, March 18, 1980, see 
'Lancet Reprints', "Enforcing a duty to care for 
patients in the NHS", in Medico-L.J . p.44, 1984
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It was stated earlier that the incidence of 
medical or dental injury could be reduced if t^hej both 
under- and post-graduate teaching of medicine courses 
were to take cognizance of the scope of the problem.
The General Medical Council (GMC)2 0 has many 
responsibilities relating to the regulation and 
education of the medical profession2 1 . It includes 
34 appointed members appointed by Universities with 
medical schools and the Royal Colleges and their 
faculties.
Under the T983 Medical Act, which consolidates
all previous medical acts, the GMC Education Committee
is responsible for determining the standards of
22
knowledge and skill required for primary medical 
qualifications and now, for the first time, for 
co-ordinating all stages of medical education, 
including post-graduate medicine. To that end it has 
the power to issue recommendations which, while they 
do not have the force of law, are nevertheless
20. The GMC received its statutory authority through 
the Privy Council; see Medical Act 1983
21. Carried out by its Education Committee.
22. It is regrettable that under the 1983 Medical Act, 
the GMC are no longer required to produce a 'safe' 
doctor at the time of graduation. Unlike prevous 
Medical Acts, it is not necessary for a doctor to be 
skilled and competent in the practice of medicine, 
surgery and midwifery. The interpretation suggests 
that the GMC are required to produce a doctor with a 
sufficient foundation of knowledge, clinical skills 
and proper attitudes to be able to benefit from 
subsequent post-graduate training in any specialty.
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mandatory upon the under-graduate medical schools.23
While there may be existing pressures on the medical
curriculum at certain medical schools, it is strongly
recommended that room must be found for teaching
ethical standards and legal responsibilities of the
medical profession.24 The medical school at the
University of Glasgow has without doubt taken the lead
in this direction and has incorporated this type of
teaching at several levels in the third and fourth
25years of clinical training. Personal experience
in teaching the -legal responsibilities to medical 
students has demonstrated, on every occasion, the need 
to develop this aspect of the medical curriculum and 
certainly at a later stage in the clinical experience 
of recently qualified practitioners. Indeed, various
23. If it were to prove that the quality of education 
provided by a particular medical school in the U.K. 
was not regarded by the Education Committee as being 
sufficient, and if its recommendations were being 
ignored by the medical school, the Committee have the 
power to recommend to the Privy Council that the 
degree awarded by through the qualifying examination 
of that school should no longer be registrable under 
the Medical Act.
24. Professor Knight, at the recent 2nd Indo-Pacific
Conference on Law, Medicine and Science, August 1986, 
expressed concern at the present postion in the U.K. 
where he stated that the teaching time allocated to 
this subject ranged from one to forty hours in
different medical schools.
25. The GMC does not require, as is required in other
EEC countries, that every school should have an
identical curriculum. It is left to the
Universities and their individual medical schools to 
determine the nature and content of the course which 
they provide.
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medical post-graduate studies have now incorporated a 
'legal' component in their courses and several major 
teaching hospitals in Scotland hold regular seminars 
on this topic. The demand from medical practitioners 
is quite clear!
It is submitted that the most effective method
of teaching the medico-legal responsibilities attached
to medical practice must be linked with 'real1
problems faced by doctors. It is suggested therefore
that if the recommendation of the type suggested above
is accepted by the GMC and the medical schools, the
legal hazards of medical practice should be taught on
the basis of 'clinico-legal teaching cases'. The
teaching cases envisaged ought to represent the
various roles, tasks and events which a practitioner
would regularly encounter in the practice of
medicine. Such case-studies would be drafted from
clinical occurrences and situations that have
2 6culminated in a negligence claim; the clinical
content and tenor of each case-study would be 
preserved to enhance the identification with the 
problems and concerns that arise for both the patient
26. The sources for such case studies would come from 
the medical defence societies. The content would 
include the medico-legal problems attached to for 
example consent; failed diagnosis; supervision of
medical staff; as well as the specific problems
attached to various specialties. The case studies 
should also have a discussion section designed to 
stimulate thought, dialogue, and debate using the
information from the particular case study.
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and doctor. The case studies should describe the 
type of professional conduct expected of practitioners 
under varying clinical circumstances. In particular, 
they must emphasise the general scope of knowledge and 
awareness expected of a practitioner and the degree of 
clinical skill that s/he is expected to exercise. 
Moreover, the cases should clearly illustrate the 
legally acceptable standards required of 
practitioners. The discussion section following each 
case-study should be based on the comments and 
opinions expressed, by experts requested to assess the 
clinical management of cases.
The method suggested is flexible enough to be 
taught outwith a 'fixed' curriculum course and could 
be presented during clinical meetings which take place 
in teaching hospitals, when practitioners of all 
ranges of clinical experience are present.
Therefore the incidence of medical injury 
could be reduced or even avoided where practitioners 
are made aware of the facts by the medical defence 
organisations and through teaching in the medical 
curriculum. As we have seen, the increase in 
litigation in some specialties has led to measures 
being taken to reduce the number of claims without 
impairing the quality of medicine provided.
Accountability
A major deficiency with the present system of
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private medical indemnity is that the medical defence
organisations lack any disciplinary powers'^ over
medical or dental practitioners against whom a claim,
or a number of claims, are raised. The records
showed that there were several practitioners in this
category with a 'track record' of claims - often
2 8involving similar medical and surgical procedures.
While the General Medical Council's Education
Committee has been criticised for its failure to make
recommendations to medical schools regarding the
teaching of professional standards of practice, there
has been considerable development in the scope of the
powers of its Professional Conduct Committee.
Until only three years ago, the General
Medical Council ignored matters of professional
negligence which might normally give rise to
29litigation. Their publication, 'Professional
Conduct and Discipline', "Fitness to Practice" stated 
that,
"The Council is not concerned with errors in"
27. Apart from refusal to provide cover - which tend 
only to be used in circumstances where there was 
dispute as to whether the appropriate fees had been 
paid.
28. At present the defence organisations only require 
a written statement from the practitioner regarding 
the circumstances surrounding the patient's claim 
the practitioner is rarely informed as to the outcome 
of a claim.
29. General Medical Council, "Professional Conduct and 
Discipline: Fitness to Practise", August 1983, London
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'diagnosis or treatment or with matters which 
give rise to action in civil courts for 
negligence."
However, there has been a progressive modification of 
their views, where the 1985 Regulations30 now state.
[The] Council may institute disciplinary 
proceedings when a doctor appears seriouslv to 
have disregarded or neglected his professional 
duties . . . Cases which have been investigated 
by a Medical Service Committee or other 
complaints procedure under the National Health 
Service machinery [can be] reported to the 
Council, but cases which have arisen in other 
ways may also be considered."
The Medical Council have for the first time stated 
what the public are entitled to expect from a 
registered practitioner:
(a) conscientious assessment of the history, 
symptoms and signs of a patient's condition;
(b) sufficiently thorough professional 
attention, examination and, where necessary, 
diagnostic investigations;
(c) competent and considerate professional 
management;
30. General Medical Council, "Professional Conduct and 
Discipline: Fitness to Practise", April 1985, (i) (a)
p.10 London
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(d) appropriate and prompt action upon 
evidence suggesting the existence of a 
condition requiring urgent medical
intervention; and;
(e) readiness, where the circumstances so 
warrant, to consult appropriate professional 
colleagues.
As regards errors in diagnosis or treatment, the 
Council can now examine those cases where the doctor's 
conduct has involved such disregard of professional 
responsibility to patients or such neglect of 
professional duties as to raise a question of serious 
professional misconduct.
It is clear therefore that the General Medical 
Council has moved towards recognising that there are 
circumstances when negligence may also raise a 
question of serious professional misconduct. This is 
a significant development when the powers of the 
Professional Conduct Committee are considered at the 
conclusion of an inquiry. Indeed the Committee has 
taken the view that where a particular doctor has 
shown that s/he was lacking in the standards of 
knowledge, skill and experience required of 
practitioners, then it would insist on attaching 
conditions to that doctor's registration. In such 
cases, it would mean that the practitioner would have 
to undergo a specific period of post-graduate training
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and experience in order to correct what the Committee
saw as being deficiencies in the doctor's clinical
skills.
It is possible that there might be misgivings 
about including negligence within the concept of 
professional misconduct since traditionally one could 
recognise professional misconduct because it was moral 
turpitude and therefore a moral issue. If the 
concept is enlarged to include the notion of 
negligence it would become a more difficult subjective 
issue. The criticism therefore is that the General 
Medical Council might blur the distinction between 
moral turpitude and negligence in a professional 
respect. In response to this criticism, the
President of the General Medical Council, Sir John 
Walton31 stated that,
"Where errors of judgment and mistake in 
diagnosis end and negligence begins, is a 
matter of professonal judgment. ... we are
never concerned with a simple error of
judgment or a simple mistake in diagnosis; 
but there are circumstances where the doctor's 
neglect of his professional responsibility has 
been clearly such as to indicate ... that 
serious professional misconduct is at least a 
possibility."
31. General Medical Council, "Professional Conduct and 
Discipline: Fitness to Practise", April 1985.
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He went further and stated that,
"For the first time, we are now attaching 
conditions to the registration of doctors 
requiring them to undertake certain 
rehabilitative training, because there have 
been clear cases in which doctors have 
apparently given care and attention to 
patients but have appeared incompetent to an 
extent which was unacceptable both to the 
profession and the public."
This development has been long overdue; its 
effectiveness will no doubt depend on the General 
Medical Council's interpretation of the words, 
"seriously to have disregarded or neglected 
professional duties".
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Summary of Conclusions
Chapter 1.
The analysis of the law and the rules of 
procedure indicate four major areas of concern, 
.namely: criticism of the fault principle; the
inherent difficulties of proof; the delay in resolving 
disputes; and the costs of the process.
The legal principles which provide for damages 
to be awarded to victims of medical injury are not 
designed to provide compensation for all those who 
suffer from a medical injury, that is, compensation is 
not automatically payable in every case. Generally, 
an award of damages will only be made where the 
patient can prove that the injury was in some way 
caused by the negligent conduct of the doctor or 
hospital board. Therefore compensation is not paid 
according to the needs of the patient, but rather, 
according to whether or not s/he is able to attribute 
blame to the doctor or hospital board.
A remedy in delict or tort is available only 
where the patient can fulfil conditions which make 
reference mainly to the circumstances in which the 
medical mishap occurred and not to the position in 
which s/he presently finds him/herself. Tha law 
attaches importance to the consequences of the 
patient's injury only when assessing damages after the 
doctor or hospital board has been found legally 
culpable for causing the injury. The difficulties of
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proof however, are cumbersome, time-consuming,
expensive and sometimes inaccurate. Causation may be 
extremely difficult to prove in medical negligence for 
a variety of reasons: the injuries may be due to a
natural progression of the disease; personal 
idiosyncrasy; unforseen side-effects of treatment as 
opposed to negligent treatment. Problems arise when
it becomes necessary to determine the extent to which
the patient's disabilities resulted from the 
particular act or ommission. In other personal
injury cases, this presents few problems, since 
ideally all that would be required would be a clearly 
diagnosed injury superimposed on a condition of normal 
health. For medical negligence claims this cannot
apply because any injury or disease is likely to be 
superimposed upon a condition which is peculiar to the 
patient. The evidence given in medical injury cases 
is invariably contradictory and often involves a 
degree of guesswork which leads to unpredictable 
awards of damages being made by the courts.
The problem of delay is serious in medical
negligence cases but it is questionable whether the 
situation is very different from other personal injury 
cases. One reason for the delay in medical
negligence cases arises from the need to wait for the 
nature and extent of the injuries to become apparent.
The procedure for settling medical negligence 
cases, which operates on a case by case basis, to
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ascertain fault, may be a crucial factor in explaining 
the high cost of litigation. The cases show that 
this involves, firstly an enquiry into the 
circumstances to discover who was at fault, and 
secondly, an assessment of the compensation to be 
paid, which, in the case of future loss of earnings, 
involves the evaluation of medical prognosis.
The arguments indicate that medical negligence 
is perceived differently by various groups depending 
on the way their financial, social, political and 
professional interests are affected. These
differences of perception have led to accusations and 
fears that have contributed very little to the 
resolution of the problems peculiar to medical 
negligence. Doctors blame lawyers for encouraging 
patients to press claims; patients are not often 
credited by doctors as capable of understanding the 
complexity and risks of many procedures which may give 
rise to claims. Patients are blamed for the increase 
in medical negligence claims on the basis of their 
supposedly increased willingness to sue their doctors.
The law recognises that the possibility of 
change and progress in medicine must be preserved, and 
this explains why it is reluctant to intervene by 
adopting policy considerations. The analysis of the 
case-law suggests that patients face many legal and 
procedural hurdles due to the very strict parameters 
defined by the courts, before a claim is successful.
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It is clear that the judiciary entertain a traditional 
deference to the views of the medical profession about 
their liability for negligence.
Chapter 2 .
The medical negligence survey showed that 
there has been an increase in the number of claims 
raised against medical and dental practitioners over 
the years. The trend is clearly upwards and does not 
suggest anything other than that more increases will 
be raised within the next few years.
The survey also showed that only a small 
minority of all medically injured patients who 
initiated claims obtained compensation for the losses 
they suffered. For all types of grievances taken 
together, the figure was 24 per cent of claims, but 
there were important differences in the success rates 
among and within different categories of grievances.
Elderly victims and young victims appeared to 
raise proportionately fewer claims for damages. 
Women appeared to claim more often than men, although 
it is difficult to suggest reasons other than that 
obstetrical and gynaecological claims were 
disproportionately higher than other hospital/surgical 
procedures.
Patients in the lowest and highest socio­
economic groups were proportionately more likely to 
raise claims in medical negligence than victims in 
other groups. This suggests the importance of being
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financially sound before initiating claims - either 
from personal wealth or from provisions made by legal 
aid. This was supported by the fact that the 
remaining groups claimed proportionately less often 
that would have been expected. It is possible to 
argue that for victims who have accidents on the road 
or at work there are normally certain procedures for 
reporting the accident which have to be followed and 
during which advice about claiming may be
spontaneously offered. This is not available for
housewives, the elderly and children - they are more
isolated than those at work from networks of
information and advice. Trade Union activity in
advising to claim for damages may provide an important 
impetus for patients to initiate a medical negligence 
claim.
The propensity for hospital medical
practitioners to be involved in medical negligence
claims reflected their relative positions within the 
hospital hierarchy and the responsibilities
attached. The findings suggest that deficiencies may 
exist in the manner in which medical responsibility is 
delegated and conducted.
Hospital specialties, from which negligence
claims emanated, were identified in terms of
propensity to become involved in medical negligence
claims. It appeared that they could be ranked in 
order of ' risk.'
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The actual system for obtaining compensation 
from the medical defence organsation placed pressures 
on many patients. The patient faced many risks: the
risk that the evidence might not prove fault on the
part of the practi t ioner (s ) or that the medical
reports on his/her prognosis might be wrong; the 
uncertainties about whether s/he could bear the 
further delay and expense of waiting for a court 
hearing, and about how much a judge would award for 
the injuries. The cumulative effect of all these 
uncertainties was' that many patients agreed to the 
sums offered in out-of-court-settleraents.
In the survey, it was clear that the majority
of claims took a considerable period from the time of
the incidence to the actual settlement. In some 
cases it was possible that solicitors advised delay in 
order to wait until medical treatment was complete or 
until the medical condition of the patient had 
stabilised. The two main problems for solicitors 
were to establish liability and to negotiate the 
amount of damages.
The financial losses from medically related 
adverse outcomes are sometimes recouped through claims 
being raised against medical defence organisations and 
Health Authorities, but they are more often absorbed 
by the injured patient and by the social welfare 
provisions which they use.
The data show how rarely medical negligence
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claims reach a court hearing before a judge. The 
complex rules of law and procedure are designed to 
produce solutions in a rare situation, because for 
medical negligence claims, out-of-court settlements 
are the norm. While rules may be ideal for achieving 
justice in individualised decisions by judges, they 
may not be ideal for achieving justice in direct 
negotiations between the patient and the medical 
defence organisations, although it must be stressed 
that all negotiations which take place are conducted 
according to what findings the courts might hold 
applicable in each case.
Chapter 3
Several alternatives to the present delictual 
system were examined. They reflected a wide range; 
from modifications of the delict-based mechanisms for 
compensation to the development of a national social 
insurance scheme. The alternatives were assessed 
according to six criteria: access; scope; procedure;
costs; injury avoidance; and integration.
Pretrial screening panels could only operate 
as an additional component of litigation rather than 
as a substitute compensation system. The advantages 
are: a) they might encourage eary settlement of
meritorious claims and discourage frivolous 
litigation; b) decisions by screening panels do not 
foreclose the option of proceeding to litigation; and 
c) the informal discovery, procedural, and evidentiary
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rules facilitate speedier decision-making.
The main disadvantages of screening panels 
are: a) the lack of finality of decisions adds another 
layer to the resolution of injury claims; and b) 
panels consisting solely of medical practitioners 
might be biased in favour of doctors or hospitals.
Arbitration is seen as a dispute-settling 
process that can be a substitute for litigation. The 
advantages are: a) arbitration agreements facilitate
access to review of medical negligence claims by a 
third party; b) the process is a complete substitute 
for litigation and could help to alleviate the burden 
of personal injury claims in court; c) the proceedings 
might be less complex thatn litigation proceedings.
The disadvantages are that the private nature of the 
process does little to encourage injury avoidance and 
the voluntary nature of arbitration is seriously 
undermined where hospitals or doctors require an 
arbitration agreement to be executed as a condition of 
receiving medical treatment.
Both pretrial screening panels and arbitration 
require the patient to prove fault using the criteria 
found in delict and allows all the deficiences 
associated with out-of-court-settlements to operate. 
Both fail under the criterion for integration, since 
the relaxed procedures would create more litigation 
with respect to any decisions that arise from their 
findings. Attempt to view the problem as one which
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could only be solved by replacing or adapting the 
existing legal structures with substitutes is unlikely 
to improve the situation for patients or doctors. 
Attempts to circumvent existing judicial procedures 
may only create more pleasant superficial structures 
without any real benefits for the litigants.
Adverse Medical Outcome Insurance has three
essential characteristics; a list of events designated 
in advance of occurrence for which compensation is 
automatically payable; an insurance system with 
variable premiums according to claims experience; and 
reliance on delict fault-based system for claims 
falling outside the list.
The advantages are: a) access to compensation
for covered events is simple; b) certainty of 
compensation for the injured patient within a
specified range of elected events; c) delays and cost 
inherent in traditional litigation would be eliminated 
for covered events. The disadvantages are: a)
distinction between avoidable and unavoidable adverse 
outcomes of medical treatment is very difficult to 
make; b) there is no judical control over acceptable 
professional standards; c) individual review of losses 
and determination of awards is eliminated; d)
availability and quality of medicine might be impaired.
Elective no-fault gives the medical profession 
some control by specifying the injuries for which they 
would be financially accountable, and the ability to
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limit liability. The advantages are similar to the 
previous proposal; disadvantages include the problems 
raised by borderline cases; no third party review of 
awards; and the system is not linked in any way with 
professional disciplinary procedures.
The introduction of a No-Fault Insurance was 
considered and in particular, the New Zealand system 
was explored. The advantage would appear to be that 
there would be more progress towards efficiency in 
compensation for medically injured patients; victims 
would be compensated by a central fund without the 
need to resort to courts. However inequities of a 
lesser degree persist with the New Zealand system 
because the scheme raises the problems of arbitrary 
distinctions being made between 'accident' and 
'disease'. The system still requires proof of 
causation and the assessment of 'risk', both of which 
are major hurdles in medical personal injury claims. 
Problems still remain with defining terms such as 
'misadventure'.
All the schemes have certain advantages over 
the present delict system for compensation, however 
they all fail to deal effectively with the problems 
associated with lump sum payments, and difficulties of 
prognosis. If victims of medical injury ought to be 
compensated on the basis of need then the focus of 
public policy and research should not be confined to 
instances of medical negligence since it is only a 
subset of all personal injuries.
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The retention of delict is favoured as the 
mechanism to provide compensation for victims of 
medical injury providing changes are made in judicial
policy and serious attempts are made to remedy the 
legal and procedural difficulties.
The onus to reduce the incidence of medical
injury is firmly placed on the medical profession. 
Effective measures must be adopted by the National 
Health Service whereby the relationships and
responsibilities among medical staff are clearly
defined. Recommendations regarding the quality and 
method of teaching of medical ethics and professional 
conduct, must come from the General Medical Council.
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